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For more than 300 years, the 
Delaware River has served as a key 
commercial highway for the region. 
While Greater Philadelphia’s mari-
time roots remain, rapid globalization 
and technological advances are driv-
ing an industry-wide transformation 
that has impacted the role that Dela-
ware River ports play in the larger 
economy.  
Understanding the impact of ever
-evolving trends in maritime com-
merce on Greater Philadelphia is 
essential to make appropriate policy 
and investment decisions. To this 
end, the Philadelphia Industrial Devel-
opment Corporation (PIDC) spon-
sored a study of maritime commerce in 
Greater Philadelphia, commissioning 
the Economy League of Greater Phila-
delphia to lead a project team that con-
sisted of a partnership with the Eco-
nomic Development Research Group 
(EDR) and assistance from Select 
Greater Philadelphia and the Delaware 
Valley Regional Planning Commission.  
The study considered port activity 
on both sides of the Delaware River, 
from Trenton, NJ and Bucks County, 
PA to the ocean. Its analysis included 
a review of dynamic factors impact-
ing maritime commerce in Greater 
Philadelphia. Its key findings include: 
⇒ Economic Impact. The port 
industry’s regional job base is 
relatively small but generates 
higher than average labor in-
come and economic output per 
job. 
⇒ Delaware River Port Descrip-
tions. The region’s inability to 
overcome natural and market-
based limitations have resulted in 
a loss of global market share in 
maritime commerce. 
⇒ Global Trends. Projections in-
dicate continued containerization 
and rationalization of trade, es-
pecially from high-growth Asian 
markets seeking to improve the 
cost-effectiveness of service 
from origin to final destination. 
⇒ Implications for Delaware 
River Ports. The region has ca-
pacity to accommodate growth, 
but its ports must collaborate to 
develop a comprehensive plan 
that addresses existing con-
straints and rationally allocates 
cargo based on competitive ad-
vantages. 
⇒ Recommended Strategies for 
Port Growth. The potential for 
Delaware River port growth will 
depend on the region’s ability to 
leverage existing competitive 
strengths, strategically invest in 
infrastructure enhancements, 
and collaborate to ensure the 
efficient deployment of re-
sources.  
⇒ Scenarios for Port Growth. 
Given dynamic industry trends, 
Delaware River ports are at a 
critical juncture. Future growth 
will depend on the extent to 
which the ports collaborate to 
implement recommended strate-
gies. 
 
Economic Impact 
Delaware River port activity gen-
erates jobs, labor income, economic 
output, and tax revenues. Delaware 
River ports employ 4,056 workers 
who earn $326 million and generate 
$1.3 billion in economic output. 
Each direct port-related worker sup-
ports an additional two jobs from 
industry demand and worker re-
spending. Based on these impacts, 
port activity in Greater Philadelphia 
supports 12,121 jobs and $772 mil-
lion in labor income, generating $2.4 
billion in economic output.  
The port industry’s regional job 
base is relatively small, but those jobs 
generate higher than average income 
and output per job. Regional direct 
jobs represent an average annual in-
come (including fringe benefits) of 
$80,000, more than double the re-
gional per capita income.  
Port activity in the City of Phila-
delphia is responsible for approxi-
mately 45 percent of regional im-
pacts. City ports employ 1,945 work-
ers who earn $142 million and gener-
ate $569 million in economic output. 
Direct city port jobs support an addi-
tional 3,565 indirect and induced 
jobs. In sum, port activity in the City 
of Philadelphia supports 5,510 jobs 
and $338 million in labor income,  
generating $1.0 billion in economic 
output. 
Regional port activity annually 
adds $81 million in tax revenues to 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Dela-
ware, as well as $12 million to City of 
Philadelphia coffers.1 
 
Delaware River Port               
Descriptions 
The Delaware River port indus-
try’s contribution to the Greater 
Philadelphia economy is a result of 
activity at the region’s more than 40 
port facilities and their associated 
businesses. The region’s public port 
facilities are owned by three state-run 
entities: the Philadelphia Regional 
 Greater Philadelphia City of Philadelphia 
Totals Direct Total Direct Total 
Employment  4,056 12,121  1,945 5,110 
Labor Income $326M $772M $142M $338M 
Economic Output (e.g., sales) $1.3B $2.4B $569M $1.0B 
Total Tax Revenues  $81M  $33M 
Note: Economic impact calculations using IMPLAN model. 
Economic Impacts Related to Delaware River Port Activity, 2005 
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inability to strategically position itself 
to leverage a flourishing maritime 
industry. As a result, while Delaware 
River ports have managed to capture 
a share of global growth, their overall 
market share has declined. 
Another reason for the region’s 
decline in market share is the nature 
of cargo handled by its ports. Ap-
proximately 65 percent of the re-
gion’s cargo tonnage is in petroleum, 
a stable industry but one that has not 
experienced market growth. The re-
gion also specializes in “niche” car-
goes such as steel, wood products, 
and perishable items such as fresh 
Port Authority (Pennsylvania); the 
South Jersey Port Corporation (New 
Jersey); and the Diamond State Port 
Corporation (Delaware). Dozens 
more facilities are owned and oper-
ated by private entities. 
The region has historically strug-
gled to keep pace with the ever-
evolving maritime industry. This real-
ity is due in part to inherent physical 
limitations of its port complex, lo-
cated 60-100 miles up the naturally 
shallow Delaware River, increasing 
shipping costs and constraining mar-
ket competitiveness. But the region’s 
struggles are also owed in part to the 
fruit, nuts, cocoa beans, and meat 
products. These cargoes require spe-
cialized facilities that are difficult to 
replicate; Greater Philadelphia’s ag-
glomeration of specialized facilities is 
a significant competitive advantage 
for capturing a large market share of 
these commodities.  
Where Delaware River ports are 
most lacking is in container facilities, 
which has accounted for the vast 
majority of global growth in mari-
time commerce over the past quarter
-century. Competitor ports, such as 
the Port of New York/New Jersey, 
Baltimore, and Virginia, have supe-
rior location and market advantages 
and have made significant invest-
ments to expand container capacity, 
managing to increase share of con-
tainer shipments. Delaware River 
ports have failed to match these in-
vestments. As a result, no port on 
the Delaware River is considered a 
top-tier container destination, and 
the region has not enjoyed the full 
impact of global containerization. 
Emblematic of this shortcoming is 
the region’s paucity of trade partner-
ships with Asia, the world’s largest 
container growth market. 
Another factor in the Delaware 
River ports status is a drastic import/
export trade imbalance. A weak ex-
port market compromises cost com-
petitiveness by limiting the ability for 
shipping lines to “backhaul” cargo, 
thereby increasing the unit costs of 
calling upon a port. In 2005, the re-
gion’s import tonnage outpaced ex-
port tonnage 34:1. Philadelphia’s 
import/export trade imbalance was 
even more severe at 80:1, while Cam-
den (9:1) and Wilmington (18:1) were 
comparably less severe. 
 
Global Trends 
Shifts in technology, consump-
tion, and trade patterns are changing 
the nature of global maritime com-
merce. Specifically, the containeriza-
tion of cargo and rise of Asian manu-
facturing have driven increases in 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Rankings of U.S. Ports by Tonnage and Value, 2005 
Cargo Tonnage 
Imports Exports 
Rank Port Short Tons Rank Port Short Tons 
11 Philadelphia 25,914,744 60 Camden-Gloucester 545,293 
17 Paulsboro 18,133,852 66 Chester 400,092 
33 Wilmington 6,896,449 67 Wilmington 381,567 
40 Camden-Gloucester 4,742,854 70 Philadelphia 322,702 
66 Chester 1,243,599    
Cargo Value 
Imports Exports 
Rank Port Value ($) Rank Port Value ($) 
6 Philadelphia 29,462,379,151 22 Philadelphia 2,430,517,679 
35 Chester 5,684,957,894 24 Wilmington 2,175,543,116 
37 Wilmington 5,499,289,565 32 Chester 1,594,532,247 
79 Paulsboro 255,203,257 74 Camden 149,968,973 
103 Camden 67,409,025 84 Paulsboro 88,580,455 
Note: Tonnage is for foreign trade only. 
Vessel Calls by Ship Type, 2005 
0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000
Baltimore
New  York
Delaw are River
Ports
Virginia Ports
Product Tanker
Crude Tanker
Container
Dry Bulk
Ro-Ro
General Cargo
Combination
Gas Carrier
Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Division. 
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Implications for Delaware River 
Ports 
Global trends in maritime com-
merce will profoundly impact the 
ongoing viability and vitality of Dela-
ware River ports. Containerization is 
driving rapid growth of waterborne 
cargo shipments, while trade ration-
alization and shifting trade routes 
have increased the attractiveness of 
East Coast ports. These factors, cou-
pled with strategic action, present an 
opportunity for the region’s port 
industry to grow its business. 
The ability of Delaware River 
ports to capture additional market 
share of maritime cargo is related to 
its competitive strengths and weak-
nesses as a port of call. Delaware 
River ports are, in some respects, 
well-positioned to benefit from in-
creased cargo shipments. For exam-
ple, the region’s proximity to the 
most dense population base in the 
global cargo demand, led by double-
digit annual growth of demand from 
South and East Asian markets. Con-
tainerization is expected to continue, 
with container-based shipping pro-
jected to double from its 2000 total 
by 2020. 
Rapid containerization is driving 
innovation in the shipping industry. 
To increase efficiency, shipping lines 
are adding larger ships to their fleet 
that are able to carry more contain-
ers, thereby lowering unit shipping 
costs. Ports, in turn, have been 
forced to continually upgrade termi-
nal and intermodal infrastructure to 
keep pace with the demands of in-
creasing cargo volumes. For many 
ports, investments have included 
expensive channel-deepening pro-
jects to accommodate deeper draft 
requirements of new container ships 
beyond 45 feet. 
Shipping lines have also sought to 
achieve efficiencies through “trade 
rationalization.” With congestion and 
gas prices increasing the cost of 
moving cargo by land, shippers are 
seeking to maximize the proportion 
of total cargo movement that occurs 
by water, thereby minimizing total 
unit shipping costs. And, in the 
United States, trade rationalization 
has occurred in response to the cost 
of “land-bridging” cargo from West 
Coast ports to central and eastern 
parts of the country by rail or long-
haul trucking.  
Trade rationalization has in-
creased the demand for container 
capacity at East Coast ports. Intensi-
fying this trend is congestion in the 
Panama Canal, which has capacity 
constraints that will not be alleviated 
until its expansion project is com-
pleted (scheduled for 2014). In the 
meantime, shipping lines are increas-
ingly relying on the Suez Canal to 
ship cargo from Asian markets to the 
United States. This shift has made 
East Coast destinations even more 
attractive as a primary port of call. 
 
 
country (27 million people live within 
100 miles and 90 million within 500 
miles), give its ports a large natural 
consumer market.  
Also, despite a history of turbu-
lence in Philadelphia, since the 1990s 
the port labor force has embodied 
stability and flexibility that has be-
come a strategic advantage. The port 
has not experienced a labor strike in 
over a decade, and Philadelphia’s 19 
labor “start times” accommodate the 
demands of time-conscious shipping 
lines, increasing the port’s competi-
tiveness.  
In addition, while other ports face 
severe congestion issues, Delaware 
River ports are relatively uncon-
strained by either terminal or inter-
modal congestion. This is due in part 
to an expansive network of road and 
rail infrastructure that is directly con-
nected to many of the region’s port 
facilities. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
North American Port Region 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Pacific CN 6.33% 18.75% 11.71% 
Atlantic CN 1.71% 7.12% 3.30% 
North Atlantic 4.36% 4.58% 8.14% 
South Atlantic 12.08% 7.17% 2.79% 
North Pacific 6.17% 2.06% 6.09% 
South Pacific 7.01% 10.08% 7.94% 
Island Pacific 8.29% -8.42% 16.18% 
Gulf 7.61% 7.30% 5.20% 
Total United States 7.48% 6.35% 6.66% 
Total North America 7.11% 6.73% 6.71% 
Average Annual Growth Rates in Container Traffic  
by North American Port Region, 1990-2005 
World Region 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
North Europe 6.45% 8.07% 8.52% 
S. Europe/Mediterranean 11.41% 12.86% 9.96% 
Middle East & South Asia 12.90% 10.48% 15.39% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.55% 8.35% 11.78% 
East Asia 14.22% 11.13% 12.22% 
Australia/Oceania 5.00% 8.22% 7.84% 
North America 6.13% 7.48% 7.24% 
Other Americas 14.58% 10.72% 9.64% 
Total 10.83% 10.14% 10.82% 
Notes: CAGR=Compound Annual Growth Rate; major bulk cargo limited to iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite/alumina & phosphate. 
Annual Growth in Container Demand  
by World Region, 1990-2005 
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nanas), juices, and cocoa beans. 
On the other hand, Delaware 
River ports do struggle with factors 
that limit growth potential. For ex-
ample, the region’s inland location 
requires a 60 to 100 mile trek from 
the Atlantic Ocean, a distance that 
increases travel time and shipping 
cost. Also, the Delaware River’s 40-
foot channel is shallow relative to 
competitor ports, limiting the ports’ 
Finally, the region possesses the 
infrastructure to support shipment of 
“niche” cargos that require special-
ized terminal and storage infrastruc-
ture. Refrigerated warehouse facilities 
and other supporting infrastructure is 
expensive and difficult to replicate; as 
a result, Delaware River ports have 
become the country’s preeminent 
port of call for perishable products 
such as fresh fruit (especially ba-
ability to compete with top-tier ports 
for shipments on the new generation 
of container mega-ships that require 
45 and 50-plus foot drafts. The im-
minent execution of a project part-
nership agreement between the Army 
Corps of Engineers and the Com-
monwealth to dredge the Delaware 
River channel to 45 feet was a critical 
first step for the region to simply 
maintain its existing port business.  
Delaware River ports’ paucity of 
Asian shipping service is noteworthy 
given the dramatic growth of Asian 
markets. This shortcoming has lim-
ited the region’s ability to benefit 
from increased global containeriza-
tion. Greater Philadelphia’s weak 
export market is also a liability, limit-
ing shippers’ ability to minimize unit 
shipping costs by backhauling cargo 
out of port. 
Additionally, while expansive, the 
region’s landside infrastructure has 
limited connectivity to inland distri-
bution markets. Of note is the re-
gion’s inadequate “double stack” rail 
clearance. Double-stacking contain-
ers on railcars has become the domi-
nant mode for moving cargo from 
the port to inland destinations be-
cause it doubles rail container capac-
ity at no additional cost. Greater 
Philadelphia’s freight rail lines are 
constrained by low bridge clearances 
that preclude efficient use of double 
stacked trains, putting Delaware 
River ports at a significant competi-
tive disadvantage for servicing Mid-
western U.S. growth markets. 
Finally, Delaware River ports’ 
growth potential is constrained by 
disjointed planning, marketing, and 
development. Lack of collaboration 
among Delaware River ports has led 
to intra-port complex competition 
for business and has limited the re-
gion’s ability to strategically plan for 
the future. Both factors have 
thwarted attempts to rationalize the 
use of port facilities and created inef-
ficiencies that limit growth potential. 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
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⇒ Investment in infrastructure 
enhancements, especially termi-
nal container capacity and road 
and rail condition and connec-
tions. 
⇒ Collaboration for the efficient 
deployment of resources, espe-
cially to rationalize the use of 
facilities and coordinate market-
ing efforts in a region-wide man-
ner.  
 
Scenarios for Port Growth  
Based on global trends and the 
Delaware River’s competitive posi-
tion (which assumes the anticipated 
Delaware River channel-deepening 
project), the study team developed 
three potential  scenarios for port 
growth: 
⇒ Scenario 1: Growing market 
share by one percent. This sce-
nario depends on successful im-
plementation of the framework 
for a strategic plan outlined in 
this report and careful manage-
ment of such risks as accelera-
tion of competitor port invest-
Recommended Strategies for 
Port Growth 
The potential for Delaware River 
ports to grow will depend on their 
ability to leverage strengths and man-
age weaknesses. Doing so will re-
quire objective analysis to guide stra-
tegic planning efforts. This planning 
should consider: 
⇒ Cargo segments handled by 
Delaware River ports; 
⇒ Cargo demand on the U.S. East 
Coast;  
⇒ Existing cargo capacity; and 
⇒ Existing geographic and infra-
structure limitations. 
From this plan, Delaware River 
ports will be able to identify strategic 
opportunities to grow business. In 
general, the strategy for growth 
should be built around three core 
principles: 
⇒ Leverage existing competitive 
strengths, especially geographic 
proximity to the large consumer 
market of the U.S. northeast and 
a difficult-to-replicate expertise 
in niche cargo handling; 
ments. 
⇒ Scenario 2: Moderate growth. 
This scenario requires that the 
region collaborate to keep pace 
with competitor port invest-
ments and leverage existing 
cargo-handling strengths. Short 
of significant infrastructure in-
vestment, the scenario also re-
quires that future economic 
trends swing in  the region’s fa-
vor. 
⇒ Scenario 3: Declining market 
share by one percent. This sce-
nario may be realized if the ports 
maintain the status quo of dis-
jointed development and fail to 
collaborate around a strategic 
plan for the future. 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Summary of Growth Scenarios 
Factors Scenario 1: Growing Market Share 
Scenario 2: 
Moderate Growth 
Scenario 3: 
Declining Market Share 
Assumptions 
♦ Delaware River ports increase 
the share of U.S. waterborne 
commerce from 5.5 percent to 
6.5 percent of the national 
market 
♦ All cargo growth at 0.9 percent  
♦ Container growth at 4.4 per-
cent, equal to the national rate 
♦ Delaware River ports share of 
U.S. waterborne commerce 
decreases from 5.5 percent 
to 4.5 percent of the U.S. 
market 
Requirements 
♦ Transit times and cost to serve 
inland markets are improved 
♦ Growth in niche cargo 
♦ Regional coordination in 
marketing and capacity 
management 
♦ Petroleum import levels must 
be maintained 
♦ Bulk and breakbulk cargoes 
remain dominant, particularly 
steel and perishables 
♦ None 
Risks 
♦ Absence of economies of scale 
♦ Improved capacity and transpor-
tation networks at competitor 
ports 
♦ Distance from Asian manufactur-
ing centers 
♦ Acceleration of global shift to 
alternative fuels 
♦ Weak regional economic and 
demographic growth 
♦ Continued containerization 
trends 
♦ Decline in niche cargoes 
♦ Lack of goods to export 
Strategies 
♦ Leverage existing competitive 
strengths 
♦ Strategic infrastructure invest-
ment 
♦ Regional collaboration 
♦ Leverage existing competitive 
strengths 
♦ Regional collaboration 
♦ The absence of coordination 
to leverage existing assets 
and improve transportation 
networks 
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Economy League of Greater Philadelphia 
The Economy League of Greater Philadelphia (ELGP) is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated 
to research and analysis of the region's resources and challenges with the goal of promoting sound public policy and in-
creasing the region's prosperity. 
Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation 
Philadelphia Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) is a private, not-for-profit Pennsylvania corporation, founded 
in 1958 by the City of Philadelphia and the Greater Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, to promote economic develop-
ment throughout the city. 
Economic Development Research Group 
Economic Development Research Group, Inc. (EDR Group) is a consulting firm focusing specifically on applying state-
of-the-art tools and techniques for evaluating economic development performance, impacts and opportunities. The firm 
was started in 1996 by a core group of economists and planners who are specialists in evaluating impacts of transportation 
infrastructure, services, and technology on economic development opportunities. 
Select Greater Philadelphia 
A business marketing organization, Select Greater Philadelphia focuses on building the economy of our region by attract-
ing and retaining businesses. The Greater Philadelphia region encompasses Southeastern Pennsylvania, Southern New 
Jersey, and Northern Delaware. 
Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission 
Serving the Greater Philadelphia region for more than 40 years, the Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission 
works to foster regional cooperation in a nine-county, two state area. City, county and state representatives work together 
to address key issues, including transportation, land use, environmental protection and economic development. 
Project Partners 
Introduction 
For more than 300 years, the 
Delaware River has served as a key 
commercial highway for the region, 
facilitating the import and export of 
raw and manufactured products from 
the region and beyond. Over time, 
Delaware River port activity has been 
a key component in perpetuating 
Greater Philadelphia’s role as a com-
mercial hub, supporting industrial 
development and thousands of port-
related local jobs. 
While Greater Philadelphia’s 
maritime roots remain, rapid global-
ization and technological advances 
are driving an industry-wide transfor-
mation that has had an impact on the 
role that Delaware River ports play in 
the larger economy. Understanding 
the impact of ever-evolving industry 
INTRODUCTION AND PROJECT PARTNERS 
trends on the nature of maritime 
commerce in Greater Philadelphia is 
essential for making smart and ap-
propriate policy and investment deci-
sions.  
To this end, the Philadelphia In-
dustrial Development Corporation 
(PIDC) sponsored a study of maritime 
commerce in Greater Philadelphia and 
commissioned the Economy League 
of Greater Philadelphia to conduct the 
analysis. The Economy League assem-
bled a study team that consisted of a 
partnership with the Economic Devel-
opment Research Group (EDR) and 
assistance from Select Greater Phila-
delphia and the Delaware Valley Re-
gional Planning Commission.  
The study considered port activity 
on both sides of the Delaware River, 
from Trenton, NJ and Bucks County, 
PA to the ocean. Its analysis included 
a review of dynamic factors impact-
ing maritime commerce in Greater 
Philadelphia and a discussion of 
trends and policies that may alter 
anticipated future activity.  
The resulting report presents 
findings from this research. It does 
not seek to evaluate the costs and 
benefits of any particular port devel-
opment proposal; rather, the report is 
intended to instruct decisions regard-
ing investment and land use along the 
Delaware Riverfront, and offer context 
and insights to guide the critical future 
choices to be made by government 
and business stakeholders.  
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SECTION 1: ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS 
tion. 
⇒ The 6,094 regional port workers 
subject to the City of Philadel-
phia Wage Tax produce $11.6 
million in Wage Tax revenues. 
 
Overview 
Delaware River ports add value to 
Greater Philadelphia’s economy. This 
section explores the magnitude and 
nature of this value by considering 
both region-wide and city-specific 
economic impacts. Using an industry
-standard input-output model, the 
analysis quantifies economic impacts 
in terms of jobs, labor income, eco-
nomic output (e.g., sales), and tax 
revenues. On-site employment data 
for Delaware River ports were as-
sembled through discussions with 
private terminal operators, coopera-
tion from public port agencies, port 
directory references, and employ-
ment estimates obtained through 
proprietary databases. (See Appendix 
C for a full methodological descrip-
tion. See Appendix D for a summary 
of an additional set of “port-reliant”2 
employment.) 
 
Greater Philadelphia 
Delaware River port activity adds 
value to the regional economy by 
creating and supporting jobs across 
the 11-county, tri-state Greater Phila-
delphia area. (See Appendix C for a 
list of counties included in the re-
gion.) 
 
 
Key Findings 
⇒ The port industry’s regional job 
base is relatively small, but those 
jobs generate higher than aver-
age income and output per job.  
⇒ Delaware River ports employ 
4,056 workers who earn $326 
million and generate $1.3 billion 
in economic output. 
⇒ The vast majority of regional 
direct port employment is in 
cargo handling and warehousing. 
⇒ Each direct port job supports an 
additional two jobs from indus-
try demand and worker re-
spending, resulting in a region-
wide port-related employment 
total of 12,121. 
⇒ Petroleum-based port activity, 
while generating a majority of 
the Delaware River’s cargo traf-
fic, constitutes less than 10 per-
cent of the region’s port-related 
employment. 
⇒ City of Philadelphia ports repre-
sent approximately 45 percent of 
region-wide employment, labor 
income, and economic output. 
⇒ Regional port activity generates 
$69 million in tax revenues for 
state governments in Greater 
Philadelphia, however its net 
fiscal impact is somewhat less 
pronounced due to subsidiza-
Employment 
Employment impacts associated 
with Delaware River port activity 
include: 1) direct maritime industry 
jobs; 2) indirect jobs supported by 
maritime industry demand; and 3) 
induced jobs supported by direct 
maritime worker re-spending. 
As Figure 1 illustrates, Delaware 
River ports employ 4,056 workers 
across Greater Philadelphia. Sector-
based direct employment analysis4 
indicates that slightly fewer than half 
(1,911) of direct port jobs are in 
cargo handling, and another fourth 
of the jobs are in warehousing (987). 
With a multiplier of 3.0, direct port 
employment supports 4,655 indirect 
and 3,410 induced jobs for a total 
employment impact of 12,121 jobs. 
Petroleum-based regional em-
ployment. While petroleum consti-
tutes a majority (both in tons and 
value) of Delaware River cargo traf-
fic, petroleum-based direct port em-
ployment represent approximately 10 
percent, or 455, of the region’s 4,056 
direct port jobs. This disparity is due 
in large part to the non-labor-
intensive nature of importing petro-
leum, a distinction that is akin to the 
labor intensity of pumping gas into a 
car as opposed to hauling numerous 
grocery bags out of the trunk.3  
Labor Income 
Delaware River port employment 
generates income that is distributed 
throughout the regional economy. 
As Figure 2 illustrates, the re-
gion’s 4,056 direct port workers earn 
Section 1: Economic Impact Analysis 
 Employment Impact Type 
 Direct Indirect/Induced Total 
Employment 4,056 8,065 12,121 
Labor Income  $326 million $446 million $772 million 
Economic Output $1.3 billion $1.1 billion $2.4 billion 
Notes: Economic impact calculations using IMPLAN model; labor income and economic output are presented in 2006 dollars.  
Figure 2: Greater Philadelphia Economic Impacts, 2005 
Employment Impact Type 
Jobs 
by  
Sector 
Direct (Maritime/Port Activity) 4,056 
Construction 318 
Wholesale 36 
Cargo Handling 1,911 
Warehousing 987 
Security 99 
Other Government 152 
Federal Government 553 
Indirect (Industry Demand) 4,655 
Induced (Worker Spending)  3,410 
Total 12,121 
Note: Economic impact calculations using IMPLAN model. 
Figure 1: Greater Philadelphia    
Employment Impacts, 2005 
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$326 million, a total that includes 
both wages and fringe benefits. With 
a multiplier of 2.4, direct labor in-
come supports an additional $446 
million in indirect and induced in-
come for a region-wide labor income 
impact of $772 million. The variation 
in multipliers (3.0 for employment; 
2.4 for labor income) indicates that 
employment directly related to port 
activity boasts higher wages than the 
indirect and induced jobs supported 
by industry demand and worker re-
spending.  
The region’s direct port jobs rep-
resent an average income (including 
fringe benefits) of $80,000, more 
than double the regional per capita 
income. When indirect and induced 
jobs are also considered, the average 
income drops to $64,000, illustrating 
the relatively high-paying nature of 
the region’s maritime-industry jobs. 
Economic Output 
Delaware River port activity cre-
ates a ripple effect of sales through-
out the region. The aggregate impact 
of this activity is quantified as the 
ports’ economic output. 
Greater Philadelphia’s 4,056 di-
rect port jobs generate $1.3 billion in 
economic output. With a multiplier 
of 1.8, port activity supports another 
$1.1 billion in economic output re-
lated to indirect and induced jobs for 
SECTION 1: ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Labor Income 
As Figure 4 illustrates, Philadel-
phia’s 1,945 direct port workers earn 
$142 million, a total that includes 
both wages and fringe benefits. With 
a multiplier of 2.4, direct labor in-
come supports an additional $196 
million in indirect and induced in-
come for a city-wide labor income 
impact of $338 million.  
Economic Output 
Philadelphia’s 1,945 direct port 
jobs generate $569 million in eco-
nomic output. With a multiplier of 
2.1, port activity supports another 
$472 million in economic output 
related to indirect and induced jobs 
for a total city economic output im-
pact of $1.0 billion. 
 
Tax Revenues 
The wages paid to direct, indirect, 
and induced port employees, as well 
as the sales generated by maritime 
commerce along the Delaware River, 
are subject to taxation, providing 
revenues to state and local govern-
ments in the region.  
State Tax Revenues 
As Figure 5 illustrates, state gov-
ernments across Greater Philadelphia 
collect a total of $69 million in tax 
revenues from Delaware River port 
activity, including $44 million for 
Pennsylvania, $18 million for New 
Jersey, and $7 million for Delaware. 
For Delaware and New Jersey, the 
largest source of port-related tax 
revenue is Individual Income Taxes, 
while in Pennsylvania the General 
Sales and Use Taxes slightly outpace 
Commonwealth Personal Income 
Tax receipts. Over one-third ($25 
a total regional economic output im-
pact of $2.4 billion. 
 
City of Philadelphia 
Port activity in the City of Phila-
delphia constitutes approximately 45 
percent of region-wide employment, 
labor income, and economic output. 
Employment 
As Figure 3 illustrates, City of 
Philadelphia ports employ 1,945 
workers, slightly fewer than half of 
regional direct port employment. 
Mirroring the region’s sector-based 
employment, slightly fewer than half 
(870) of direct port jobs are in cargo 
handling, and another fourth of the 
jobs are in warehousing (478). With a 
multiplier of 2.8, direct port employ-
ment supports 2,336 indirect and 
1,229 induced jobs for a city employ-
ment impact of 5,510 jobs.  
The somewhat lower city employ-
ment multiplier (2.8 for the city; 3.0 
for the region) is indicative of addi-
tional “leakages” that occur for city 
employment impacts. This reflects 
the notion that city-related indirect 
and induced jobs are more likely to 
occur outside of the city than their 
regional equivalents are to occur out-
side the region. 
Petroleum-based city employ-
ment. The city’s 1,945 direct port 
jobs include 162 in petroleum, 
amounting to less than 10 percent of 
total direct jobs and mirroring the 
region-wide proportion of petroleum
-based employment.  
 
 
 
 
Employment Impact Type 
Jobs 
by  
Sector 
Direct (Maritime/Port Activity) 1,945 
Construction 183 
Wholesale 20 
Cargo Handling 870 
Warehousing 478 
Security 41 
Other Government 35 
Federal Government 318 
Indirect (Industry Demand) 2,336 
Induced (Worker Spending)  1,229 
Total 5,510 
Note: Economic impact calculations using IMPLAN model. 
Figure 3: City of Philadelphia      
Employment Impacts, 2005 
 Employment Impact Type 
 Direct Indirect/Induced Total 
Employment 1,945 3,565 5,510 
Labor Income $142 million $196 million $338 million 
Economic Output $569 million $472 million $1.0 billion 
Note: Economic impact calculations using IMPLAN model; labor income and economic output are presented in 2006 dollars.  
Figure 4: City of Philadelphia Economic Impacts, 2005 
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region-wide port activity, 36 percent 
of which is directly related to city-
specific port activity. 
 
million) of state tax revenues are as-
sociated with port activity in the City 
of Philadelphia. 
It should be noted that states in 
turn use taxpayer dollars to support 
public port agencies, reducing the net 
financial benefit to balance sheets.  
For example, while the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania received ap-
proximately $44 million in taxes as a 
result of port activity in 2005, it also 
spent roughly $10 million to subsi-
dize Philadelphia Regional Port Au-
thority operations and $19 million 
for debt service obligations.  
City of Philadelphia Tax Revenues 
The City of Philadelphia collects 
tax revenue from port activity that 
occurs inside and outside the taxing 
jurisdiction.  
Wage Tax Revenues. The pri-
mary source of the city’s port-related 
tax revenue is the Wage Tax, which 
the city receives from both residents 
of Philadelphia and non-residents 
that work in Philadelphia. For the 
Wage Tax, taxable wages reflect an 
amount equivalent to labor income 
less fringe benefits and are assessed 
at two different rates based on place 
of residence: in 2006, the Philadel-
phia resident rate was 4.301 percent, 
and the non-resident rate was 3.7716 
percent. 
Of the 12,121 direct, indirect, and 
induced port-related regional jobs, 
4,216 (35 percent) hold residence in 
Philadelphia and generate $183 mil-
lion in taxable wages. At the 2006 
resident tax rate, this produced $7.9 
million in Wage Tax revenues. An-
other 1,878 (15 percent) of port-
related employees work - but do not 
live - in Philadelphia and pay the non
-resident Wage Tax rate. The $99.7 
million in non-resident taxable wages 
produced $3.8 million in Wage Tax 
revenues. 
In total, Philadelphia Wage Tax 
rates were assessed on 6,094 workers 
and $283 million of taxable wages, 
producing $11.6 million in tax reve-
nues for the city and reflecting an 
effective Wage Tax rate of 4.11 per-
cent. 
Sales Tax Revenues. The city 
also recoups revenue from its one 
percent Sales Tax. The city generates 
over seven-hundred thousand dollars 
in annual Sales Tax revenues from 
Figure 5: Tax Revenue Impacts of Delaware River Ports and City of 
Philadelphia Ports, 2005 
Type of Tax All Regional Jobs All City Jobs 
Individual Income Taxes   
Delaware $           2,538,803 $              932,829 
New Jersey $           6,679,380 $           2,454,197 
Pennsylvania $         13,102,579 $           4,814,266 
General Sales and Use Tax   
Delaware - - 
New Jersey $           5,326,255 $           1,944,851 
Pennsylvania $         13,851,735 $           5,056,706 
Corporate Income Tax   
Delaware $              888,055 $              323,581 
New Jersey $           1,988,447 $              724,530 
Pennsylvania $           3,632,195 $           1,323,463 
Selective Sales Taxes   
Delaware $           1,075,499 $              395,169 
New Jersey $           2,674,104 $              982,543 
Pennsylvania $           7,807,469 $           2,868,689 
Other State Taxes, Licenses and Fees   
Delaware $           2,536,226 $              924,124 
New Jersey $           1,597,420 $              582,052 
Pennsylvania $           5,199,444 $           1,894,521 
City of Philadelphia   
Wage Taxes (See Below) $         11,649,603 $           7,886,308 
Sales Taxes $              731,330 $              266,843 
Total State and Local Taxes   
Delaware $           7,038,582 $           2,575,704 
New Jersey $         18,265,605 $           6,688,173 
Pennsylvania $         43,593,424 $         15,957,645 
City of Philadelphia $         12,380,933 $           8,153,151 
Total $         81,278,544 $         33,374,673 
City of Philadelphia Wage Tax Calculation 
Wage Tax Rate  
Residents 4.301% 
Non-Residents 3.7716% 
Philadelphia Residents  
Employment 4,216 
Wages $183 million 
Wage Taxes Paid $7.9 million 
Non-Residents That Work in Philadelphia  
Employment 1,878 
Wages $100 million 
Wage Taxes Paid $3.8 million 
Total Wages $283 million 
Total Wage Taxes Paid $11.6 million 
Effective Wage Tax Rate 4.11% 
Notes: Economic impact calculations using IMPLAN model; while employment figures are for 2005, wage tax rates used are 
for 2006. Wages are labor income less benefits and reflect Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) Place of Residence adjust-
ment factors; totals may not add due to rounding. 
11 
SECTION 2: DELAWARE RIVER PORT DESCRIPTIONS AND KEY COMPETITORS 
Section 2: Delaware River Port Descriptions and Key Competitors 
Key Findings 
Delaware River ports: 
⇒ Have historically struggled to 
keep pace with the ever-evolving 
maritime industry. 
⇒ Are comprised, in part, of public 
facilities owned by three state-run 
entities: the Philadelphia Regional 
Port Authority (Pennsylvania); the 
South Jersey Port Corporation 
(New Jersey); and the Diamond 
S t a t e  P o r t  C o r p o r a t i o n 
(Delaware). Dozens more facili-
ties are owned and operated by 
private entities. 
⇒ Are constrained by an inland, up-
river location and naturally shal-
low channel. 
⇒ Have experienced growth in busi-
ness but a decline in market share. 
⇒ Are noted for their large share of 
petroleum imports and for niche 
commodities such as fresh fruit 
and cocoa beans.  
⇒ Have capacity for container ship-
ments but are not primary ports-
of-call.  
⇒ Trade primarily with African mar-
kets, owed in large part to the 
region’s preeminence in petro-
leum imports. The Delaware 
River has virtually no trade rela-
tionship with Asia, the largest 
global growth market. 
⇒ Have imports that far outpace 
exports, resulting in a drastic im-
port-export imbalance. 
⇒ Compete for cargo with other 
East Coast ports, including the 
Port of New York/New Jersey, 
Baltimore, and Virginia. These 
ports have key locational, market, 
and infrastructure advantages and 
been more aggressive than the 
Delaware River in infrastructure 
investment to attract new busi-
ness, particularly in the growing 
global container market. 
 
Delaware River Ports in        
Historical Context 
Greater Philadelphia commercial 
activity originated along the Dela-
ware River. William Penn selected 
the location for his settlement based 
on proximity to the river for com-
merce and inland location for safe 
harbor and access to the region’s 
resource-rich hinterlands.  
These assets fueled growth in 
maritime commerce through the 18th 
century, during which time Philadel-
phia rose to premier port status as 
the third largest port in the British 
Empire behind London and Liver-
pool. The Industrial Revolution ac-
celerated Philadelphia’s rise in the 
19th century. Steam locomotives 
provided access to the Lehigh Val-
ley’s vast coalmines, and manufactur-
ing activity in the city stimulated the 
market for both imports and exports. 
But by the turn of the 20th cen-
tury, Philadelphia’s prominence as a 
commercial hub had waned. Manu-
facturing activity moved to less costly 
regions and the demand for anthra-
cite coal slackened. Hastening the 
decline was  Philadelphia’s failure to 
keep pace with demands for infra-
structure modernization. This short-
coming put the port at a competitive 
disadvantage. (A more complete his-
tory of Delaware River maritime 
commerce is available in Appendix 
B). 
Containerization 
Philadelphia’s industrial decline 
coincided with the rise of alternative 
global supplier markets, spurred on 
in large part by dramatic post-World 
War II advancements to cargo ship-
ping. In particular, the advent of 
containerization in 1956 dramatically 
improved the efficiency of goods 
movement. Employing a standard-
ized box for moving cargo, contain-
ers simplified cargo handling, thereby 
lowering overall costs of goods 
movement.2 Over the second half of 
the 20th century, containerization 
grew to become the predominant 
means for general cargo movement, 
driving rapid growth in trade across 
all modes of goods transport. How-
ever, by far the most pervasive im-
pact of container shipping was on 
maritime commerce. By increasing 
the cost effectiveness of overseas 
shipping, containerization stimulated 
dramatic growth in waterborne trade 
and became a key driver in economic 
globalization. 
Containerization changed the 
economics of shipping. Efficiencies 
resulting from the use of standard 
container boxes drove demand for 
the construction of larger ships that 
could take advantage of economies 
of scale. In turn, this new breed of 
ship accelerated the pressure to mod-
ernize port facilities by imposing a 
new set of terminal requirements that 
rendered older-style finger piers ob-
solete. Many of Philadelphia’s com-
petitor ports aggressively responded 
by initiating expensive efforts to 
adapt and expand terminal facilities 
to meet the demands of container 
vessels.  
Efforts to Keep Pace 
Philadelphia reacted slowly to the 
demands of containerization. Strug-
gling to compete, in 1965 the city 
partnered with the Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania and Greater Phila-
Figure 6: 1978 Forecast for Port 
of Philadelphia Containerization 
Year Forecasted TEUs 
Actual  
TEUs 
1972  43,512 
1975  86,148 
1978 126,000 n/a 
1980 211,000 124,339 
1990 353,000a 65,309 
Source: Philadelphia Commerce Department, Philadelphia 
Port Facilities Study, 1978. 
Notes: (a) - Based on the Commerce Department study’s 
standard of an average of 11 tons per container. 
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more than 40 public and private port 
facilities. As Figure 9 illustrates, 
Delaware River port facilities line 
both sides of the Delaware River 
from Delaware to Trenton, NJ. For 
maps of individual Delaware River 
port facilities, see Appendix H. 
Public Port Facilities 
Aside from petroleum facilities 
(which represent nearly 80 percent of 
waterborne trade by volume on the 
Delaware River), state-owned facili-
ties have the highest volume of Dela-
ware River port operations. Three 
public entities own and either oper-
ate or lease port facilities covering 
nearly 1,000 acres, including: 
⇒ The Port of Philadelphia; 
⇒ The Port of Camden; and 
⇒ The Port of Wilmington. 
Port of Philadelphia. In 1990, 
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
purchased the city’s public port facili-
ties and created the Philadelphia Re-
gional Port Authority (PRPA) to re-
place the PPC. PRPA owns and acts 
as landlord for Packer Avenue and 
Tioga Marine Terminals, Piers 38/40, 
78/80, 82, 84, 96 and 98 Annex. 
Since its inception, the PRPA has 
initiated several upgrades to these 
delphia Chamber of Commerce to 
replace the Department of Wharves, 
Docks, and Ferries with the Philadel-
phia Port Corporation (PPC). The 
formation of the PPC was consid-
ered critical to keep up with the de-
mands of technological advance-
ments of maritime commerce. It cre-
ated a more accommodating govern-
ance structure and enhanced access 
to capital that provided for swifter 
and more flexible pursuit of infra-
structure improvements to port fa-
cilities.  
The PPC oversaw the develop-
ment of Philadelphia’s two container 
terminals, the Packer Avenue Marine 
Terminal (PAMT), completed eleven 
years after the first container ship’s 
voyage in 1967, and Tioga Marine 
Terminal (TMT), completed five 
years later in 1972. With PAMT and 
TMT online, Philadelphia had en-
tered the market to compete for a 
share of the container business. 
In 1978, the Philadelphia Depart-
ment of Commerce released a study 
that analyzed the city’s port facilities 
and presented a strategy for future 
development. Citing significant 
growth in container traffic and a 
trend towards containerization of 
previously non-containerized general 
cargoes, the study concluded that 
PAMT and TMT in their existing 
state would reach container capacity 
by 1984 and require significant up-
grades and expansion to satisfy fu-
ture container demand. Between 
1972 (the year of TMT’s establish-
ment) and 1975, container traffic at 
Philadelphia ports doubled, from 
43,512 Twenty-Foot Equivalent 
Units (TEUs), the standard capacity 
measure for containers, in 1972 to 
86,148 in 1975.  
At the same time, containeriza-
tion of the region’s existing cargo 
flows increased the share of contain-
erized cargo in Philadelphia from 16 
percent in 1972 to 23 percent in 
1975. Citing concurrent shifts at 
competitor ports, the study projected 
that the containerized proportion of 
Philadelphia’s overall cargo would 
reach 60 percent by 1990, effectively 
quadrupling the city’s container traf-
fic.6 
By the mid-1980s it was apparent 
that Philadelphia would not realize 
the Commerce Department’s bullish 
projections. Globally, the containeri-
zation revolution was driving growth 
of container ships in both size and 
number. With larger ships requiring 
deeper channels and shipping lines 
looking for quicker turnaround 
times, the port’s inland location - 
nearly 100 miles up the Delaware 
River, which featured a naturally 
shallow channel - became an increas-
ingly significant liability. Moreover, 
while PAMT and TMT established 
Philadelphia as a player in the con-
tainer game, several other East Coast 
ports modernized their infrastructure 
more quickly and aggressively, in-
creasing their competitiveness vis-à-
vis Philadelphia.  
 
Delaware River Port               
Descriptions 
Today, the Delaware River serves 
as a 100-mile “marine highway” for 
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Figure 7: Philadelphia Regional Port Authority Facilities 
Name Location Acreage Specialized Cargoes 
Packer Avenue 
Marine Terminal 
Columbus Blvd. at 
Packer Ave. 106 
Containers, steel products, frozen meat, 
fruit, heavy lift, project, paper  
Piers 38/ 40 Columbus Blvd. at Christian St.  12 
Newsprint, coated paper, wood pulp, 
other forest products 
Piers 78/ 80 Columbus Blvd. at Snyder Ave. 40 
Newsprint, coated paper, wood pulp, 
other forest products 
Pier 84 
Columbus Blvd. 
between Oregon 
Ave.& Jackson St. 
23 Cocoa beans and cocoa products 
Pier 96 & 98 
Annex 
Columbus Blvd. at 
Oregon Ave. 55 Automobiles, project, heavy equipment 
Tioga Marine 
Terminal 
Delaware River & 
Tioga Street 97 
Containers, refrigerated fresh fruit, paper, 
plywood, cocoa beans, autos, palletized, 
project, breakbulk and steel 
Pier 82 
Columbus Blvd. 
between Oregon 
Ave. & Jackson St. 
18 Fruits and vegetables, break bulk, project, paper 
Source: Philadelphia Regional Port Authority. 
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port facilities, including the addition 
of on-dock warehouse space at the 
Tioga Marine Terminal and new 
warehouse space and refrigeration at 
the Pier 82 site.  
Today, Packer Avenue and Tioga 
facilities each have six berths and one 
roll-on-roll-off (“RoRo”) berth. 
PRPA’s other facilities have one to 
three berths. Additionally, PRPA 
boasts more than 2.3 million square 
feet of refrigerated storage space at 
Packer Avenue and Tioga as well as 
significant dry and heated space at its 
other facilities. The facilities have 
close access to Interstates 76 and 95 
and are served by three railroads: 
Norfolk Southern, Canadian Pacific, 
and CSX. 
Port of Camden. Established in 
1834, the Port of Camden has devel-
oped into a niche port that special-
izes in breakbulk cargo. A national 
leader in the import of cement, ply-
wood, fresh fruit, and cocoa beans, 
Camden is also the region’s primary 
exporter, shipping hundreds of thou-
sands of tons of scrap metal each 
year.  
The South Jersey Port Corpora-
tion (SJPC), a state-created entity, has 
managed the Port of Camden since 
1928. SJPC’s primary port facilities 
include the Beckett Street Terminal, 
opened in 1931, and Broadway Ter-
minal, opened in 1971. Additionally, 
SJPC owns the Broadway Produce 
terminal and another terminal in Sa-
lem, New Jersey.  
In total, SJPC facilities feature 
eight berths: four at Beckett Street, 
two at Broadway, and one each at 
Salem and Broadway Produce. SJPC 
also boasts more than 2.2 million 
square feet of dry warehouse space 
and three temperature controlled 
facilities at the Broadway Produce 
Terminal. All SJPC facilities are 
within close proximity to I-676, I-76, 
US Rte. 130, and I-295. 
In recent years, private operators 
have made significant investments to 
these facilities, including over $50 
million in expansion projects at the 
Broadway Terminal in the past dec-
ade. Additionally, in 1994 the SJPC 
entered into an agreement to operate 
the Port of Salem in New Jersey, ex-
panding its scope of operations 
south.7 Further expansions are 
planned, including a new two-berth 
facility at the Port of Paulsboro.  
Port of Wilmington. Established 
in 1923, the Port of Wilmington is  a 
national leader in the import of fresh 
fruit (particularly bananas) and juice 
concentrate and is currently the mid-
Atlantic regional port of discharge 
for Volkswagen of America. Its con-
tainer operations have rapidly grown 
in recent years. 
In 1995, the State of Delaware 
purchased the port from the City of 
Wilmington and created the Dia-
mond State Port Corporation 
(DSPC) to manage and operate the 
port. Since its inception, the DSPC 
has guided the port through a series 
of improvements, including the pur-
chase of a $5.6 million multipurpose 
crane, creation of a $27.5 million 
auto and RoRo berth, and construc-
tion of two new storage warehouses.8  
Unlike the Ports of Philadelphia 
and Camden, the Port of Wilming-
ton’s operations occur at a single site 
on 308 acres. The Port of Wilming-
ton features ten berths, including 
seven deepwater general cargo 
berths, two RoRo and auto berths, 
and one tanker berth. Additionally, 
the Port of Wilmington features six 
separate warehouses that provide 
upwards of 800,000 square feet of 
chilled and freezer storage space, and 
16,000 extra square feet of controlled 
atmosphere capability. The facility 
also has two multi-purpose gantries, 
each with 50-ton capacity, and one 
heavy-lift gantry with 75-ton capabil-
ity. Wilmington’s key cargoes are 
autos, fruit, juice, meat, paper, salt, 
and steel.  
Regarding landside transporta-
tion, Wilmington is primarily ser-
viced by trucks and is situated in 
close proximity to I-495 and I-95. 
From a regional perspective, the 
port’s principle locational advantage 
is its 65-mile proximity to the Atlan-
tic Ocean; Philadelphia and Camden 
are 90-100 miles upriver. 
Private Port Facilities 
The remainder of the region’s 
port facilities are owned and oper-
ated by private firms and play a sig-
nificant role in Delaware River mari-
time commerce. They include opera-
tions at: 
⇒ Port of Chester (Penn Termi-
nals); 
⇒ Port of Bucks (Kinder Morgan, 
Riverside, and Waste Manage-
ment);  
⇒ Gloucester Marine Terminal 
(Gloucester Terminals LLC); and 
⇒ Oil refineries. 
Port of Chester. At the Port of 
Chester, Penn Terminals has retrofit-
ted a former Sun Shipbuilding yard 
to handle both container and break-
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Figure 8: South Jersey Port Corporation Facilities 
Name Acreage Specialized Cargoes 
Beckett Street  
Terminal 125 
Wood product, steel products, cocoa beans, containers, 
iron ore, furnace slag, scrap metal 
Broadway  
Terminal 180 
Petroleum coke, furnace slag, dolomite, other dry bulks, 
steel products, wood products, minerals, cocoa beans, 
and fresh fruit 
Broadway  
Produce Terminal 26 Bananas, pineapples, other perishables 
Paulsboro (Planned) — — 
Port Of Salem — — 
Source: South Jersey Port Corporation. 
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Overall, the port’s principle car-
goes include steel, and salt, and pro-
ject cargo (windmill materials, 
mostly). Facilities are situated in 
close proximity to the Pennsylvania 
Turnpike, I-95, and U.S. Route 1. 
Gloucester Marine Terminal. 
Gloucester Marine Terminal is situ-
ated below the Walt Whitman Bridge 
in New Jersey and is operated by 
Gloucester Terminals LLC, with op-
erations supported by Holt Logistics 
(Holt also supports the operations of 
Greenwich Marine Terminals LLC at 
PRPA’s Packer Avenue facility). The 
facility has 22 warehouses, half of 
which are refrigerated and frozen 
storage space.  
Gloucester’s key cargoes include 
containers, steel products, frozen 
meat, fruit, heavy lift, and project 
cargo. Its 150-acre site is close to the 
Walt Whitman Bridge, I-95, and I-76. 
Oil Refineries. Private petroleum 
operations in Delaware City, Chester, 
and Philadelphia account for the vast 
majority of the region’s annual ton-
nage and cargo value. Large oil com-
panies, including Sunoco and BP, 
have operations along the Delaware 
River. As a result, the Delaware River  
bulk cargo. Since purchasing the 
property in the 1980s, Penn Termi-
nals refurbished two dry storage 
warehouses and developed 80,000 
square feet of refrigerated storage 
space, increasing the terminals’ total 
reefer  (refrigerated storage) capacity 
to 100,000 square feet.  
These facilities support the han-
dling of Penn Terminals’ key cargoes, 
including bananas, steel, forest prod-
ucts, and project cargo. The 71-acre 
facility is situated  between Philadel-
phia and Wilmington and approxi-
mately 2 miles from I-95. 
Port of Bucks. Formerly the U.S. 
Steel “Fairless Hills” site, the Port of 
Bucks is situated 29 miles north of 
Philadelphia and is entirely privately 
owned. The port is now part of what 
is called the Keystone Industrial Port 
Complex (KIPC), with facilities di-
vided between Kinder Morgan, Inc. 
and Waste Management. Nearby, 
Riverside Concrete also has port op-
erations but is not part of the KIPC. 
The port’s operations are coordi-
nated by the Bucks County Interna-
tional Trade Council, a body founded 
by the county’s five chambers of 
commerce, that serves as a de facto 
port authority for the county.  
 
is a leading American port complex 
for petroleum imports. 
 
Delaware River Port Activity:      
Recent Trends 
Delaware River port facilities 
overall activity has increased. Nearly 
3,000 ships called upon the Delaware 
River in 2006, up ten percent over 
1995. As Figure 10 illustrates, a 58 
percent increase in container ship-
ments drove overall growth. (See 
Appendix G for 2006 vessel calls at 
individual Delaware River port facili-
ties.) 
Containers 
The Port of Philadelphia captured 
a portion of the growth in regional 
container shipments. As Figure 11 
illustrates, after bottoming out at 
65,309 TEUs in 1990, Philadelphia 
recovered to break 100,000 TEUs in 
1995 and 200,000 in 2005. 
Nevertheless, Philadelphia’s con-
tainer growth pales in comparison to 
other ports. Between 1985 and 2005, 
Philadelphia’s share of East Coast 
and  U.S. container traffic dropped 
by more than half, from 2.60 to 1.09 
percent of the East Coast market and 
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Figure 10: Delaware River Ports Vessel Calls by Cargo Type, 1995-2006 
Year General Containers Roll-On/Roll-Off Refrig. Bulk Tankers 
Chemicals/
Gas Autos Passenger Totals 
1995 304 368 84 333 405 812 138 110 16 2,570 
1996 332 448 58 321 411 770 119 79 23 2,561 
1997 317 533 70 318 419 798 140 40 13 2,648 
1998 380 632 76 372 462 902 154 95 22 3,095 
1999 392 478 41 487 452 872 145 102 20 2,989 
2000 400 397 64 458 399 873 155 116 28 2,890 
2001 352 376 82 455 381 831 166 126 28 2,797 
2002 340 359 75 444 349 852 99 121 12 2,651 
2003 330 321 78 465 608 858 86 120 28 2,594 
2004 330 340 91 456 329 877 86 92 36 2,637 
2005 279 441 77 392 358 897 107 108 41 2,700 
Source: OCS, 2006. 
Notes: “Other” category includes Port of Albany, NY, Providence,RI, New Haven and Bridgeport, CT, and Camden-Gloucester NJ. 
Change, 
‘95-’06 -56 213 -6 40 -3 49 6 11 23 277 
% Change, 
‘95-’06 -18.4% 57.9% -7.1% 12.0% -0.7% 6.0% 4.3% 10.0% 143.8% 10.8% 
2006 248 581 78 373 402 861 144 121 39 2,847 
Wilmington witnessed growth in ton-
nage market share over this period. 
Between 1985 and 2005, Camden’s 
tonnage share grew from 1.08 to 1.32 
percent of the East Coast market and 
from 0.29 to 0.33 percent of the U.S. 
market. Wilmington’s East Coast 
share grew from 0.56 to 1.44 percent 
and its U.S. share grew from 0.15 to 
0.36 percent. Wilmington’s tonnage 
growth represented the second fast-
est proportionate increase of any 
port on the East Coast. 
Commodities 
While U.S. maritime commerce is 
increasingly containerized, the Dela-
ware River’s cargo expertise remains 
in bulk and breakbulk cargo — com-
modities that are shipped by means 
other than containers. In particular, 
Delaware River ports have carved 
out a niche in perishable cargoes.10 
Shippers are drawn to the region’s 
agglomeration of refrigerated storage 
facilities. The region’s streamlined 
U.S. Customs systems allow for ex-
pedited transport, another attractive 
element for time and cost-conscious 
shippers of perishable cargo. As a 
result, Delaware River ports import 
nearly half of the nation’s cocoa 
beans, almost a third of the bananas, 
and a quarter of all fruit and nuts.  
Still, the region’s biggest com-
modity is petroleum. While the re-
gion’s perishable imports boast large 
share of national imports, their share 
of total Delaware River activity is 
dwarfed by that of the oil refineries. 
As Figure 14 illustrates, petroleum 
accounts for 65 percent of the re-
gion’s import activity by value, while 
fruits and nuts account for just 4 
percent. 
A large share of Delaware River 
exports is highly valued goods such 
as motor vehicles, petroleum, and 
military supplies. Philadelphia has 
been designated as one of 14 United 
States “ports of strategic military sig-
nificance.” As a result, the port ships 
supplies to international posts and 
sees the return of equipment and 
vehicles for repair and refurbish-
ment. 
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from 1.12 to 0.49 percent of the U.S. 
market. 
While Philadelphia lost ground, 
Wilmington approximately tripled its 
TEU share between 1985 and 2005, 
increasing from 0.47 to 1.33 percent 
of the East Coast market and from 
0.20 to 0.60 percent  of the U.S. mar-
ket. Wilmington’s rapid ascent in the 
container business represented the 
largest proportionate growth among 
the 20 largest U.S. container ports 
during that time period.9 
Despite overall growth, contain-
ers remain a small proportion of 
Delaware River port activity. As Fig-
ure 12 illustrates, container trade ac-
counts for 5 percent of Philadelphia’s 
tonnage and 19 percent of its cargo 
value, well below the national aver-
ages of 16 percent and 51 percent. 
Wilmington and Camden also fall 
below the national averages. 
Tonnage 
In contrast to containers, Phila-
delphia ranks among top U.S. ports 
in total tonnage, a volume measure 
largely driven by bulk and  breakbulk 
activity, especially petroleum. In 
2005, Philadelphia tonnage ranked 
4th among East Coast ports and 19th 
among U.S. ports. But as Figure 13 
illustrates, Philadelphia lost tonnage 
market share between 1985 and 
2005, declining from 7.7 percent to 
6.7 percent of the East Coast market 
and from 2.06 percent to 1.66 per-
cent of the U.S. market.  
On a smaller scale, Camden and 
Port 
%  
Container 
Trade 
(Weight) 
%  
Container 
Trade 
(Value) 
Philadelphia, PA 5% 19% 
Wilmington, DE 7% 7% 
Chester, PA 10% 47% 
Camden, NJ 13% 17% 
Paulsboro, NJ 0% 0% 
U.S. Total 16% 51% 
Source: U.S. Census Foreign Trade Division. 
Figure 12: Containers as a  
Percentage of Port Trade, 2005 
 Philadelphia Wilmington 
Year Total TEUs Share of East Coast 
Share of 
U.S. Total TEUs 
Share of 
East Coast 
Share of 
U.S. 
1985 104,522 2.60% 1.12% 18,790 0.47% 0.20% 
1990 65,309 1.13% 0.48% 91,623 1.58% 0.67% 
1995 107,094 1.23% 0.53% 156,940 1.81% 0.78% 
2000 198,680 1.70% 0.73% 192,091 1.64% 0.70% 
2005 204,912 1.09% 0.49% 250,507 1.33% 0.60% 
Source: AAPA; Notes: Unavailable for Chester, Camden, and Paulsboro. 
Figure 11: Port of Philadelphia and Wilmington Total TEUs  
as a Share of East Coast and U.S. Markets, 1985-2005 
 Philadelphia Wilmington  
Year Tonnage (000s) 
Share 
of East 
Coast 
Share 
of  
U.S. 
Tonnage 
(000s) 
Share 
of East 
Coast 
Share 
of 
U.S. 
Tonnage 
(000s) 
Share 
of East 
Coast 
Share 
of  
U.S. 
1985 32,690 7.72% 2.06% 2,362 0.56% 0.15% 4,573 1.08% 0.29% 
1990 41,830 8.99% 2.03% 4,209 0.90% 0.20% 4,379 0.94% 0.21% 
1995 40,634 9.08% 1.92% 4,273 0.96% 0.20% 5,919 1.32% 0.28% 
2000 43,855 7.97% 1.85% 5,184 0.94% 0.22% 5,171 0.94% 0.22% 
2005 39,365 6.70% 1.66% 8,445 1.44% 0.36% 7,732 1.32% 0.33% 
Source: AAPA; Notes: Unavailable for Chester, Camden, and Paulsboro. 
Camden 
Figure 13: Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Camden Tonnage  
as a Share of East Coast and U.S. Markets, 1985-2005 
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Trading Partners 
Although Asia dominates U.S. 
waterborne trade, few Asian carriers 
visit the Delaware River, and none 
call on Philadelphia. In general, East 
Asian cargo shippers prefer the 
Trans Pacific route and tend to call 
on West Coast ports. West Asian 
cargo shippers that use the Suez Ca-
nal are  drawn to the Port of New 
York/New Jersey as a first port of 
call given its size and local consumer 
market. These factors limit the Dela-
ware River ports’ competitiveness in 
Asian markets, which is also con-
strained by the complex’s upriver 
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location and limited connectivity to 
inland distribution networks. 
Instead of Asia, Delaware River 
ports are tied to Africa, a trade rela-
tionship largely driven by the region’s 
strength in petroleum and other 
niche cargoes. As Figure 15 illus-
trates, 43 percent of Delaware River 
trade was with African markets in 
2005, compared with 13 percent na-
tionwide. And, as Figure 16 illus-
trates, trade with African markets 
account for virtually none of the 
Delaware River’s container ship-
ments. 
Import/Export Ratio 
While the Delaware River ranks 
among the top U.S. ports for total 
tonnage, the region represents a 
small export market, resulting in a 
stark import/export imbalance.  
As Figure 17 illustrates, in 2005 
Philadelphia ranked highest in the 
region for import tonnage (11th in 
the nation) and lowest for export 
tonnage (70th in the nation), 
amounting to a 80 to 1 ratio of im-
port tons to export tons. Camden (9 
to 1) and Wilmington (18 to 1) also 
have trade imbalances. The region’s 
import/export imbalance is less stark 
when measured by value, largely due 
to the high volume and value of pe-
troleum cargo shipments. Current 
import and export rankings of all 
U.S. ports by tonnage and value is 
provided in Appendix G.  
The Delaware River’s trade im-
balance can be explained in part by 
the economic composition of indus-
try in its market area. For the most 
part, the region’s businesses do not 
manufacture products that require 
ocean-going services, resulting in a  
weak export market. The weak ex-
port market compromises shippers’ 
ability to backhaul cargo from Dela-
ware River ports, resulting in ineffi-
ciencies associated with moving 
empty vessels out of port. This 
amounts to an additional expense to 
Figure 16: Delaware River and United States  
Trade with Asia and Africa, 2005 
 Delaware River 
 
%  
Containerized 
Trade Value 
Top Five Goods 
Traded by Value  
(% of Total) 
%  
Containerized 
Trade Value 
Top Five Goods 
Traded by Value  
(% of Total) 
Asia 25% 
Iron & Steel (30%) 
74% 
Ind. Machinery (15%) 
Petroleum Product 
(12%) Motor Vehicles (14%) 
Wood Products (11%) Elec. Machinery (12%) 
Elec. Machinery (9%) Furniture (4%) 
Cocoa (8%) Apparel (4%) 
Africa 1% 
Petroleum Product 
(12%) 
11% 
Petroleum Product 
(78%) 
Cocoa (2%) Ind. Machinery (4%) 
Iron & Steel (1%) Motor Vehicles (3%) 
Fruit & Nuts (0.4%) Cereals (2%) 
Ind. Machinery (0.2%) Iron & Steel (1%) 
Source: U.S. Census Foreign Trade Division. 
United States 
Figure 15: Trading Partners by 
Percentage of Total Trade, 2005 
Trade Partners 
(by weight) 
Delaware 
River % of 
Trade 
U.S. % 
of Trade 
Asia 3% 22% 
Africa 43% 13% 
North America 7% 17% 
South America 16% 18% 
Middle East 13% 11% 
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. 
Notes: Foreign imports and exports only. 
Europe 15% 16% 
Australia/Oceania 1% 1% 
Central America 2% 2% 
Total 100% 100% 
Figure 14: Top Five Imports and Exports  
for Delaware River Ports and U.S. by Value, 2005 
Delaware River Exports Delaware River Export Share U.S. Exports 
U.S. Export 
Share 
Motor Vehicles 31% Industrial Machinery 14% 
Petroleum Products 12% Motor Vehicles 10% 
Precious Stones & Metals 7% Petroleum Products 7% 
Industrial Machinery 6% Organic Chemicals 7% 
Plastics 6% Plastics 6% 
Delaware River Imports Delaware River Import Share U.S. Imports 
U.S. Import 
Share 
Petroleum Products 65% Petroleum Products 27% 
Iron & Steel 7% Motor Vehicles 13% 
Fruit & Nuts 4% Industrial Machinery 11% 
Meat 3% Elec. Machinery 7% 
Industrial Machinery 2% Apparel 3% 
U.S. Census Foreign Trade Division. 
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a comparison of selected East Coast 
ports’ distance to inland destina-
tions.) Baltimore markets its inland 
location as a strategic advantage re-
lated to closer proximity to Midwest 
distribution locations.  
Baltimore’s five public terminals 
are overseen by the Maryland Port 
Administration. The port is served by 
the Norfolk Southern and CSX rail-
roads and is close to I-95. Its key 
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shippers, reducing Delaware River’s 
cost competitiveness.  
 
Key Competitors 
Delaware River ports compete for 
business with other East Coast ports. 
Its closest competitors include the 
ports of New York/New Jersey, Bal-
timore, and Virginia. 
Port of New York/New Jersey 
With the largest volume on the 
East Coast, the Port of New York/
New Jersey is comprised of multiple 
publicly-owned facilities on more 
than 1,400 acres. It is nearly 50 per-
cent larger than the footprint of 
Camden, Philadelphia, and Wilming-
ton ports combined. 
The Port Authority, created in 
1921 to manage the shared harbor 
interests of New York and New Jer-
sey, oversees seven cargo terminals 
and is viewed as a “must call” port 
by shippers due to the economies of 
scale it offers, its affluent and dense 
local consumer market, and the vast 
network of road and rail connections 
to inland markets. Norfolk Southern, 
Canadian Pacific, and CSX railroads 
serve the facilities. Efforts to dredge 
to a channel depth of 50 feet are un-
derway to the new generation of con-
tainer mega-ships. 
New York/New Jersey handles a 
wide variety of cargo. Its largest mar-
kets include petroleum products 
(especially gasoline), food products 
(especially alcoholic beverages), and 
manufactured equipment (especially 
vehicles and textiles). 
Port of Baltimore 
At just over 1,000 acres, the Port 
of Baltimore is slightly larger in area 
than Camden, Philadelphia, and Wil-
mington combined.  Its facilities are 
accessible via a 50-foot channel and 
are located 150 miles from the ocean, 
over twice as far inland as Wilming-
ton and fifty percent farther than 
Philadelphia. (Appendix G provides 
commodities include crude materials 
(especially iron ore and scrap metal), 
forest products, and “Ro-Ro” prod-
ucts (especially motor vehicles and 
parts). 
Virginia Ports 
The Virginia ports are comprised 
of three publicly-owned terminals 
stretching over 1,172 acres. Virginia 
ports have distinct natural assets, 
Figure 17: Rankings of U.S. Ports by Tonnage and Value, 2005 
Cargo Tonnage 
Imports Exports 
Rank Port Short Tons Rank Port Short Tons 
11 Philadelphia 25,914,744 60 Camden-Gloucester 545,293 
17 Paulsboro 18,133,852 66 Chester 400,092 
29 Marcus Hook 9,570,380 67 Wilmington 381,567 
33 Wilmington 6,896,449 70 Philadelphia 322,702 
40 Camden-Gloucester 4,742,854    
Cargo Value 
Imports Exports 
Rank Port Value ($) Rank Port Value ($) 
6 Philadelphia 29,462,379,151 22 Philadelphia 2,430,517,679 
35 Chester 5,684,957,894 24 Wilmington 2,175,543,116 
37 Wilmington 5,499,289,565 32 Chester 1,594,532,247 
79 Paulsboro 255,203,257 74 Camden 149,968,973 
103 Camden 67,409,025 84 Paulsboro 88,580,455 
Source: U.S. Census Foreign Trade Division. 
Note: Tonnage is for foreign trade only. 
Figure 18: Port of New York/New Jersey 
Source: Port Authority of New York/New Jersey 
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Virginia’s key commodities in-
clude coal and food products 
(especially tobacco). In another note-
worthy department from East Coast 
competitors, its exports outweigh its 
imports. 
 
Comparative Cargo Statistics 
and Trends 
Comparative analysis shows that 
the Delaware River has lost ground 
to its competitors in recent years, 
especially relative to New York/New 
Jersey. 
Commodities & Tonnage 
As Figure 21 illustrates, Delaware 
River ports’ market share of foreign 
trade volume has declined in recent 
years, while New York/New Jersey’s 
share has spiked.  
Trends in market share can be 
explained in large part by the type of 
commodities shipped through the 
port. As Figures 22 and 23 illustrate, 
while the Delaware River’s market 
share of trade volume remains high 
compared to competitor ports, it is 
largely driven by the slower growth 
bulk and breakbulk markets 
(including general cargo). By con-
trast, New York/New Jersey’s 
prominence in the high-growth con-
tainer market is driving growth in 
that port’s overall market share.  
Containers 
The Delaware River’s small posi-
tion in global container trade has 
contributed to its loss of market 
share in overall foreign trade volume. 
As Figure 24 illustrates, New York/
New Jersey and Virginia have experi-
enced dramatic increases in container 
traffic in recent years, while Dela-
ware River container traffic has re-
mained flat. 
As a result, the Delaware River is 
currently not a major center of activ-
ity for container traffic. As Figure 25 
illustrates, none of the ports on the 
Delaware River are top tier container 
ports. In 2006, Wilmington ranked 
18th (9th on the East Coast) and 
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including proximity to the ocean (18 
miles) and a natural deepwater (50 
foot) and ice-free harbor.  
These advantages help the Vir-
ginia ports compete in the container 
market with other top ports like New 
York/New Jersey. Virginia Port Au-
thority, which owns and oversees the 
port’s public terminals, has adopted a 
strategy of attracting distribution 
centers for major retailers, such as 
Wal-Mart, to reinforce the Virginia 
ports attractiveness as the gateway to 
inland markets. With close access to 
I-64 and rail service from both CSX 
and Norfolk Southern, fast access to 
of the country’s interior has boosted 
the Virginia port’s volume of busi-
ness. 
 Port of  Baltimore  Virginia Ports 
Port of  
New York/New Jersey 
Top Five Commodities Short Tons (000s) 
% of  
U.S. Total 
Short Tons 
(000s) 
% of  
U.S. Total 
Short Tons 
(000s) 
% of  
U.S. Total 
Short Tons 
(000s) 
% of  
U.S. Total 
Crude Materials 9,260 5.4% 2,745 1.6% 9,947 5.8% 3,945 2.3% 
Coal 6,224 7.6% 16,725 20.6% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Primary Manufactured Goods 3,602 3.0% 3,298 2.7% 7,574 6.2% 5,924 4.9% 
Petroleum & Petroleum Products 3,438 0.5% n/a n/a 44,806 6.0% 66,908 8.9% 
Manufactured Equipment/Machinery 2,695 3.0% 4,499 5.0% 10,233 11.4% 5,924 4.9% 
Total 28,235 1.9% 34,280 2.3% 87,799 5.9% 82,250 5.5% 
Source: U.S. Census Foreign Trade Division. 
Note: Foreign imports and exports only. 
Delaware River Ports 
Food and Farm Products n/a n/a 3,805 2.2% 7,673 4.4% 5,032 2.9% 
Figure 20: Competitor Port Commodities, 2005 
Figure 19: Competitor Port Facilities 
Competitor Port Number of Facilities 
Total  
Acreage 
Port of Baltimore 5 1,073 
Virginia Ports 3 1,172 
Port of New York/New Jersey 7 1,407 
Delaware River Ports 11 990 
Philadelphia Regional Port Authority 7 351 
South Jersey Port Corporation 3 331 
Diamond State Port Corporation 1 308 
Source: Port websites. 
Note: Facilities and acreage represent publicly owned port facilities only. 
* Dredging project is underway to deepen the channel to 50 feet. 
** Funding for dredging project to deepen the channel to 45 feet has received preliminary approval. 
Channel 
Depth 
50 feet 
50 feet 
45 feet* 
40 feet** 
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Philadelphia ranked 19th (10th on the 
East Coast) in TEUs. Even if ton-
nage handled at Philadelphia and 
Wilmington were combined, the vol-
umes would fail to match 16th-
ranked Baltimore. Together, Wil-
mington and Philadelphia handle just 
one-quarter of the containers moving 
through the Virginia ports and one-
tenth moving through the Port of 
New York/New Jersey. 
As a whole, East Coast container 
movements are highly concentrated, 
with New York/New Jersey, Savan-
nah (GA), and Virginia ports ac-
counting for over 60 percent of East 
Coast traffic.11 This concentration is 
the product of port capacity, strong 
landside connections critical national 
distribution markets such as Chicago 
and Columbus, and large consumer 
markets. The stabilizing influence of 
these market factors will likely per-
petuate concentration of container 
traffic in the foreseeable future.   
 
Plans for the Future:          
Philadelphia, the Delaware 
River, and the Competition 
Ports are in a constant state of re-
evaluating global trends and the 
competitive landscape to strategically 
position facilities for capturing future 
maritime business. Planning for the 
future on the Delaware River will 
require keeping pace with these ef-
forts. The planned and potential im-
provements and expansions of indi-
vidual ports, and those of their com-
petitors, will affect the future vol-
umes of maritime commerce in the 
region and the economic benefits 
that that activity generates.  
Port of Baltimore 
The Maryland Port Administra-
tion’s 2002 Strategic Plan for the 
Port of Baltimore evaluated the com-
parative strengths and weaknesses of 
the port and the operational and po-
litical environment. The plan estab-
lished an explicit goal of three per-
cent annual container growth and 
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Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Maritime Division. 
Figure 21: Share of U.S. Waterborne Foreign Trade  
Volume by Customs Port, 1997-2005 
Figure 22: Vessel Calls by Ship Type, 2005 
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Figure 23: Petroleum and Petroleum Product Vessel Calls, 2005 
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expanded niche cargo business in 
forest products, steel, and automo-
biles.  
New facilities were designed to 
help Baltimore reach its goal of being 
the first-ranked port for automobiles 
(it is currently ranked second). Be-
tween 1997 and 2002, the Port of 
Baltimore constructed 200,000 
square feet of cargo sheds and a new 
auto terminal and acquired land for 
future expansion.  In 2007, the port 
opened two automotive-related facili-
ties, including a 72-acre processing 
center.   
The Port of Baltimore also 
sought to foster new relationships 
and expand its business. For exam-
ple, the Port has completed an agree-
ment with the Suez Canal Authority 
for information sharing that could 
lead to joint marketing efforts. The 
Port of Baltimore also intends to 
expand its facilities. In addition to 
the construction of an additional 
berth at the Seagirt Marine Terminal, 
three other sites have been targeted 
for future expansion and terminal 
development: 
⇒ Cox Creek: 230 to 330 acres, avail-
able about 2020 
⇒ Masonville: 100 to 130 acres, avail-
able about 2035 
⇒ Sparrows Point: 220 to 420 acres, 
available about 2040 
Baltimore has also taken strides 
to link facilities improvement and 
expansion with infrastructure en-
hancement, including dredging pro-
jects and security upgrades. A work-
ing group including CSX and Nor-
folk Southern has managed market-
ing issues and landside transportation 
concerns, including chokepoints in 
the rail system that serves the port. 
In particular, the region’s lack of 
“double stack” (two containers 
stacked on top of each other) rail 
clearance in its aging tunnels limits 
potential future port growth. Estab-
lishing such clearance would cost 
billions of dollars and likely require a 
massive public subsidy. 
Virginia Ports 
Recent private and public infra-
structure investments have helped 
the Virginia ports prepare for future 
growth. APM Terminals, associated 
with the Maersk-Sealand shipping 
line, announced a $600 million in-
vestment in a 300-acre container ter-
minal in April 2004. In 2005, federal 
funding was granted for the Heart-
land Corridor, an improvement pro-
ject that will enhance rail capacity 
and access to Midwest growth mar-
kets such as Columbus, OH (a grow-
ing hub for distribution centers) and 
Chicago, IL. Construction is under-
way with completion expected in 
June 2010. In 2006, a $60 million 
investment funded the construction 
of one million square feet of ware-
house/distribution space. Another 
3.5 million square feet is in planning 
stages. 
The Virginia ports’ long-term 
vision is reflected in its 2040 master 
plan. Capital investments totaling 
nearly $3 billion are planned between 
2006 and 2032, all with an eye to-
wards managing the anticipated tri-
pling of cargo demand during this 
period. Among them, the largest is 
Craney Island development, con-
tainer facilities to be built over 600 
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Rank Port TEUs 
1 Los Angeles 8,469,853 
2 Long Beach 7,289,365 
3 New York/New Jersey 5,092,806 
4 Oakland 2,390,262 
5 Savannah 2,160,168 
6 Tacoma 2,067,186 
7 Hampton Roads 2,029,799 
8 Seattle 1,987,360 
9 Charleston 1,968,474 
10 San Juan (FY) 1,729,294 
11 Houston 1,606,360 
12 Honolulu (FY) 1,113,789 
13 Miami (FY) 976,514 
14 Port Everglades (FY) 864,030 
15 Jacksonville (FY) 768,239 
16 Baltimore 627,947 
17 Anchorage 485,760 
18 Wilmington (DE) 262,856 
19 Philadelphia 247,211 
20 Palm Beach (FY) 244,004 
21 Portland (OR) 214,484 
22 Boston 200,113 
23 Gulfport 197,428 
24 Wilmington (NC) 177,634 
25 New Orleans 175,957 
Source: AAPA & PRPA. 
Notes: East Coast Ports in bold. 
Figure 25: Rankings of  
U.S. Container Ports, 2006 
Figure 24: Total TEUs by Customs Port,  
1997-2005 
0
500,000
1,000,000
1,500,000
2,000,000
2,500,000
3,000,000
3,500,000
4,000,000
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
New York Baltimore Delaware River Virginia
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 
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tivize greater use of rail for landside 
transportation movements at the 
port. 
Delaware River Ports 
Although the Delaware River 
ports as a whole have not undertaken 
a comprehensive planning process, 
various infrastructure and facility 
improvement projects are either 
planned or underway. The long-
awaited I-95/PA Turnpike Inter-
change connection is designed to 
reduce congestion and smooth tran-
sitions between the region’s major 
highway connectors. Construction is 
slated to commence in 2008. Rail 
improvements initiated by CSX will 
enhance the region’s existing double 
stack clearance, allowing for higher 
volumes of container cargo to move 
through the region. PRPA has been 
designated the non-federal sponsor 
for dredging the Delaware River’s 
main channel from 40 to 45 feet to 
allow the region’s ports to accommo-
date larger vessels with heavier loads. 
These proposed investments and 
projects suggest that Delaware River 
ports could see additional upgrades 
or expansion in the near future. In 
New Jersey, The South Jersey Port 
Corporation is developing a 190-acre 
port in Paulsboro, a facility that is 
anticipated to start with two berths 
and be operational in three years. A 
master plan for the South Jersey Wa-
terfront, completed by the Delaware 
River Port Authority, identifies the 
need for additional berths beyond 
those being developed at Paulsboro, 
including additional berths at sites in 
Carney’s Point and Gloucester City. 
In Delaware, the Diamond State Port 
Corporation has 180 acres adjacent 
to the Delaware River available for 
future expansion. While it hopes to 
develop this land, funding has yet to 
be secured for the project. In Penn-
sylvania, Governor Edward G. 
Rendell announced in May 2007 a 
$300 million capital improvement 
program for port develop-
ment.  
In addition to investments in 
existing facilities, there may 
be a proposal for a new facil-
ity construction under the 
aegis of the Philadelphia Re-
gional Port Authority. Of particular 
note are two sites adjacent to the 
Packer Avenue Marine Terminal.  To 
the north, an expansion of 1000 
acres would add 2,700 linear berthing 
feet. To the south of Packer Avenue, 
marginalization of existing finger 
piers and conversion of 90 to 140 
acres is being explored. The PRPA 
anticipates issuing a request for in-
formation in June 2008 to private 
investors to gauge interest in devel-
oping the facility. The size, cargo 
types handled, equipment and tech-
nology employed and net new busi-
ness attracted to the region will de-
termine the magnitude of tonnage 
and direct employment growth asso-
ciated with any new facilities. 
acres in two stages with a projected 
final capacity of 5.0 million TEUs. 
The port also has authorization to 
dredge its harbor to a depth of 55 
feet, enabling it to handle the new 
generation of container mega-ships. 
Port of New York/New Jersey 
The Port of New York/New Jer-
sey expects to continue to be a high 
volume port. To accommodate in-
creasing container demand, New 
York/New Jersey is dredging its 
channel to 50 feet. Scheduled for 
completion in 2014, parts of the 
deeper channel may be serviceable as 
soon as 2009. 
New York/New Jersey’s long-
term vision is reflected in its Com-
prehensive Port Improvement Plan. 
Created in 2005, the Plan projects 
cargo volumes through 2060 and 
evaluates infrastructure needs to han-
dle anticipated traffic flows. The 
plan’s projections also ac-
count for competitor port 
activity.  
A capacity analysis re-
vealed that roughly double 
the number of containers 
could be handled without major ex-
pansion or investment, but also that 
by 2060, an additional 2,138 acres 
would be needed. There are 2,780 
acres available at existing facilities, so 
redevelopment rather than acquisi-
tion will be employed.  Cost analysis 
revealed that Port Elizabeth is the 
optimum location for terminal en-
hancements to increase container-
handling operations. 
As part of a $2 billion capital 
strategy, investments are being made 
that will double the port’s rail capac-
ity, allowing for simultaneous arrivals 
and departures for CSX and Norfolk 
Southern. Other terminal area up-
grades, such as new buildings and 
implementation of advanced green 
and information technologies, also 
have commenced. To address the 
region’s highway congestion, the plan 
also suggests revenue supports and 
other mechanisms that would incen-
SECTION 2: DELAWARE RIVER PORT DESCRIPTIONS AND KEY COMPETITORS 
The Heartland Corridor promises to shave 
a half-day and over 200 miles off the     
current rail route to Chicago from the Port 
of Virginia. 
Figure 26: Virginia Port Authority Proposal  
for “Craney Island Marine Terminal” 
 Phase I: 2017 Phase II: 2032 
Size 220 acres 600 acres 
Depth 52 feet 52 feet 
Capacity 1.5 million TEUs 5.0 million TEUs 
Cost $1.2 billion $1.0 billion 
Source: Virginia Port Authority presentation to the Transportation Accountability Commission, January 31, 2007. 
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markets; a weak export market; 
and limited regional collaboration. 
 
Recent Patterns of Cargo 
Movement by Type 
International trade patterns, tech-
nological development, and con-
sumption patterns have impacted 
Delaware River port development.  
Over the past quarter-century, 
growth in shipment of crude oil and 
petroleum products, major bulk 
commodities, and other bulk and 
containerized cargoes has roughly 
paralleled global and regional GDP 
growth. However, other factors such 
as production and supply chain 
management could render historical 
trends less reliable as predictors of 
future shipments. Figure 27 provides 
a summary of global growth trends 
by cargo type from 1980 to 2005, 
excluding containers. Unprecedented 
growth in global shipping occurred 
between 1990 and 2000 despite sig-
nificant disruptions in Asian trade 
and economic shocks in South 
America and Eastern Europe.  
Global exports in 2005 were 
dominated by Asia, including both 
intra– and inter-continental trade. 
Exports from the Americas and 
Europe were at approximately the 
same levels in 2005, with Oceania 
and Africa exporting a distinctly 
lesser volume of goods. Increased 
transshipment activity – the move-
ment of goods between ships in port 
– and slowing of the most rapidly 
growing economies of Asia, coupled 
with the maturation of outsourcing 
trends, might change existing struc-
tural relationships between GDP 
growth and trade volumes. 
The composition of maritime 
global trade changed significantly 
between 1970 to 2005. In the 1970s, 
crude oil and petroleum shipments 
accounted for the majority of water-
borne commerce. Between 1980 and 
1990, crude oil and petroleum ship-
ments remained relatively constant, 
but containerized traffic began to 
emerge. By 2005, dry shipments 
(bulk and container) comprised al-
most two-thirds of all waterborne 
trade despite continued growth in 
liquid (crude oil and petroleum) bulk 
shipments, a shift driven by the 5.0 
percent average annual growth in dry 
(container and bulk) shipments be-
tween 1990 and 2005. 
Container Trades 
The second half of the twentieth 
century was marked by the revolu-
tionary development of container-
based shipping. In standardizing the 
method of cargo handling, contain-
erization improved the efficiency of 
marine commerce, driving port inter-
ests to pursue technological invest-
ments that would adequately support 
container operations.  
These investments served to ex-
pand port capacity and set the stage 
for enormous increases in overall 
trade volume. Continued technologi-
cal advancements have increased the 
cost effectiveness of container ship-
ping, expanding the breadth of car-
goes moved in this medium. The 
movement to containerization per-
petuated virtually all of late 20th cen-
tury global shipping and undoubtedly 
Section 3: Global Trends and Implications for Delaware River Ports 
Key Findings 
⇒ Containerization has driven in-
creases in global cargo demand, 
led by double-digit annual growth 
of demand from South and East 
Asian markets. 
⇒ Container-based shipping is ex-
pected to double by 2020. 
⇒ Containerization is driving inno-
vation in the shipping industry, 
including larger ships and in-
creased scrutiny on unit shipping 
costs. 
⇒ Trade rationalization and shifting 
trade routes have created oppor-
tunities for East Coast ports to 
capture additional market share of 
global maritime cargo. 
⇒ Several factors indicate Delaware 
River ports are well-positioned to 
capture a share of the global in-
crease in cargo shipments, includ-
ing existing terminal and landside 
capacity; noted operating effi-
ciency; proximity to a large con-
sumer market; and positioning for 
niche cargoes. 
⇒ Several factors limit Delaware 
River ports’ ability to capture ad-
ditional cargo, including distance 
from the ocean and a relatively 
shallow channel; limited connec-
tivity with distribution networks; 
limited trade with Asian growth 
Cargo Type 1980 1990 2000 2005 
Tanker/Liquid 1,871 1,755 2,163 2,422 
CAGR  -0.6% 2.1% 2.3% 
Dry Major Bulk 796 968 1,288 1,701 
CAGR  2.0% 2.9% 5.7% 
Other Bulk 1,037 1,285 2,533 2,986 
CAGR  2.2% 7.0% 3.3% 
Total Dry 1,833 2,253 3,821 4,687 
CAGR  2.1% 5.4% 4.2% 
Total 3,704 4,008 5,984 7,109 
CAGR  0.8% 4.1% 3.5% 
Source: UNCTAD, 2006.  
Notes: CAGR=Compound Annual Growth Rate; Major bulk cargo limited to iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite/alumina & phosphate. 
Figure 27: Trends in Global Maritime Trade, Loaded Goods, 1980-2005 
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will drive 21st century maritime com-
merce.  
Changes in the global economy 
have played a leading role in promot-
ing container growth. Among the 
driving forces in expansion of con-
tainer and liner (regularly scheduled) 
operations has been globalization of 
production, transition of developed 
countries from manufacturing- to 
service-oriented economies, and the 
adaptability of containerized trans-
portation to handle diverse com-
modities, including many that were 
formerly shipped via bulk carriers. 
Additionally, the growth of income 
and wealth in developing countries 
among a percent of the population 
has led to greater global demand for 
finished goods.  
One of the most significant fac-
tors in the rapid expansion of con-
tainerized trade has been the integra-
tion of landside intermodal transpor-
tation. Port operators that under-
stood this connection and imple-
mented innovations in integrating 
transportation modes have seen an 
increase in container traffic. 
Between 1995 and 2005, total 
container demand more than dou-
bled from 144.1 million TEUs to 
391.1 million TEUs. However, the 
concentration of growth has been 
less pronounced with traditional 
trade partners for the East Coast 
such as Europe and South America, 
limiting the impact of growth on 
East Coast port traffic. Overall, aver-
age annual growth was over 10 per-
cent for each five-year period from 
between 1990 and 2005. As Figure 
28 illustrates, the Middle East and 
South Asia grew most rapidly 
throughout this period, with an aver-
age annual growth rate of over 15 
percent between 2000 and 2005.  
North America was among the slow-
est growing of all global port regions, 
averaging less than 8 percent. North-
ern Europe averaged more than 8 
percent growth for both time periods 
between 1995 and 2005, while the 
Southern Europe/Mediterranean 
averaged nearly 13 percent growth 
between 1995 and 2000 and 10 per-
cent between 2000 and 2005.  
As Figure 29 illustrates, relative 
growth rates have caused changes to 
relative market share. These data 
show that the relative growth in de-
veloping regions has begun to drive 
global container trade and that 
growth in container trade for devel-
oped economies is more modest yet 
still significant. Most forecasters ex-
pect these trends to continue 
through the next five to seven years.  
Although North America’s share 
of global container demand declined 
between 1995 and 2005, growth in 
container cargo rose in each of the 
North American port areas: North 
and South Atlantic, North and South 
Pacific, Pacific and Atlantic 
Canadian, Gulf and Island Pacific.  
The South Pacific port region, which 
includes the ports of Los Angeles 
World Region 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
North Europe 6.45% 8.07% 8.52% 
S. Europe/Mediterranean 11.41% 12.86% 9.96% 
Middle East & South Asia 12.90% 10.48% 15.39% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 9.55% 8.35% 11.78% 
East Asia 14.22% 11.13% 12.22% 
Australia/Oceania 5.00% 8.22% 7.84% 
North America 6.13% 7.48% 7.24% 
Other Americas 14.58% 10.72% 9.64% 
Total 10.83% 10.14% 10.82% 
Source: UNCTAD, 2006. 
Notes: CAGR=Compound Annual Growth Rate; major bulk cargo limited to iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite/alumina & phosphate. 
Figure 28: Annual Growth in Container Demand  
by World Region, 1990-2005 
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and Long Beach, Oakland and San 
Diego (among others), moves the 
largest number of containers 
annually.  North and South Atlantic 
ports handle roughly the same annual 
volumes of container traffic, with the 
South Atlantic ports handling 
between 400,000 TEUs (2004) and 
2.1 million TEUs (2000) more than 
the North Atlantic ports since 1993. 
For a list of individual ports by 
North American region, please see 
Appendix G. 
As Figure 32 illustrates, the North 
Atlantic port region (which includes 
Philadelphia and Delaware River 
ports) has the third highest average 
growth rate (over 6 percent) among 
U.S. and Canadian port regions, be-
hind North and South Pacific 
regions. Unlike most regions, the 
North Atlantic and North Pacific 
port regions both had higher average 
annual growth rates between 2000 
and 2005 than between 1995 and 
2000. In particular, the North Pacific 
region grew as overflow and 
congestion in the South Pacific ports 
caused problems. Also, residual 
effects of the longshoremen's strike 
and the rail slowdowns on the Union 
Pacific caused shippers to employ 
alternative access points. On the 
North Atlantic, increased direct 
shipments from Asia, the size of 
inland markets, and new niche 
services (such as refrigerated cargo) 
helped to increase overall cargo 
flows.  
 
Global Factors Driving Future 
Maritime Commerce 
The study team convened an ex-
pert panel of national specialists in 
port operations, maritime commerce, 
international trade, freight flow dy-
namics, and intermodal logistics to 
weigh in on the factors that will have 
the greatest impact and how they 
might affect Philadelphia and the 
region. Panelists included: Steve Fitz-
roy of Volpe Transportation Group; 
Shashi Kumar, Dean of the U.S. 
Merchant Marine Academy; Eliza-
beth Ogard of Prime Focus Consult-
ing; and John Rounesville of Hori-
zon Lines. This chapter draws from 
the findings that emerged from pan-
elist discussions. 
Projected Container Growth 
Global growth of container move-
ments is expected to continue, fueled 
in part by the fast growing econo-
mies of Asia. In the U.S., container 
traffic is expected to more than dou-
ble by 2020. However, the increase in 
containers also means larger ships 
Figure 30: Growth in Container Demand  
by Global Port Regions, 1990-2006 
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Figure 31: Growth in Container Demand  
by U.S. Port Regions, 1990-2006 
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with deeper berth and channel re-
quirements.  
The global surge in containers is 
also expected to exhaust projected 
United States port capacity by 2015. 
Dwindling capacity is leading to port 
congestion, which is increasing ship-
ping costs. Larger container ships 
also need plentiful warehouse stor-
age, which is running out.  
Trade Rationalization 
Asian cargo destined for the U.S. 
East Coast or Midwest has histori-
cally been imported through West 
Coast ports and transported by train 
across the country, a trade pattern 
referred to as “land-bridging.” Rising 
fuel costs, congestion at West Coast 
ports, concerns regarding the vulner-
ability to trade disruptions, and 
changing global trade patterns have 
made land-bridging less economically 
viable in recent years. As a result, 
goods intended for East Coast mar-
kets are increasingly being shipped 
through East Coast ports, a shift re-
ferred to as “trade rationalization.” 
The expected continuation of 
trade rationalization could result in 
increased activity at U.S. East Coast 
ports. Capturing additional market 
share will require that ports actively 
prepare for growth, especially by fo-
cusing on improvements to landside 
infrastructure and services. Shipping 
lines are increasingly taking into 
account the efficiency of cargo 
handling and inland distribution 
networks in choosing a port-of-call. 
For this reason, coordinated regional 
port activity and cost-effective con-
nections to inland U.S. markets will 
be key factors in attracting future 
port business. Ports that are able to 
swiftly move cargo off the terminal 
and to such inland markets as 
Chicago, Memphis, and Detroit will 
be at a competitive advantage.  
Shifting Trade Routes 
Figure 33 illustrates current major 
global shipping routes. Trade pat-
terns involving Latin America (via 
the Panama Canal) and Southwest 
Asia (via the Suez Canal) are becom-
ing more desirable as the economies 
of these regions improve. The rela-
tive viability of these trade routes is 
impacted by infrastructure limita-
tions. Of note, the Panama Canal is 
coping with mounting delays and will 
not be able to accommodate the new 
generation of container ships until its 
expansion project is completed 
(scheduled for 2014). As an alterna-
tive, global traffic will increasingly 
make use of the Suez Canal. As ships 
travel through the Suez and across 
the Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic 
Ocean to the U.S., East Coast ports 
are the logical destination.  
Short Sea Shipping 
As container mega-ships enter 
global fleets, they will call on only the 
largest container ports. This trend 
will increase potential for the devel-
opment of a hub and spoke system 
to accommodate demand, in which 
secondary ports with feeder barges 
would handle local, or “short sea,” 
trips. Such a system could be seen as 
analogous to air traffic, which utilizes 
hub airports as primary destinations 
and smaller, “reliever” airports to 
absorb a portion of additional traffic.  
In other parts of the world, short 
sea shipping is used as a way to by-
pass poor roads and congestion. In 
the U.S., despite congestion in major 
metro areas and particularly around 
ports, the cost differential is currently 
not significant enough to justify the 
entry of short sea routes by carriers. 
If the Federal Highway Administra-
tion pushes short sea shipping as a 
real strategy for mitigating landside 
highway congestion and improving 
air quality, then it is possible that 
subsidies like those offered intermo-
dal rail facilities (using grants, bonds, 
and public/private partnerships) 
would induce marine carriers to de-
velop these services. 
A recent study evaluated possi-
bilities for short sea shipping routes 
on the U.S. East Coast.12 The investi-
gators asked shipping companies to 
assess cost factors that would 
prompt them to use this type of ser-
vice. Interviewees indicated that be-
cause container cargo is time-
sensitive, the dependability of truck 
transportation is very valuable. The 
study estimated that a 10 percent 
cost savings would not be sufficient 
to utilize short sea shipping, however 
a 20 percent reduction may cause 
shippers to consider it. 
In addition, legal barriers exist to 
the implementation of short sea ship-
ping. The Merchant Marine Act of 
1920, commonly referred to as the 
Jones Act, requires that shipping ac-
tivity between ports in the United 
States be limited to U.S.-built ships. 
The Federal government’s recent 
exploration of short sea shipping as a 
means to mitigate road and rail con-
North American Port Region 1990-1995 1995-2000 2000-2005 
Pacific CN 6.33% 18.75% 11.71% 
Atlantic CN 1.71% 7.12% 3.30% 
North Atlantic 4.36% 4.58% 8.14% 
South Atlantic 12.08% 7.17% 2.79% 
North Pacific 6.17% 2.06% 6.09% 
South Pacific 7.01% 10.08% 7.94% 
Island Pacific 8.29% -8.42% 16.18% 
Gulf 7.61% 7.30% 5.20% 
Total United States 7.48% 6.35% 6.66% 
Source: American Association of Port Authorities, July 2007. 
Total North America 7.11% 6.73% 6.71% 
Figure 32: Average Annual Growth Rates in Container Traffic  
by North American Port Region, 1990-2005 
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gestion has underscored the potential 
for expansion of U.S. shipbuilding 
capacity.  
Military Cargo Demand 
Commercial cargo is not the only 
business flowing through the U.S. 
ports. Military cargo is imported and 
exported through local facilities. In 
particular, the RESET program re-
turns damaged military equipment to 
a state of good repair. This effort 
requires that equipment, such as 
tanks, jeeps, and helicopters, be 
shipped back to the United States for 
maintenance.  The 2007 Defense 
Appropriations bill included $17.1 
billion for this program, a substantial 
increase made necessary by mounting 
volumes of equipment worn out by 
prolonged military engagements in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere.  
 
Implications for Delaware 
River’s Competitive Position 
Anticipated global trends high-
light the important factors that will 
influence Delaware River ports’ com-
petitive position in future maritime 
commerce.  
Positive Factors 
Container Capacity to Increase 
Throughput. Proposed capital in-
vestments in port infrastructure 
would increase container capacity, 
thereby allowing the ports to capture 
a share of anticipated demand. In 
Philadelphia, recent proposals in-
clude densification of existing facili-
ties and construction of new facili-
ties, including the Southport and 
Northport proposals adjacent to the 
existing Packer Avenue facility. If 
realized, these capital projects could 
triple the Port of Philadelphia’s con-
tainer capacity.  
Storage Capacity. Existing con-
gestion at large East Coast container 
ports may present an opportunity for 
Delaware River ports. In particular, 
warehouse facilities are becoming 
scarce around the Port of New 
York/New Jersey. Efforts to invest 
in and promote warehousing and 
distribution centers in Greater Phila-
delphia could attract shipping busi-
ness being squeezed out by dwin-
dling supply at its competitor ports.  
Access to Trade Routes. Ports 
on the Delaware River will not likely 
become the first point of call for 
container mega-ships coming 
through the Suez Canal, but they 
stand to benefit from increased usage 
of the Suez as a primary trade route. 
Proximity to Large Regional 
Consumer Market. The Delaware 
River’s primary port function is to 
accommodate demand generated by 
its regional population base. As Fig-
ure 34 illustrates, the Delaware River 
is situated at the center of the most 
heavily populated region in the U.S. 
Approximately 27 million people are 
located within 100 miles of Delaware 
River ports, and 95 million people 
(31 percent of the U.S. population) 
are within 500 miles. The 500 mile 
radius is a rough fulcrum point be-
tween cost-effective service for 
trucks (shorter distance) and trains 
(longer distances). The Delaware 
River’s geographic proximity to such 
a large consumer market will help its 
ports sustain competitiveness in 
maritime commerce.  
Port Operating Efficiency. 
Delaware River ports have relatively 
predictable and versatile work rules 
that are a distinct advantage over 
competitors. For example, the Port 
of Philadelphia offers 19 labor “start 
times” compared to New York/New 
Jersey’s five. Additional start times 
improve competitiveness by increas-
ing docking flexibility, thereby reduc-
ing the potential for delays and, in 
turn, the average cost to shippers of 
calling on the port. Additionally, 
Philadelphia has been noted for high 
landside velocity, minimizing a ship’s 
“turnaround time” and further re-
ducing shipping costs. 
Landside Infrastructure Capac-
ity. The region’s major highways, 
including Interstate 95, Interstate 
476, Interstate 76, Pennsylvania 
Turnpike, and New Jersey Turnpike 
create an extensive arterial network 
serving both North-South and East-
West freight corridors. These road-
ways are close to the region’s port 
facilities and have low levels of con-
gestion relative to competitor ports, 
thus providing competitive connec-
tions to large clusters of distribution 
facilities in South Central Pennsyl-
vania, the Lehigh Valley, and Central 
New Jersey.  
Figure 33: Global Shipping Routes 
Source: Hofstra University. 
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The region’s freight rail network 
also is extensive and well-connected 
to the river. Both CSX and Norfolk 
Southern have modern intermodal 
facilities adjacent to Packer Avenue 
Marine Terminal. Combined, the 
region’s road and rail infrastructure 
represent a critical support mecha-
nism for moving cargo from the 
Delaware River ports to a final desti-
nation. 
Positioning for Short Sea Ship-
ping. If short sea shipping material-
izes, Delaware River ports would 
likely act as “relievers” for larger 
container ports such as New York/
New Jersey or the Virginia ports.  Of 
specific short sea feeder routes evalu-
ated by the study team, one from 
Halifax, Nova Scotia to Philadelphia 
was seen as having the most promise. 
The study team concluded: “Should a 
short sea operator from Atlantic 
Canada wish to target transshipped 
feeder traffic…a port in Philadelphia 
would be a suitable choice and help 
complement the existing demand.”13  
Short sea shipping would also 
create new demand for American-
built ships. In the Aker Shipyard, 
Phi ladelphia would be wel l 
positioned to capture a significant 
share of this new market. 
Positioning for Military Cargo. 
Philadelphia is strategically posi-
tioned to  handle additional demand 
for military cargo. Letterkenny and 
Tobyhanna Army Depots in Pennsyl-
vania are already servicing electronics 
and vehicles that come through the 
Port of Philadelphia, a designated 
strategic port deemed to have the 
appropriate capacity, logistical net-
works, and security to handle military 
cargo.  Increased Congressional 
funding for RESET, continued mili-
tary equipment needs, and Philadel-
phia’s maintenance of its strategic 
port designation present the oppor-
tunity for increased maritime activity.  
Limiting Factors 
Shallow Channel Depth. The 
Delaware River does not have a deep 
enough channel to accommodate the 
largest of new container ships. Even 
now,  some sh ips  must  be 
“lightered” (partially offloaded to 
reduce draft requirements) before 
navigating up the river. Dredging the 
Delaware River channel from 40 to 
45 feet will help to mitigate this limi-
tation, but it will not be sufficient to 
accommodate the new generation of 
container mega ships. Several com-
petitors are undertaking more aggres-
sive channel deepening measures, 
putting the Delaware River ports at a 
competitive disadvantage, even if 
dredged to a 45-foot depth.  
The impact of a relatively shallow 
channel is compounded by tidal 
shifts, which can delay ships at the 
mouth of the Delaware River for up 
Figure 34: 100-mile and 500-mile Radii from Philadelphia 
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30 
to 10 hours. 
Distance from the Ocean. The 
Port of Philadelphia is approximately 
100 miles from the mouth of the 
Delaware River, a trip of as much as 
a half-day that amounts to a signifi-
cant additional cost. 
Limited Trade with Asian Mar-
kets. The Delaware River ports have 
not been active participants in the 
rise of trade with Asia, the world’s 
largest container growth market. At 
present, no Asian ships call on any 
Delaware River port. Capturing addi-
tional container share will require 
establishing closer ties with Asian 
container business. 
Limited Connectivity with 
Inland Markets and Critical 
National Distribution Net-
works. The ability for Dela-
ware River ports to develop 
connections with distribution 
networks is constrained by the 
Philadelphia region’s rail and 
road infrastructure.  
Regarding railroads, low 
bridge clearances limit the 
region’s capacity for “double stack” 
container trains  to access inland dis-
tribution networks. Double stack 
trains have become the standard for 
container service, doubling a train’s 
container capacity by without in-
creasing fixed costs. Double stack 
clearance is critical for railroads to 
provide ports with competitive distri-
bution service, and is therefore es-
sential for establishing a port’s com-
petitiveness in connections with 
inland markets. 
Currently, the only port facility in 
the Philadelphia region with double 
stack clearance is the Packer Avenue 
Marine Terminal. However, Packer 
Avenue’s double stack clearance is 
constrained in that it requires trains 
to stop and change tracks, a process 
that adds 37 miles and 5 hours to 
travel. This distance and time adds 
cost that reduces the benefit of dou-
ble stacking. 
Most of the Philadelphia region’s 
double-stacked trains first travel 
north through New York to access 
inland distribution markets, a process 
that can add up to a day of additional 
travel for Delaware River based 
trains compared with New York-
based trains.  
As a result, the Delaware River 
ports’ container market is limited to 
regional markets and truck-based 
distribution, which is also con-
strained in part by infrastructure limi-
tations. The connections between the 
highway system and port facilities are 
characterized by troublesome grade 
crossings and frequent delays. 
Compounding poor connectivity is 
poor condition. That 57 road bridges 
in southeastern Pennsylvania are 
rated “structural ly deficient” 
i l lustrates that the region’s 
infrastructure is rapidly aging, a fac-
tor that is compromising the highway 
network’s ability to effectively service 
port activity.  
Trade Imbalance. The decline 
of manufacturing in Philadelphia 
reduced the region’s exports. Rapid 
globalization weakened U.S. export 
markets and further undermined the 
region’s status as an exporter. The 
result has been a drastic import-
export trade imbalance. This imbal-
ance has led to inefficiencies by limit-
ing shippers’ ability to backhaul, 
thereby increasing the cost of calling 
on a Delaware River port. Moreover, 
niche cargoes, for which the region 
has developed an expertise, tend to 
be seasonal, a temporal reality that 
results in an uneven and therefore 
inefficient overall usage of existing 
facilities. These factors have all lim-
ited the Delaware River’s maritime 
competitiveness. 
Limited Regional Collabora-
tion. Competition and conflict 
among Delaware River port facilities 
have led to fractious and unproduc-
tive relationships among port 
stakeholders. Despite several efforts 
at  inst i tut ional iz ing regional 
coordination, historically public and 
private port entities have operated 
unilaterally. 
As a result, while other regions 
have banded together to promote 
unified port interests, Delaware River 
ports compete with one another for 
business and develop plans for 
growth in a piecemeal manner. Phila-
delphia’s lack of regional collabora-
tion has resulted in inefficient 
use of increasingly scarce wa-
terfront land, compromising 
overall port competitiveness. 
 
Summary 
Delaware River ports’ com-
petitive advantages - terminal, 
storage, and infrastructure capacity, 
access to trade routes, proximity to a 
large regional consumer market, op-
erating efficiency,  and positioning to 
accommodate future demand - and 
their disadvantages - a shallow chan-
nel, prohibitive distance from the 
ocean, trade imbalance and trade 
partners, poor connectivity with 
inland markets and distribution net-
works, and limited regional collabo-
ration - suggest that the region is not 
now and is unlikely to become a top 
tier container port, but that global 
trends offer prospects for growth. 
Delaware River ports should strategi-
cally focus on leveraging competitive 
advantages and mitigating disadvan-
tages to maximize growth potential. 
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The ability for Delaware River ports 
to develop connections with 
distribution networks is constrained 
by the Philadelphia region’s rail and 
road infrastructure.  
use, storage, quayside operations and 
equipment, and landside transport 
linkages. Many port’s capital and 
strategic plans collapse the cargo em-
phasis to container, bulk (dry, liquid, 
and break-bulk) and roll-on/roll-off 
(vehicles).  
Planning Around Demand on the 
U.S. East Coast 
The macro factors influencing 
global maritime commerce are hav-
ing a profound affect on the U.S. 
East Coast ports, resulting in a con-
stantly evolving competitive land-
scape. These industry factors will 
continue to impact future cargo de-
mand at East Coast ports, a reality 
that will have significant implications 
for Delaware River ports’ future 
competitive position.  
Planning Around Existing Capacity 
Capac i ty  inves tments  a re 
expensive, protracted propositions. 
Ideally, a port’s capacity reflects an 
optimal balance of infrastructure 
types to service a port’s existing 
cargo mix. To maximize the value of 
future investment, desired increases 
to capacity should take into account 
cargo mixes and industry factors that 
will have the largest positive impact 
on a port’s competitive position.  
Planning Around Limitations 
Even with channel-deepening, 
Delaware River ports must develop 
other capabilities (inland distribution, 
for example) that add value for ship-
pers. Wilmington and Philadelphia 
may be able to capture significant 
business as a second port of call. Par-
tially offloaded ships would not re-
quire drafts as deep as needed when 
sailing at full capacity. 
To capture additional share in this 
market, Delaware River ports have 
an opportunity to target trade routes 
that typically feature smaller ships. 
For example, Eastern Europe, the 
Baltics, and Central America are 
smaller volume regions that may 
serve as an attractive alternative to 
trade with larger Asian markets. In 
particular, Eastern European and 
Baltic involvement in intermediate 
manufacturing could serve the 
Delaware River region well.14 
 
Strategies to Leverage          
Opportunities for Growth 
A strategy to promote port 
growth should explicitly relate 
to an objective analysis of 
market opportunities. This 
report has illustrated some of 
the market considerations that 
should impact the development of a  
strategy for Delaware River port 
growth. Its key findings accentuate 
the importance of building this strat-
egy around three core actions: 
⇒ Leveraging existing competitive 
strengths; 
⇒ Investing in infrastructure en-
hancements; and 
⇒ Collaborating to rationalize use 
of regional facilities. 
Leverage Existing Competitive 
Strengths 
Delaware River ports’ competi-
tive strengths include a proximity to 
a large consumer market and an ag-
glomeration of facilities to support 
niche cargo shipments. These 
strengths should be strategically lev-
eraged to capture additional business. 
Leverage Geographic Prox-
imity to U.S. Northeast Market. 
Sitting at the center of the largest 
population mass in the country, 
Key Findings 
⇒ Planning matters. In particular, 
planning around cargo segments, 
existing capacity, and inherent 
limitations will help Delaware 
River ports prepare for growth. 
⇒ Delaware River ports’ strategy 
for growth should include lever-
aging existing strengths, targeting 
infrastructure investments 
around strategic objectives, and 
collaborating as a region to pur-
sue all future growth opportuni-
ties. 
⇒ The future of maritime com-
merce on the Delaware River is 
uncertain, and will depend 
on the ports’ collective 
ability to strategically de-
velop infrastructure and 
mitigate risks. 
⇒ Ports presently have ca-
pacity to accommodate 
another 1.5 million TEUs 
through 2020. 
 
Planning Principles for Growth 
Strategically positioning port fa-
cilities for the future is a complex 
process of effective marketing and 
capacity readiness. Market position-
ing is somewhat predetermined by 
relative geographic placement, local 
market size, density of development 
around port facilities, and access to 
inland markets.  
Strategically improving the com-
petitive position of Delaware River 
ports will require proactively leverag-
ing the region’s competitive advan-
tages and mitigating its disadvan-
tages. The first step in this process is 
to shape future plans and actions 
around anticipated global trends. 
Planning Around Cargo Segments 
The types of cargo Delaware 
River ports plan to handle matters. 
Each cargo segment has unique re-
quirements for labor utilization, land 
Section 4: Strategies and Scenarios for Delaware River Port Growth 
SECTION 4: STRATEGIES AND SCENARIOS FOR DELAWARE RIVER PORT GROWTH 
A strategy to promote port growth 
should explicitly relate to an           
objective analysis of market           
opportunities. 
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Delaware River ports have an 
opportunity to leverage geographic 
proximity to a large population base. 
While a recent marine trade growth 
outlook for the North Atlantic port 
range shows growth fueled by inland 
markets,15 an expert panel found that 
the  De l aware  R ive r ’ s  bes t 
opportunity to expand market share 
is in the northeast United States.  
Greater Philadelphia’s large local 
consumer market that the Delaware 
River helped to create is largely re-
sponsible for the river’s continued 
viability as a commercial maritime 
highway. The regional consumer 
market provides a stable source of 
cargo demand and therefore a strate-
gic opportunity for growth. Delaware 
River ports are located a short dis-
tance from two growing distribution 
hubs: south-central Pennsylvania and 
the New Jersey Turnpike Corridor. 
From this perspective, Delaware 
River ports stand to gain from lim-
ited availability of land in northern 
New Jersey for warehouse and distri-
bution uses that has resulted in a mi-
gration of distribution centers to-
wards Greater Philadelphia. This 
trend represents an opportunity for 
Delaware River port interests to lev-
erage  proximity to distribution cen-
ters and position themselves as a cost
-effective way to access this network.  
However, the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey is actively 
addressing this trend by supplement-
ing expanded terminal capacity with 
a “Portfields” initiative that aims to 
recapture the migrating distribution 
centers and strengthen the port’s ties 
to its local distribution networks. 
Greater Philadelphia port stake-
holders should consider developing a 
similar proactive strategy for address-
ing migrating distribution centers as a 
business development opportunity.  
Leverage Expertise in Niche 
Cargoes. Specialization of port op-
erations16 could be a significant mar-
ket opportunity for the Delaware 
River, which has a well-established 
reputation for managing high-value 
perishable breakbulk cargo. With the 
concentration of container trade at 
the largest U.S. ports expected to 
continue, the remaining U.S. ports 
will be competing for a smaller share 
of overall U.S. container traffic. Ports 
with strength in container move-
ments will look to leverage that 
strength, potentially at the expense of 
other existing bulk and breakbulk 
operations.  
The region’s agglomeration of 
infrastructure to support refrigerated 
cargo movement has created 
economies of scale that maximize the 
cost effectiveness of facilities. More-
over, such infrastructure clusters are 
very difficult and costly to duplicate; 
as a result, refrigerated cargo traffic is 
relatively stable at Delaware River 
ports. Leveraging this strength is an 
opportunity to grow market share in 
a important commodity for the re-
gion’s overall port activity. 
Invest in Infrastructure               
Enhancements 
To accommodate anticipated ad-
ditional business, Delaware River 
ports will require strategic invest-
ments in terminal and landside infra-
structure capacity. 
Investment in Terminal Ca-
pacity. Philadelphia’s container ca-
pacity is documented at 362,000 
TEUs for the Packer Avenue Marine 
Terminal (with limited additional 
container capacity at Tioga Termi-
nal). Based on 2006 statistics from 
PRPA, the 247,211 TEUs consumed 
68 percent of the current container 
capacity.  
As Figure 37 illustrates, realiza-
tion of a densification project (one of 
four proposed projects under 
PRPA’s Capital Enhancement Plan, 
and the one with the shortest build-
out of 1 year) would provide Phila-
delphia with an additional capacity of 
750,000 TEUs, more than tripling its 
current container capacity. 
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Figure 35: North Atlantic Port Range Container Demand by Hinterland 
Hinterland Market Projected Demand for TEUs, 2020 (Millions) CAGR, 2005-2020 
U.S. Northeast 10.34 5.5% 
Eastern Canada 3.14 5.4% 
Great Lakes/Plains 3.55 4.0% 
U.S. Southeast 3.70 6.8% 
Source: Ocean Shipping Consultants, 2006. 
Figure 36: Container Market Share at North Atlantic Ports, 2005 
Port TEUs (000s) Market Share 
New York/New Jersey 4,793 47% 
Hampton Roads 1,982 20% 
Montreal 1,255 12% 
Baltimore 603 6% 
Halifax 551 5% 
Wilmington, DE 251 2% 
Philadelphia 205 2% 
Boston 189 2% 
St. Johns NF 111 2% 
Other 157 2% 
Source: OCS, 2006. 
Notes: “Other” category includes Port of Albany, NY, Providence,RI, New Haven and Bridgeport, CT, and Camden-Gloucester 
NJ. 
Total - North Atlantic Ports 10,097 100% 
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Existing and proposed capacity at 
Delaware River ports comes at a time 
of projected exhaustion of existing 
container capacity at competitor 
ports. A North Atlantic port outlook 
projects that 95 percent of the 
planned container capacity by 2015 
in the North Atlantic port range will 
occur among the ports of New 
York/New Jersey, Baltimore, Hali-
fax, Montreal, and the Virginia ports. 
If demand expectations for the 
North Atlantic port range are near 
accurate, capacity utilization will be 
at 93 percent, a rate well above the 
level associated with efficient port 
operations.17 
An overall increase in container 
demand, coupled with potentially 
displaced cargo due to capac-
ity constraints at competitor 
ports, suggest that Delaware 
River ports could capture ad-
ditional container business. 
Existing capacity and pro-
posed capacity enhancements 
would help to prepare port 
facilities for this potential 
growth.  
Investment in Landside Capac-
ity. Any growth in port activity will 
increase the strain on Greater Phila-
delphia’s existing landside infrastruc-
ture. For this reason, terminal capac-
ity investments must be linked with 
strategic investments in road and rail 
infrastructure.  
The various infrastructure im-
provement projects planned or un-
derway (described in Section II) will 
allow for higher volumes of cargo to 
move more efficiency through the 
region. Given the magnitude of in-
frastructure need, the best way to 
maximize the utility of investments is 
to focus each investment on targeted 
objectives. For this reason, future 
infrastructure investments should be 
tailored towards achieving explicit 
goals set forth in strategic plans.  
Given the strength of the con-
sumer market in the northeast U.S., 
landside infrastructure improvements 
should be geared towards improving 
road connections to regional destina-
tions. To this end, the Delaware 
River ports should consider its geo-
graphic proximity to distribution 
center growth markets as a strategic 
advantage and look to enhance con-
nections with the Lehigh Valley, Car-
lisle, and Harrisburg areas. Develop-
ing linkages with these markets is an 
opportunity for the region to estab-
lish a stable niche market for its 
ports. 
Currently, PennPORTS (an office 
of the Pennsylvania Department of 
Community and Economic Develop-
ment that facilitates port and infra-
structure projects) is working on an 
initiative with PennDOT to improve 
the east-west transportation corridor 
spanning from U.S. 422 in Altoona 
to western Pennsylvania and Ohio. 
The proposed Ben Franklin Corridor 
project would improve linkages be-
tween the Port of Philadelphia and 
the Midwest, an integral element for 
maintaining and growing port activity 
in Philadelphia.  
In the same way that PennDOT’s 
“Ben Franklin” corridor has en-
hanced access to areas of western 
Pennsylvania and southeastern Ohio, 
future infrastructure investments 
should target strategic destinations to 
improve overall connectivity between 
Delaware River ports and inland dis-
tribution destinations.   
Collaborate for the Efficient       
Deployment of Resources 
Efforts to grow Delaware River 
port activity will be most effective if 
port stakeholders work together to 
plan and develop strategies for the 
future. 
Rationalize Facility Utilization 
and Planning. Without effective 
collaboration and coordination, port 
investments may yield an inefficient 
allocation of resources. It is easy to 
imagine that without coordination, 
capacity for some types of cargo may 
be oversupplied, while others are 
undersupplied.  In areas that 
the region has a dearth of ca-
pacity, business will be lost to 
competitor ports outside the 
region. 
Public and private ports with 
excess capacity will compete 
internally for business, driving 
down prices.  Given that port 
costs are but one part of the overall 
expenses considered by supply chain 
managers, it is unlikely that undercut-
ting prices is what draws business to 
the Delaware River ports. In this 
scenario, pitting Delaware River 
ports against one another for cargo 
that was destined for this region any-
way hurts public and private opera-
tors by lowering their revenues. 
State and local governments are 
also harmed by this internal competi-
tion, as lower revenues translate into 
lower tax collections overall for the 
region.  Even if state and local gov-
ernments wanted to encourage inter-
nal competition in the hopes of get-
ting a larger piece of the shrinking 
pie, the economic impact analysis of 
the Delaware River ports discussed 
in Section I made clear that states 
and local governments realize tax 
revenues from port activity even 
when it occurs outside their taxing 
jurisdiction.  
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Terminal capacity investments must 
be linked with strategic investments 
in road and rail infrastructure. 
Figure 37: Packer Avenue Marine 
Terminal Container Capacity 
PAMT Incremental TEU Capacity 
Current 362,000 
With Densification 750,000 
Total TEUs 1,112,000 
Source: Transystems’ Port of Philadelphia Forecast. 
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Coordinate Marketing. Carriers 
and national shipping experts identi-
fied the region as having neither a 
positive or negative image, but rather 
no real image at all. Given that each  
port entity in the region is small 
compared to competitors like the 
Port of New York/New Jersey and 
the Virginia ports, it is unsurprising 
that marketing efforts to date have 
not made the region a well-known 
shipping destination.  
Pooling resources to raise aware-
ness of the Delaware River ports 
would provide an opportunity to 
introduce the region to non-
traditional trading partners that offer 
growth potential, such as Asian and 
Eastern European lines. Rather than 
individual marketing efforts 
designed to brand a particular 
facility, these efforts would 
present the assets of the re-
gion, such as proximity to 
population centers, transpor-
tation networks, and expertise 
in niche cargoes, as well as to 
address concerns shippers 
may have, such as the depth 
and distance of the river.  
Select Greater Philadelphia is a 
business marketing organization that 
has successfully employed this 
model; it proactively markets the area 
to firms that could chose any region 
and then later provides the resources 
for business to find the appropriate 
location within the region.  
A Continuum of Cooperation. 
Efforts to grow Delaware River port 
activity will be most effective if port 
stakeholders work together to plan 
and develop strategies for the future. 
Unification of public facilities, while 
a challenge with the involvement of 
three state jurisdictions and a com-
plex history, may be ripe for serious 
reexamination, particularly in light of 
the success it has brought competi-
tors such as the Port of New York/
New Jersey.  
Even if unification proves too 
challenging or otherwise undesirable, 
smaller cooperative efforts can build 
trust for future collaboration. Joint 
facilities planning and market re-
search ensure an efficient allocation 
of investment, and coordinated mar-
keting efforts will leverage individual 
marketing budgets to provide a 
broader reach and image.  
 
Scenarios for Delaware River 
Port Growth 
With global trade volumes rising 
and competition among East Coast 
ports intensifying, the study team 
engaged a panel of national experts 
to better understand the range of 
trade activity the Delaware River 
ports could expect in the future. 
They evaluated prospects for three 
growth scenarios for Delaware River 
ports: 
⇒ Increasing market share of total 
U.S. tonnage; 
⇒ Moderate growth; and 
⇒ Declining market share of total 
U.S. tonnage. 
Each scenario anticipates dredging of 
the Delaware River channel to 45 
feet, a baseline prerequisite that ex-
perts emphasized was absolutely nec-
essary to simply maintain the region’s 
maritime competitiveness.  
Scenario 1 – increasing market 
share  – requires regional coordina-
tion, growing niche cargoes, and in-
frastructure investment that outdoes 
competitors. Scenario 2 – moderate 
growth – is dependent on public and 
private investments to improve dis-
tribution networks.  Scenario 3 – 
declining market share – reflects the 
absence of coordinated regional 
planning and investment. Of these 
scenarios, the expert panel found 
Scenario 3 to be the most likely out-
come as it most closely resembles the 
status quo. (See Appendix E for ex-
cerpts from the panel discussion.) 
Scenario 1:  Increasing Market 
Share 
Summary of Factors 
Assumption 
⇒ Delaware River ports increase 
the share of U.S. waterborne 
commerce from 5.5 percent to 
6.5 percent of the national mar-
ket 
Key Requirements 
⇒ Inland transit times and cost to 
serve inland markets is im-
proved 
⇒ Growth in niche cargo 
⇒ Regional coordination in 
marketing and capacity man-
agement 
Risks 
⇒ Absence of economies of 
scale 
⇒ Improved capacity and transpor-
tation networks at competitor 
ports 
⇒ Distance from Asian manufac-
turing centers 
Strategies 
⇒ Leverage existing competitive 
strengths 
⇒ Strategic infrastructure invest-
ment 
⇒ Regional collaboration 
Assumption. This scenario as-
sumes that ports of the Delaware 
River are able to capture an increased 
market share of port activity by 2020.  
Capturing additional market share 
will require new strategies and ac-
tions, particularly in light of aggres-
sive efforts by competitor ports on 
the East Coast.  In 2005, the Dela-
ware River ports carried 5.5 percent 
of the nation’s waterborne com-
merce.  This included 12 percent of 
the nation’s petroleum shipped, ac-
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With global trade volumes rising and 
competition among East Coast ports 
intensifying, the Delaware River 
ports are poised for either growth or 
decline. 
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counting for more than three quar-
ters of the total tonnage moved on 
the Delaware River. As the volume 
of petroleum is not expected to in-
crease due to refinery capacity con-
straints, growth would have to be 
achieved in non-crude cargoes.  
Without commodity specific pro-
jections, estimates of necessary 
growth levels by cargo type 
(container, bulk, and breakbulk) can-
not be estimated.  Reaching 6.5 per-
cent market share without growth in 
petroleum will likely necessitate ex-
pansion in volume for each cargo 
type at levels beyond national growth 
rates. If container volumes needed to 
be 8.8 percent compound annual 
growth rate (CAGR), twice the na-
tional growth rate of 4.4, total vol-
ume for the Delaware River ports 
would grow from 317,000 in 2000 to 
roughly 1.5 million TEUs in 2020, 
more than could be accommodated 
at just Packer Avenue and Tioga Ma-
rine Terminals with densification, but 
likely feasible if spread across the 
Philadelphia Regional Port Authority 
facilities and other existing ports in 
the region. 
Key Requirements. Increasing 
market share requires that Delaware 
River ports cultivate new business 
flows to inland markets with trip 
time and cost improvements. Reli-
ability, vessel turnaround time, and 
seamless intermodal connections are 
of primary concern to supply chain 
managers, assuming the port’s cost 
structure is not grossly out of line. 
The ports’ future will depend in part 
on identifying opportunities to im-
prove intermodal connectivity, iden-
tifying corridors to and from inland 
growth markets, and strategically 
focusing infrastructure investment 
on developing those connections.  
More competitive distribution 
networks to inland markets would 
present the opportunity to expand 
the base for the Delaware River’s 
niche cargoes, such as steel and per-
ishables. The Delaware River ports 
will also be well positioned to divert 
niche bulk and breakbulk cargo away 
from competitors focused on in-
creasing their container business. 
Capacity constraints in New York 
and elsewhere may push out these 
cargo types. Delaware River ports 
can build upon existing niche mar-
kets more efficiently than developing 
specialization in new areas. 
Most successful regional ports, 
such as the Virginia ports and the 
Port of New York/New Jersey, have 
consolidated to create marketing en-
tities that recognize the increasing 
scale of shipping companies and 
competitive ports driving the indus-
try. Currently, the individual ports of 
the Delaware River do not have the 
market power individually nor the 
combined resources to compete with 
emerging North Atlantic ports. Op-
portunities for coordination include 
unified international sales teams and 
more impactful presence at trade 
events. 
Risks. The Delaware River ports 
are currently at a disadvantage in 
terms of economies of scale and 
inland market connections and ef-
forts to improve may not be suffi-
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Figure 38: Summary of Growth Scenarios 
Factors Scenario 1: Growing Market Share 
Scenario 2:  
Moderate Growth 
Scenario 3: 
Declining Market Share 
Assumptions 
♦ Delaware River ports increase 
the share of U.S. waterborne 
commerce from 5.5 percent to 
6.5 percent of the national 
market 
♦ All cargo growth at 0.9 percent  
♦ Container growth at 4.4 per-
cent, equal to the national rate 
♦ Delaware River ports de-
crease the share of U.S. 
waterborne commerce from 
5.5 percent to 4.5 percent of 
the national market 
Requirements 
♦ Inland transit times and cost to 
serve inland markets is improved 
♦ Growth in niche cargo 
♦ Regional coordination in 
marketing and capacity 
management 
♦ Petroleum import levels must 
be maintained 
♦ Bulk and breakbulk cargoes 
remain dominant, particularly 
steel and perishables 
♦ None 
Risks 
♦ Absence of economies of scale 
♦ Improved capacity and transpor-
tation networks at competitor 
ports 
♦ Distance from Asian manufactur-
ing centers 
♦ Acceleration of global shift to 
alternative fuels 
♦ Weak regional economic and 
demographic growth 
♦ Continued containerization 
♦ Decline in niche cargoes 
♦ Lack of goods to export 
Strategies 
♦ Leverage existing competitive 
strengths 
♦ Strategic infrastructure invest-
ment 
♦ Regional collaboration 
♦ Leverage existing competitive 
strengths 
♦ Regional collaboration 
♦ The absence of coordination 
to leverage existing assets 
and improve transportation 
networks 
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cient to overcome the advantage held 
by other East Coast ports. 
The Delaware River ports will not 
be alone in upgrading transportation 
infrastructure and adopting policies 
to improve freight movement. The 
Heartland Corridor serving the Vir-
ginia ports will cut travel times to the 
Midwest, and the Port of New York/
New Jersey has considered subsidiz-
ing rail rates to ease congestion on 
regional roads. 
Delaware River ports will have 
difficulty attracting additional con-
tainer traffic given their location and 
lack of historic container business.  
The distance from Asian manufac-
turing centers that are the origin of 
increasing container traffic 
exacerbates this. As those 
manufacturing centers in East 
Asia move westward, Suez 
shipping routes will become 
more competitive.  While this 
presents an opportunity for 
the East Coast to capture 
business from West Coast 
ports, southern East Coast 
ports will have an advantage 
over the Delaware River ports based 
on travel times from the Straits of 
Gibraltar. 
Strategies. Successful implemen-
tation of three interlocking strategies, 
leveraging existing strengths, strate-
gic infrastructure investment, and 
regional collaboration are precondi-
tions for increasing the market share 
of trade volumes at the Delaware 
River ports.  
As this scenario requires im-
proved transportation networks and 
may necessitate expansion or recon-
figuration of port facilities, region-
wide market research for specific 
commodities and cargo types should 
be a precursor to investment deci-
sions. To guide resources efficiently 
and effectively throughout the re-
gion, regional cooperation among all 
public and private entities can ensure 
that additional capacity is used and 
that internal competition for business 
among the region’s ports does not 
artificially deflate profits.  
Scenario 2: Moderate Growth 
Summary of Factors 
Assumptions 
⇒ All cargo growth at 0.9 percent  
⇒ Container growth at 4.4 percent, 
equal to the national rate 
Key Requirements 
⇒ Petroleum import levels must be 
maintained 
⇒ Bulk and breakbulk cargoes re-
main dominant, particularly steel 
and perishables 
Risks 
⇒ Acceleration of global shift to 
alternative fuels 
⇒ Weak regional economic and 
demographic growth 
Strategies 
⇒ Leverage existing competitive 
strengths 
⇒ Regional collaboration 
Assumptions. Consistent with 
projections by Global Insight and 
forecasts prepared by the Army 
Corps of Engineers and others, the 
projected growth of 0.9 percent 
CAGR is envisioned for the Dela-
ware River ports, despite national 
cargo projections for all cargo at 
double this rate. At this rate, Dela-
ware River port tonnage will expand 
from 72 million tons to 82 million 
tons between 2000 and 2020.  
Growth in containerized cargo is 
projected to mirror the national rate 
in this scenario, at 4.4 percent 
CAGR. This would increase regional 
container volumes from 317,000 in 
2000 to 605,000 TEUs in 2020.  This 
volume of activity could be entirely 
accommodated at Philadelphia Re-
gional Port Authority facilities, pro-
vided that densification occurs as 
envisioned, which would add 
750,000 slots to the existing 362,000 
available at Packer Avenue and Tioga 
Marine Terminals.  The existence of 
other container handling facilities in 
the region suggests that even with 
the assumption that the region will 
match national container growth 
rates, Delaware River ports will have 
excess container handling capacity 
through 2020. 
Key Requirements. This sce-
nario’s plausibility rests upon main-
taining existing core strengths 
in niche cargo markets. For 
total tonnage to grow, petro-
leum import levels must be 
maintained. The location of 
oil refineries in the region, 
absence of planned new facili-
ties, and the fact that refineries 
elsewhere in the country are at 
capacity limits the threat of 
losing business to competitor 
ports. 
Maintaining prominence in key 
niche bulk and breakbulk cargoes will 
be necessary to achieve growth.  Sig-
nificant quantities of steel are han-
dled through private ports in the area 
and this may be enhanced by addi-
tional investment in United States 
steel manufacturing by foreign firms.  
This development may stimulate ex-
ports through Delaware River ports 
and help address the region’s trade 
imbalance.  
Refrigerated cargo can be ex-
pected to remain strong, particularly 
in Wilmington which benefits from 
being closer to the ocean than Phila-
delphia and South Jersey ports with 
comparable refrigerated warehousing 
and other facilities.  Barriers to entry 
in this market segment are high, 
making the region best positioned to 
attract additional container growth in 
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Successful implementation of three 
interlocking strategies - leveraging 
existing strengths, strategic 
infrastructure investment, and regional 
collaboration - are preconditions for 
increasing the market share of trade 
volumes at the Delaware River ports. 
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the shipment of perishable items. 
Risks. Erosion of the current 
volume of petroleum is not likely to 
come from competition, but instead 
result from changes in oil consump-
tion patterns. Environmental con-
cerns and high oil prices may cause a 
shift to other fuels that are less likely 
to be trafficked on the Delaware 
River.   
The Delaware River ports can 
realize moderate growth, albeit at 
lower levels than national growth, so 
long as the region’s population and 
economic conditions continue to 
rise.  Delaware River ports have fo-
cused on serving the local consumer 
market; should conditions deteriorate 
without the region improving 
its service to inland markets, 
port activity could be expected 
to slow proportionally. 
Strategies. This growth 
scenario is contingent on lev-
eraging existing strengths and 
regional collaboration.  In ar-
eas where growth is possible, 
such as containers, region-
wide facility planning can pre-
vent the building of excess capacity.  
Additionally, joint marketing efforts 
can support the maintenance and 
expansion of niche cargoes in the 
face of competition from more coor-
dinated ports along the East Coast. 
Regional cooperation and priority 
setting for investment in landside 
transportation can improve connec-
tions to inland markets that the Dela-
ware River ports have not tradition-
ally served. This serves as a hedge 
against economic and demographic 
decline in the local market, but is not 
as essential as in Scenario 1. 
Scenario 3: Declining Market 
Share 
Summary of Factors 
Assumption 
⇒ Delaware River ports decrease 
the share of U.S. waterborne 
commerce from 5.5 percent to 
4.5 percent of the national mar-
ket 
Risks 
⇒ Continued containerization 
⇒ Decline in niche cargoes 
⇒ Lack of goods to exports 
Strategies 
⇒ The absence of coordination to 
leverage existing assets and im-
prove transportation networks. 
Assumption. This scenario as-
sumes that the Delaware River ports’ 
market share will decline from 5.5 
percent to 4.5 percent of waterborne 
commerce.  This assumption is based 
on maintenance of the region’s share 
of crude traffic but declines in other 
cargo types, although vulnerability of 
the region’s petroleum trade is a pos-
sibility. 
Delaware River ports could ex-
perience volume growth even while 
losing market share. In this scenario 
it is unlikely that container growth 
would match the national rate of 4.4 
percent CAGR.   
Risks. Without a great increase in 
population or efficient inland con-
nections, it is unlikely that consumer 
demand for products that move 
through the region’s ports will grow. 
As a relatively small player in the 
container business, the trend of mov-
ing more and more commodities by 
container rather than shipping them 
as bulk or breakbulk could hurt re-
gional port activity in two ways: 
⇒ The distance up the Delaware 
River and lack of Asian business 
relationships makes the region’s 
ports unattractive to Asian 
growth markets and container 
shippers in general; and  
⇒ As breakbulk and bulk cargoes 
are converted to containerized 
shipping, the Delaware River 
may lose business in the niche 
cargo areas that it once domi-
nated. 
Further erosions to the region’s 
niche cargoes may arise from a pro-
longed slump in the real estate sec-
tor.  As new housing starts decline, 
so to does the demand for construc-
tion materials in which the Delaware 
River ports have traditionally ex-
celled. 
Uncoordinated efforts to attract 
containers away from other East 
Coast ports without the benefit of 
improved transportation link-
ages to inland markets will 
divert resources away from 
investments that would main-
tain and expand traditional 
cargoes, creating opportunities 
that other ports could exploit 
to lure that business away.  
South Atlantic and Gulf Coast 
ports closer to the South 
American and Australian ori-
gins of many of the perishable items 
that currently arrive in the United 
States via the Delaware River are 
already expanding facilities to handle 
those cargoes. 
Strategies. As a result of rising 
trade volumes, Delaware River ports 
can expect to gain some trade vol-
ume without making any strategic 
actions. Maintaining the region’s 
market share, however, is an addi-
tional hurdle given that improve-
ments at competitor ports are already 
underway. Without coordination for 
improved distribution networks and 
efforts to retain and expand niche 
cargoes, market share decline can be 
expected. 
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Conclusion 
For more than 300 years, Dela-
ware River ports have been vital to 
Greater Philadelphia’s development. 
Going forward, the question is 
whether the ports' diverse entities 
and interests can come together to 
leverage strengths, confront weak-
nesses, and gain from global trends 
driving the future of maritime com-
merce. 
Summary of Key Findings 
This report has described 
the current composition of 
Delaware River ports and 
highlighted the key factors 
that will impact their future. 
The report has illustrated that 
Delaware River ports are char-
acterized by: 
⇒ A low number of jobs 
with high wages 
⇒ Niche – and largely un-
containerized –commodities 
⇒ Largely constrained landside in-
frastructure 
⇒ A drastic import/export trade 
imbalance 
⇒ A history of disjointed planning, 
marketing, and development 
⇒ Existing capacity for expansion 
These factors have dictated the im-
pact of Delaware River ports on the 
Greater Philadelphia economy and 
now comprise the framework for 
evaluating potential future growth of 
port activity.  
Within this framework, the report  
also illustrates that several factors 
will impact the potential future 
growth for Delaware River ports and 
will continue to drive the future of 
maritime commerce in the region. 
They include: 
⇒ Evolving global shipping trends 
⇒ Investments made by competitor 
ports 
⇒ The ability of Delaware River 
ports to adapt to the fluid com-
petitive landscape.  
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Key Recommendations 
Based on its key findings, the 
Economy League developed a series 
of recommendations highlighting 
opportunities for the region’s ports 
to enhance advantages and improve 
competitiveness through a renewed 
focus on coordination and compre-
hensive approaches to maritime busi-
ness development. They include: 
⇒ Leverage existing assets that are 
both inherent (geographic) and 
commodity-based (niche car-
goes) 
⇒ Strategically investing in infra-
structure enhancements (both 
terminal and landside) 
⇒ Collaborating to rationally lever-
age existing assets and strategi-
cally invest in the future. 
Leverage Existing Assets 
With centuries of continuous op-
erations, Delaware River ports have 
managed to survive adaptations in 
global trends, technology, and de-
mand. Nevertheless, to improve its 
competitiveness will require the 
Delaware River ports to take a proac-
tive approach in reconstituting its 
business to define a competitive po-
sition in the 21st century port indus-
try.  
To do so, Delaware River ports 
should leverage their existing assets, 
including expertise in niche cargos, 
proximity to consumer markets, and 
opportunities for improved port fa-
cilities. Efforts by the Delaware 
River ports to grow trade volumes 
and maintain or expand market share 
rest upon building on what the re-
gion already does well, as opposed to 
chasing business for which we are ill-
suited or at a competitive disadvan-
tage.  
Investment in Infrastructure      
Enhancements 
Expanding existing lines of busi-
ness or pursuing new ones will re-
quire investment in facilities, infra-
structure and marketing. Piecemeal 
or uncoordinated approaches 
should be avoided to ensure 
that the scarce resources spent 
have  maximum impact. 
Through densification and 
other investments in existing 
facilities, the region has the 
capacity to accommodate pro-
jected container traffic, and 
also has locations identified as 
suitable for future port development.  
Access to inland markets is critical 
to port competitiveness. For this 
reason, adequate rail and road con-
nections from port facilities to distri-
bution networks is critical to port 
expansion. In particular, competitive 
rail service will require increasing the 
region’s double stack clearance. Im-
proving double stack rail access 
would enhance port capacity by mak-
ing freight movement more efficient. 
Expanded double stack clearance 
would also help the port and region 
develop linkages with the Midwest, a 
critical growth market for potential 
expansion of Delaware River port 
activity.  
Collaborate for Efficient             
Deployment of Resources 
Although past port unification 
efforts have experienced limited suc-
cess, stakeholders recognized the 
benefits of coordinating and rational-
izing port operations. Business devel-
opment and national experts are clear 
that institutionalizing collaborative 
regional port activity is a prerequisite 
Section 5: Conclusions and Key Recommendations 
The region’s ports remain viable  
despite several limiting factors and 
could gain from global trends  
driving the future of maritime  
commerce. 
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for enhancing the competitive posi-
tion of the Delaware River ports.  
With three states and a mixture of 
public and private facilities, a single 
ownership and management struc-
ture for the region’s ports is unlikely, 
but there are key initiatives that could 
be undertaken to better coordinate 
port operations and development. 
Opportunities for doing so include: 
⇒ Joint market demand and 
cargo strategy 
⇒ Multi-state waterfront and 
port land use planning 
⇒ A region-wide capacity 
analysis and demand fore-
cast to prevent over or 
under supply of facilities, 
including comparative 
cost/benefit analyses of 
densification and expansion op-
portunities 
⇒ Joint marketing and branding 
efforts. 
The regional port industry would 
also benefit from a more holistic ap-
proach to port-related investment 
and development. A comprehensive 
approach to future port planning 
should include evaluation of various 
models of public and private financ-
ing and management of design, con-
struction, and operations of new and 
redeveloped port facilities. As ship-
ping companies, investment banks, 
and others seek to invest in ports, 
public authorities should carefully 
explore potential costs and benefits.  
Consideration also should be given 
to the off-site infrastructure demands 
from port development. Transporta-
tion improvements are likely to re-
main a public responsibility, even 
with private port development, and 
may be a prerequisite to future in-
vestment. 
 
A Defining Moment 
The Delaware River has reached a 
critical juncture in its commercial 
history. Potential for port growth is 
real but will hinge on the region’s 
ability to take a coordinated ap-
proach to future development. This 
situation analysis has highlighted 
both opportunities and challenges 
impacting the future of maritime 
commerce in Greater Philadel-
phia. As the region continues 
to reassess and revaluate its 
relationship to the Delaware 
River, port functions have the 
opportunity to remain an im-
portant part of the Greater 
Philadelphia economy as it has 
for over 300 years.  Successful 
growth in regional port activ-
ity will require a diverse group of 
port interests to rally around mutu-
ally beneficial goals.  Only through 
strategic and collaborative action can 
stakeholders ensure that the Dela-
ware River ports will thrive in the 
future. 
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Backhaul  
To load a freight vessel for its return 
to its point of origin. 
 
Berth  
Where a vessel “parks” at a port for 
loading and unloading. 
 
Breakbulk  
Goods shipped in small separable 
units.  For example, bags of cocoa 
beans. 
 
Bulk  
Unpacked, unbundled cargo.  It may 
be liquid (e.g., petroleum products) 
or dry (e.g., gravel or sand). 
 
CAGR  
Compound Annual Growth Rate, the 
year-over-year growth rate.  Often 
applied to changes in tonnage or 
value of cargo in relation to port ac-
tivity. 
 
Channel Depth  
Distance between the waterline and 
bed of the dredged body of water. 
 
Containerization  
System of freight transport where 
goods are placed in standardized 
containers that can be loaded onto 
ships, rail, or trucks. 
 
Densification 
Process by which capital upgrades 
are made at existing port facilities to 
increase the efficiency of land use.  
 
Distribution Facilities  
Warehouse/logistical centers where 
goods are organized for delivery. 
Double Stack  
Rail routes with overhead clearances 
sufficient for trains carrying two con-
tainers stacked atop one another to 
pass through. 
 
Drayage  
Logistical service in the shipping in-
dustry. 
 
Dredging 
Underwater excavation to remove 
bottom sediments and move them 
elsewhere, thus increasing the chan-
nel depth and facilitating the move-
ment of larger or more heavily laden 
vessels.  
 
DSPC 
Diamond State Port Corporation.  
The Delaware State agency that owns 
and operates the Port of Wilmington. 
 
DWT/Deadweight tonnage 
The weight of a loaded ship minus 
the weight of an empty ship.  The 
DWT includes the weight of cargo, 
crew, passengers, crew, and fuel. 
 
Gantry 
Crane used to move breakbulk cargo 
and containers on and off ships.  
May either be on rails or wheels. 
 
ILA 
The International Longshoremen’s 
Association is a union of maritime 
workers. 
 
Intermodal Transportation 
Freight or passenger movements that 
involve multiple forms of transporta-
tion between origin and destination. 
 
Jones Act 
Also known as the Merchant Marine 
Act of 1920, the Jones Act is a fed-
eral statute that governs the rights of 
sailors and restricts the movement of 
goods between U.S. port.  Goods 
may be moved by ship between U.S. 
ports only if the ship was made and 
registered in the United States. 
 
Labor Starts 
Appointed times per day when load-
ing or unloading of a vessel may be-
gin. 
 
Land bridging 
Moving goods from West Coast 
ports to the central and eastern U.S. 
via long-haul trucking or intermodal 
rail. 
 
Landside Logistical Networks 
The management of the flow of 
goods, incorporating information, 
transportation, warehousing, and 
transportation, once cargo has been 
offloaded from the ship. 
 
Lighter 
The act of transferring a commodity 
from ship-to-ship without anchoring.  
This is common practice with oil 
tankers because the large vessels can-
not fit into ports. 
 
Liner Operations 
Regularly scheduled commercial ship 
sailings along established trade lanes. 
 
Megaship 
Ships that typically have capacity for 
more than 8,000 TEUs. 
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Perishables 
Products that are temperature sensi-
tive, such as produce, meats, and 
pharmaceuticals. 
 
Project Cargo 
Freight that is unusually large in ei-
ther weight or size. An example of 
project cargo in this region is large 
windmill components destined for 
Gamesa, a Spanish manufacturer and 
supplier of energy technologies with 
facilities in Bucks County. 
 
PRPA 
Philadelphia Regional Port Authority.  
The state-created entity that is re-
sponsible for public port manage-
ment in Philadelphia. 
 
RESET 
Military equipment refurbishment 
program. 
 
RoRo 
Cargo, such as cars, machinery, and 
farm equipment, that can roll on and 
roll off vessels. 
Short Sea Shipping 
Hub and spoke system of freight 
movement to alleviate congestion 
and accommodate overflow demand. 
 
Short Ton 
A measurement of weight equal to 
2,000 lbs. A long ton is equal to 
2,240 lbs or 1,000 kilograms. 
 
SJPC 
South Jersey Port Corporation. State-
created agency that owns and oper-
ates public port facilities at the Port 
of Camden. 
 
Strategic Port 
Ports designated by the military as 
having logistical capabilities, security, 
and capacity sufficient for the han-
dling of military cargo. 
 
Terminal 
Maritime terminals are facilities 
where cargo is moved from ships to 
other modes of transportation.  
 
TEUs 
Twenty-foot Equivalent Units, the 
standard capacity measure for con-
tainers. Most containers today are 
forty feet, or 2 TEUs. 
 
Tidal Delays 
The amount of time a ship spends 
waiting for high tide because depth is 
insufficient to sail at low tide.  
 
Tonnage 
The cargo capacity of a ship, a meas-
urement of volume. 
 
Trade Rationalization 
Shipping patterns where goods get as 
close as possible to their final desti-
nation by water. 
 
Transshipment 
Goods that are shipped to one loca-
tion, transfer to another vessel, then 
continue on to their final destination. 
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Summary 
⇒ Philadelphia and surrounding 
towns along the Delaware River 
were settled to take advantage of 
the safe harbor and access to the 
resource-rich inland areas. 
⇒ Coal exports from the Lehigh 
Valley, development of railroads, 
and manufacturing activity in the 
region supported port growth in 
the 19th century. 
⇒ As coal exports waned, manufac-
turing moved, and port facilities 
failed to modernize quickly to 
attract containerized cargo; Dela-
ware River ports declined in 
prominence.   
⇒ Efforts to consolidate regional 
management of port opera-
tions have been attempted 
and failed, yet stakeholders 
still see opportunities for 
improved efficiencies 
through coordination and 
collaboration. 
 
Origins 
American cities – especially along 
the eastern seaboard – have histori-
cally developed around ports, which 
provided commercial access to wa-
terways and allowed for the conven-
ient exchange of both people and 
goods. Today, maritime commerce 
remains critical to the national econ-
omy, accounting for over 95 percent 
of the United States’ international 
trade by volume.19 
In Greater Philadelphia, commer-
cial activity originated with the Dela-
ware River. The land was initially 
inhabited by the Lenape (Delaware) 
people, and then settled by Europe-
ans in the early 1600s. After receiving 
the charter for Pennsylvania in 1681, 
William Penn founded Philadelphia 
on the river’s western bank and be-
gan dividing parcels of land among 
backers. Penn’s investors were im-
mediately drawn to the opportunity 
for maritime commerce and quickly 
purchased land within close prox-
imity to the river. From the very be-
ginning, the Delaware River played a 
critical role in Philadelphia’s emer-
gence as a commercial powerhouse 
in colonial America.  
The Delaware River’s commercial 
attractiveness was enhanced by its 
resource-rich hinterlands character-
ized by fertile farmland and ample 
forestland, providing the River’s 
ports with a natural agricultural ap-
peal. The Delaware Valley was also 
characterized by a temperate climate 
and an inland location, affording 
Delaware River ports a safe harbor 
and immediate access to inland trade 
routes, increasing Philadelphia’s vi-
ability as an international and domes-
tic port of call.  
However, Delaware River ports 
also faced an assortment of natural 
impediments. First and foremost, 
Philadelphia’s inland location, while 
safely removed from the ocean, was 
less convenient than coastal locations 
like New York. Moreover, navigating 
the River was considered hazardous 
because of its shallow water and scar-
city of lighthouses and accurate 
maps. On arrival in Philadelphia 
ships were greeted by thirty-foot high 
riverbanks, further complicating the 
logistics of cargo movement.20 By 
1720, Philadelphia had passed 
Charleston, SC as the third largest 
American port in annual trade vol-
ume.21 
Growth in maritime commerce 
continued through the 18th century, 
and by the time of the Revolutionary 
War, Philadelphia had become a pre-
mier port destination for both do-
mestic and international trade and 
the third most important commercial 
hub in the British Empire behind 
only London and Liverpool.22 
 
The Industrial Revolution 
The discovery of anthracite coal 
in the Lehigh Valley in 1792 acceler-
ated Philadelphia’s rise during the 
industrial revolution as the manufac-
turing hub of America. The advent 
of the steam locomotive enhanced 
access from the port to coalmining 
territory and other inland locations. 
While the railroad industry 
marginalized the use of canals, 
Philadelphia successfully lev-
eraged railroads as a new 
means to promote port activ-
ity. By the close of the 19th 
century, every wharf in the 
city had direct rail access, with 
service offering rates lower 
than that of New York or Boston.23 
In addition, many of the marine ter-
minals were owned by the rail com-
panies themselves, allowing ships to 
dock and unload free of wharfage 
charges.24 These features increased 
the competitiveness of Philadelphia 
as a port of call. 
In the late 19th century, advances 
in steamship technology improved 
the viability of transatlantic shipping 
routes and accelerated international 
maritime commerce along the East 
Coast of the U.S. Demands of bigger 
and faster ships pressured ports to 
modernize facilities. Philadelphia 
responded in 1895 by deepening the 
Delaware River from its natural 
depth of 17 feet to 26 feet.  
As a result, Philadelphia was able 
to add new transatlantic lines to sup-
port increases in both goods move-
ment and passenger travel.25 How-
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ever, as the new century would illus-
trate, the more immediate impact of 
steamship technology was on Phila-
delphia’s shipbuilding capacity. Al-
ready the premier 18th and 19th cen-
tury port for North American ship-
building, Philadelphia was poised to 
leverage steamship technology to 
become a dominant force in a new 
era of 20th century shipbuilding. 
At the turn of the 20th century, 
Philadelphia was still a top tier East 
Coast port of call, bolstered in large 
part by the Delaware Valley’s indus-
trial development into a manufactur-
ing powerhouse. In 1912, Philadel-
phia produced five percent of all 
manufactured goods in the United 
States, much of which were exported 
through the city’s port facilities. 
While Philadelphia had made a name 
for itself in the textile industry, 
the city also exhibited world-
class strength in a variety of 
building industries, including 
lumber, concrete, paints, roof-
ings, and fixtures.26 Industrial 
activity was also strong else-
where in the region, especially 
in cities and towns along the 
Delaware River.  
A variety of export markets were 
thriving, including coal, petroleum, 
iron, machinery, cotton, leather, 
grain, livestock, lumber, fertilizer, 
and tobacco. Bristol (PA) had be-
come a primary point of connection 
from the Delaware River to the Le-
high Valley coal region. It also 
boasted mill operations, developing 
industry strengths in wool, silk, and 
felt production. Trenton was a pri-
mary producer of machinery and 
agricultural equipment, as well as 
automobiles, carriages, bridges, and 
elevators. Camden had developed a 
number of specialties, including com-
mercial and military shipbuilding, 
iron and wood products, paper, 
paints, and coffee. Chester was a na-
tional leader in oil refining, while 
Wilmington boasted the largest pow-
der making plant in the world.  
By 1910, approximately 4 million 
tons of coal were being exported 
annually from Philadelphia to points 
along the East Coast and to the West 
Indies, while annual oil exports 
ranged from 250 million to 400 mil-
lion gallons.27 Philadelphia’s sugar 
industry also experienced rapid 
growth in the early 20th century, due 
in large part to the opening of the 
Panama Canal in 1914 that enhanced 
East Coast access to the port from 
the Hawaiian Islands. That year, 
Philadelphia refined approximately 
500,000 tons of raw sugar, approxi-
mately one-sixth of all sugar refined 
in the United States.28 Several invest-
ments were made to waterfront fa-
cilities in this period to support in-
dustrial growth, including a state-of-
the-art grain elevator at Girard Point 
and an ore handling plant at Port 
Richmond. 
Despite the improvements and a 
robust export market, by the late 19th 
century Philadelphia had begun to 
lag behind port competitors in the 
effort to modernize port facilities, 
negatively impacting the port com-
plex’s global competitiveness. Be-
tween 1900 and 1907, the city’s rank-
ing among worldwide ports in vol-
ume of trade fell thirteen spots, from 
38th in 1900 to 51st in 1907.29  Princi-
pal among modernization efforts was 
deepening the Delaware River, which 
had become increasingly important 
to account for rapid growth in ship 
size. At the time, the depth of the 
Delaware Channel was 28 feet, seven 
feet shallower than that of Boston 
and Baltimore and 10 feet shallower 
than New York.30 The failure to keep 
pace in this regard diminished Phila-
delphia’s relative attractiveness and 
utility of its port facilities.  
 
The Post-War Period 
Philadelphia’s post-World War II 
industrial decline had a markedly 
damaging impact on port competi-
tiveness. Compounding the city’s 
industrial decline was a weakening 
market for Pennsylvania coal and 
steel production, which had driven a 
large share of Philadelphia export 
activity through the first half of the 
century. The use of oil and natural 
gas decreased demand for coal, and 
high sulfur levels characteristic of 
Pennsylvania anthracite damaged its 
competitiveness in the remaining 
coal market.  
Philadelphia’s export market 
also suffered from the decline 
of Pennsylvania’s steel indus-
try, which by the 1950s and 
1960s had begun to succumb 
to rising costs, material short-
ages, environmental regula-
tions, and overseas competi-
tion. The resulting economic 
decline had a harmful effect 
on Philadelphia port activity, which 
relied on the city and state’s once-
strong industrial base for a viable 
export market to sustain global com-
petitiveness.31 
In fact, Philadelphia’s most sig-
nificant maritime activity during the 
mid-20th century was at the Navy 
Yard. Its 40,000 wartime employees 
built 53 ships and repaired over 500 
more, earning it the moniker 
“Arsenal of America.”32 The Navy 
Yard was able to satisfy the require-
ments of building large military ves-
sels due in part to deepening of the 
Delaware River to 40 feet in 1941.33 
However, after the war the demand 
for shipbuilding dropped precipi-
tously, and the Yard eventually 
ceased operations as a U.S. Navy 
facility in 1995.  
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Historical Port Governance 
Recognition of declining standing 
in the early 20th century spurred what 
became a century of port governance 
change. In 1907, Philadelphia Mayor 
John Rayburn moved to create a Mu-
nicipal Department of Wharves, 
Docks, and Ferries, charged with 
overseeing maritime activity and co-
ordinating improvements to port 
facilities.34 Through the 1910s and 
1920s, the Department oversaw a 
quadrupling of the number of pub-
licly owned piers. New “finger piers” 
employed new technology to im-
prove the efficiency of multimodal 
cargo movement, emphasizing con-
nections between railroads and load-
ing docks along Delaware Avenue.35 
While Philadelphia was commis-
sioning a municipal depart-
ment to manage its port facili-
ties, competitors had begun to 
see the benefits of inter-
jurisdictional collaboration in 
port governance. After many 
years of interstate battles, in 
1921 New York and New Jer-
sey formed the Port Authority 
of New York, later renamed 
the Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey, to oversee both states’ 
port infrastructure. As the first bi-
state port authority in the United 
States, New York/New Jersey eased 
political tension and became a model 
for regional port governance. 
In Philadelphia, regional port 
governance was much slower to take 
hold. In 1919, New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania created the Delaware River 
Joint Bridge Commission, which 
managed the construction of the 
Delaware River Bridge, later renamed 
the Benjamin Franklin Bridge. In 
1948, the Commission recommended 
the creation of a joint port authority, 
and in 1952 the Delaware River Port 
Authority (DRPA) was established as 
the Commission’s successor.36 How-
ever, the DRPA failed to take control 
of the region’s commercial port in-
terests and has played only an indi-
rect role in maritime trade on either 
side of the River.  
For most of the 20th century, 
Delaware River ports struggled to 
keep pace with an evolving maritime 
industry, resulting in a steady deterio-
ration of port business. In the 1980s 
this decline became more pro-
nounced. Between 1981 and 1987, 
the region’s non-petroleum imports 
and exports fell by 23 percent, with 
exports dropping by 74 percent.37 
This decline caught the attention of 
regional port stakeholders, prompt-
ing several investigations that con-
firmed the ports’ overall state of cri-
sis.38 
While some were quick to blame 
the port complex’s shallow channel 
and inland location for its weakened 
condition, many came to realize that 
one of the most significant impedi-
ments to growth was in fact self-
imposed. For decades, ports on both 
sides of the river had resisted devel-
oping a regional alliance for port 
governance, funding, and operations, 
opting instead to protect individual 
port interests at the expense of over-
all port competitiveness. While other 
regions had forged institutionalized 
partnerships, Philadelphia’s intra-
regional battles for shrinking port 
business was growing increasingly 
fierce, prompting a 1988 DRPA 
study to conclude: “‘The ports of the 
Delaware are a maritime house di-
vided against itself. The outside ob-
server need only spend a short pe-
riod’ with the port ‘community to 
become convinced he has walked 
onto the battlefield of a river war.’”39 
Recognizing the role regional in-
fighting had played in accelerating 
port decline, leaders in Delaware, 
New Jersey, and Pennsylvania began 
to call for “port unification,” spark-
ing the most concerted attempt at 
regional port governance in the his-
tory of the Delaware River. Champi-
ons of the port unification cause in-
cluded: New Jersey Governor Tho-
mas Kean; Pennsylvania Governor 
Robert Casey; business-led groups, 
such as the Greater Philadelphia 
Chamber of Commerce and the Pen-
jerdel Council; and the Maritime Ex-
change, an organization of port 
stakeholders.40 Delaware Governor 
Michael Castle was involved in initial 
unification discussions but would not 
continue to play an active role. 
Also endorsing unification was a 
gubernatorial panel commis-
sioned by Governor Casey 
and led by SmithKline 
Beecham CEO Henry Wendt 
to develop recommendations 
for resuscitating the Philadel-
phia ports. The Wendt report 
resolved that the Common-
wealth must take two steps to 
revive port activity: 1) pur-
chase the ports from the City of 
Philadelphia; and 2) unify the ports 
of Pennsylvania and New Jersey un-
der the Delaware River Port Author-
ity (DRPA). According to the com-
mittee report, these actions would 
have three specific benefits:  
⇒ A state takeover of Philadelphia’s 
ports would put Pennsylvania and 
New Jersey, which already con-
trolled the ports of Camden un-
der the South Jersey Port Corpo-
ration, on equal political footing; 
⇒ The combination of state owner-
ship and DRPA management 
would afford the ports an un-
precedented level of capital to 
pursue much needed improve-
ments to infrastructure; and 
⇒ DPRA control would represent 
concerted regional port govern-
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ance, institutionalizing bi-state 
cooperation and mitigating river 
infighting that had threatened 
overall port competitiveness. 
In July 1989, Pennsylvania pur-
chased Philadelphia’s port facilities, 
replacing the Philadelphia Port Cor-
poration with the Philadelphia Re-
gional Port Authority (PRPA). Unifi-
cation was the first of PRPA’s three 
strategic initiatives, which also in-
cluded retention and expansion of 
Pennsylvania port business and de-
velopment of the South Philadelphia 
rail yard. In creating the PRPA, the 
state pledged $33 million towards 
initial port improvements, with the 
promise of additional future funds 
from DRPA’s expanded coffers.41 
After nearly two years of state 
leadership change and bi-
state political posturing, in 
1992 New Jersey and Penn-
sylvania both passed bills 
that dramatically expanded 
DRPA’s ability to manage a 
unified port. The DPRA’s 
revised compact allowed the 
Authority to: “acquire rail-
roads and related facilities, 
even using the power of 
eminent domain; operate terminals, 
transportation and commerce-related 
facilities; engage in a wide range of 
economic development and job-
creation initiatives; and consolidate 
government-owned docks and termi-
nals into a single operation and mar-
ket the area’s public and private port 
facilities worldwide.”42 
In December 1993, the bi-state 
merger was approved by the PRPA 
and SJPC, creating the Ports of 
Philadelphia and Camden, a not-for-
profit subsidiary of the DPRA to be 
governed by an 18-member board, 
with nine appointees from each state. 
Made official in May 1994, the 
merger set in motion the naming of a 
board chairman, a series of additional 
board appointments, and a national 
search for a qualified CEO. It also 
empowered the DRPA to engage in 
the final phase of port unification: 
the official takeover of PRPA and 
SJPC port facilities.43 
Considered at the time to be a 
two-year process, DRPA assumption 
of bi-state port ownership was al-
most immediately snagged by intense 
politicking and legal challenges. By 
the end of 1994, port unification was 
in jeopardy. A lawsuit filed by Tho-
mas Holt, owner of the largest pri-
vate operating port facility in the re-
gion, argued that the DRPA’s sub-
sidization of public ports would rep-
resent unfair competition with pri-
vate facilities. Also at issue was intra-
state anger among New Jersey legis-
lators at Governor Christie Whit-
man’s board appointment choices, 
with several State Senators threaten-
ing to block the appointments alto-
gether.  
The mechanics of staff merger 
had also become contentious, com-
plicated by a provision requiring that 
no port employees be fired in the 
process. Finally, renewed port activ-
ity drove port stakeholders to protest 
to unification and explicitly act in 
ways that would hinder the takeover. 
On both sides of the river, port lead-
ers began pursuing new leases and 
maverick port operations that would 
ultimately limit the DPRA’s authority 
and flexibility should the takeover 
occur.44 
Two years after the DPRA take-
over process had begun, legal and 
political battles had paralyzed unifi-
cation efforts. By 1996 very few pro-
ponents of the original plan re-
mained. To many, it seemed the uni-
fication effort had actually soured 
port relations, between port stake-
holders and DPRA officials, between 
the two states, and within the states 
themselves. The final death knell to 
unification was delivered in 1998, 
when the SJPC withdrew its offer to 
voluntarily turn over its ports to the 
DRPA, asking instead for an annual 
rent payment of $2 million. SJPC 
also insisted on the DPRA assuming 
its liabilities, including debt service 
obligations, environmental problems, 
and pending litigation. Such 
an agreement on the part of 
DPRA would have required 
a similar arrangement with 
PRPA.  
By fall of 1998, port unifica-
tion was all-but abandoned. 
The CEO of the Ports of 
Philadelphia and Camden, 
hired after a national search 
following the 1994 merger, decided 
not to pursue renewal of his contract 
and left the region. Port executives 
promised employment in the unified 
port agency moved on to other posi-
tions. By that time a judge had dis-
missed Holt’s lawsuit questioning the 
legality of public subsidies, but unifi-
cation efforts had been irrevocably 
damaged.  
Recognizing the reality of the 
situation, the Ports of Philadelphia 
and Camden board members decided 
to cut their losses and devised a new 
plan to develop unified port market-
ing, resolving that each state would 
retain rights to own and operate its 
port facilities separately.45 
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Calculating Impacts 
To estimate the magnitude of 
economic impact of the port indus-
try, information regarding 2005 activ-
ity at Delaware River marine ports in 
the 11-county Philadelphia-Camden 
metro area was compiled. This as-
sessment includes maritime trade 
activity at both public and private 
terminals along the river and reflects 
the availability of the terminal-related 
data needed to build this analysis – 
namely the employment on-site to 
conduct port activity. This analysis 
shows the resulting annual economic 
impact for the group of Delaware 
River ports together and for the 
Philadelphia port complex alone. 
Impacts and activity of only non-oil 
facilities are also presented. 
The economic multiplier model 
from IMPLAN46 was used to esti-
mate the impact of on-site port and 
terminal employment. Two versions 
of the model were assembled by Se-
lect Greater Philadelphia using the 
latest IMPLAN model (2006): an 11-
county47 Greater Philadelphia Metro 
area model for analysis of the Dela-
ware River port complex and a single
-county model of Philadelphia to 
address the stand alone evaluation of 
Philadelphia ports (public and private 
facilities). 
Economic Impact 
The IMPLAN analysis system is 
an input-output model that calculates 
multipliers. Once IMPLAN has pro-
vided a description of the direct ef-
fects (whether as jobs or dollars of 
sales), it measures the added eco-
nomic activity that is subsequently 
triggered. This additional effect is 
made up of indirect and induced im-
pact. Indirect impact reflects the sub-
sequent rounds of purchase interac-
tions among businesses across differ-
ent industries (some are local) to buy 
inputs in the form of goods and ser-
vices for their respective production 
processes. Households are also paid 
to supply labor to assemble/improve 
the inputs into a final product or 
service. When local households 
spend their after-tax earnings for 
household consumption, it creates 
cycles of wage generation and more 
household spending. This describes 
the induced impact. The sum of the 
direct, indirect, and induced impact is 
the total economic impact. 
The success in using this tool for 
impact estimation depends on: (a) 
data quality; (b) knowing how to de-
scribe the workings of the policy/
facility under study to the IMPLAN 
model; and (c) ensuring that sectors 
selected in the IMPLAN model to 
represent the profile of direct activity 
do a good job of representing the 
other direct aspects (wages, sales or 
jobs) of each sector in use and a 
plausible set of indirect responses. 
Tax Revenue Impact 
IMPLAN was further employed 
to determine the tax revenue impact 
associated with port activity in the 
city and region. The level of tax reve-
nues produced by an individual sce-
nario is a function of its total eco-
nomic impact, specifically the in-
creases in employment, output, value 
added, and labor income produced 
by that scenario’s direct increase in 
employment.  
The tax analysis estimated 
changes in the following types of 
state taxes: individual income tax, 
corporate income tax, general sales 
and use tax, selective sales taxes (e.g., 
cigarettes, alcohol), and other state 
taxes and fees. Increases in the City 
of Philadelphia’s wage and sales taxes 
were also determined. Business Privi-
lege Tax and other taxes unique to 
Philadelphia were not included.  Fur-
ther analysis may be done to deter-
mine if these taxes are significant 
enough to include in further models. 
Determining regional tax reve-
nues. Because this study covered 
parts of three states, each with its 
own unique tax system and tax rates, 
it was necessary to distribute the total 
economic impact generated by the 
IMPLAN model across the three 
states. The total changes in employ-
ment, which IMPLAN provides on a 
place of work basis, were distributed 
across 11 counties based on the Jour-
ney to Work commuting flows for 
the region from the 2000 Census of 
Population.  
The commuting flow data show, 
for a single county, all the counties 
where its employed residents worked 
in 2000 and also the county of resi-
dence for all the persons who 
worked there in 2000. For example, 
in 2000 Philadelphia’s place-of-work 
employment was 660,050 persons, 
comprised of 429,667 residents who 
also worked in the city and 230,383 
residents from other counties who 
commuted into Philadelphia to work.  
Gross output, valued added, and 
earnings were distributed across the 
11 counties based on 2005 personal 
income data published by the Bureau 
of Economic Analysis (BEA), which 
is available at http://www.bea.gov/
regional/reis/.  
Since the amount of individual 
income taxes paid is determined by 
where a worker lives as opposed to 
where he or she is employed, it was 
necessary to convert the county-level 
employment and earnings data from 
a place-of-work to a place-of-
residence basis. The Journey to Work 
flows were used to convert the em-
ployment estimates, while 2005 per-
sonal income data was also used to 
convert the wage and proprietor’s 
earnings estimates. Supplemental 
income (i.e., employer-paid fringe 
benefits and contributions to retire-
ment) was subtracted from IM-
PLAN’s labor income results to ob-
tain wage and proprietor earnings 
that are subject to income and wage 
taxes.  
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In order to use the results of the 
IMPLAN model, it was necessary to 
derive effective tax rates for each of 
the taxes being considered. An effec-
tive tax rate is expressed in percent 
terms; it is obtained by dividing the 
annual revenues collected for a spe-
cific tax (e.g., individual income, cor-
porate income, sales, etc.) by the pri-
mary economic activity that the tax is 
generated by. For example, if total 
individual income taxes paid in a year 
are $2 million from a total earnings 
base of $100 million, then the effec-
tive tax rate is 2 percent. 
The first step in deriving the ef-
fective tax rates was to obtain actual 
2006 values for the amount collected 
in each of the three states for the 
taxes listed above. This data was ob-
tained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
2006 State Government Tax collec-
tions data, available at: http://
www.censu s . gov/govs/www/
statetax06.html. This source showed 
that total individual income tax col-
lections during 2006 were $1,018.6 
million in Delaware, $9,091.7 million 
in New Jersey, and $9,021.9 million 
in Pennsylvania. 
The next step was to obtain state-
level totals in 2006 for the same vari-
ables provided by the IMPLAN 
model. Estimates for gross output, 
value added (i.e., Gross Domestic 
Product by State), employment, and 
labor income in each of the three 
states were obtained.  
Effective tax rates were then cal-
culated for each of the taxes by di-
viding revenues collected by the ap-
propriate variable.  For example, col-
lections of individual income taxes in 
New Jersey during 2006 were divided 
by total labor income in the state for 
the same year to obtain the effective 
tax rate for individual income taxes, 
while corporate income tax receipts 
in Pennsylvania for 2006 were di-
vided by the state’s output in 2006 to 
obtain the effective tax rate for cor-
porate income taxes.  Once the effec-
tive tax rates were derived, they were 
multiplied by the appropriate meas-
ures of economic activity to estimate 
the increases in tax revenues.  
Determining Philadelphia tax 
revenues. The first step in estimat-
ing the increases in Philadelphia’s 
wage tax revenues was to estimate 
place of residence employment for 
each scenario since City residents 
paid a higher wage tax of 4.301 per-
cent in 2006 regardless of where they 
worked. It was also estimated that 
the number of employed residents of 
the other 10 counties that worked in 
Philadelphia paid a lower wage tax of 
3.7716 percent in 2006. The two em-
ployment estimates were multiplied 
by county-specific figures for wage 
and proprietor earnings per job to 
obtain the total amounts subject to 
the wage tax, and these two figures 
were multiplied by the appropriate 
wage tax rate from 2006.  
The resulting shares of wage tax 
payments by residents and non-
residents were compared against ac-
tual data to check the accuracy of our 
methodology. The City of Philadel-
phia’s Department of Revenue indi-
cated that 61 percent of total wage 
taxes in 2006 were paid by residents 
of Philadelphia versus 39 percent 
paid by non-residents. By compari-
son, this study estimates that just 
over 64 percent of the wage tax pay-
ments were made by residents; the 
higher share is likely due to the fact 
the difference between the average 
salaries of residents and non-
residents is less in the port sector 
than in other sectors such as Fi-
nances, and Professional and Busi-
ness Services. 
The City of Philadelphia levies an 
additional 1 percent sales tax on top 
of the 6 percent Pennsylvania sales 
and use tax, so the state sales tax 
revenue estimate was divided by 6 to 
obtain additional revenues received 
by the City. Finally, the effective 
sales tax rate for New Jersey was ad-
justed upward to account for the fact 
that the sales tax rate was increased 
from 6 percent to 7 percent on July 
1, 2006. 
 
Calculating “Direct” Employ-
ment 
When reviewing the best estimate 
of port facilities and private terminal 
jobs (termed the direct effect or di-
rect jobs) to base the economic im-
pact measurement on, it is important 
to understand what is being de-
scribed. The estimate describes on-
site employment functions.  Other 
support activities involved in running 
a specific facility at a port and termi-
nal represent indirect effects occur-
ring with suppliers or vendors that 
contribute to water cargo transaction 
(e.g., off-site warehousing, trucking, 
export packing, etc.) 
Some researchers and consultants 
augment the concept of what the 
direct effect includes typically when 
evaluating transportation facilities 
such as water ports and airports. 
They add many of the indirect (off-
site) functions into the direct cate-
gory and the consequence is their 
analysis presents a larger number of 
direct jobs and a disproportionately 
smaller number of indirect jobs. In 
the process of assembling the 2005 
employment data for this exercise, it 
became clear that two of the three 
public port facilities in the Delaware 
River port system are associated with 
direct effects congruous with on-site 
jobs. We have attempted to place all 
facilities’ employment on an equal 
footing.  Direct jobs are on-site and 
include union and non-union posi-
tions.  Off-site port-related activity is 
handled as an indirect effect of the 
port.  
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Employment of Port-Reliant Business  
in Greater Philadelphia, Importers 2006 
NAICS 
Code Description Jobs 
111 Crop Production 550 
212 Mining 108 
221 Utilities 110 
236 Construction 50 
237 Heavy and Civil Engineering Construction 40 
238 Specialty Trade Contractors 26 
311 Food Manufacturing 1,719 
312 Beverage & Tobacco Product Manufacturing 140 
313 Textile Mills 293 
314 Textile Product Mills 50 
315 Apparel Manufacturing 20 
316 Leather and Allied Product Manufacturing 20 
321 Wood Product Manufacturing 6 
322 Paper Manufacturing 1,118 
323 Printing and Related Support Activities 475 
324 Petrol and Coal Product Manufacturing 2,583 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 19,309 
326 Plastics and Rubber Product Manufacturing 677 
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing 362 
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 528 
332 Fabricated Metal Manufacturing 98 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 384 
334 Computer & Electrical Product Manufacturing 16,989 
335 Electric Equipment Manufacturing 1,297 
336 Tran. Equipment Manufacturing 701 
337 Furniture Manufacturing 242 
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing 162 
423 Wholesale – Durable Goods 1,956 
424 Wholesale – Non-Durable Goods 2,624 
444 Retail – Blding Material and Garden Supplies 85 
445 Retail – Food and Beverage 1,315 
447 Gasoline Stations 746 
448 Retail – Clothing 487 
452 Retail – General Merchandise 204 
453 Retail – Miscellaneous 4 
454 Non-store Retailers 98 
484 Truck Transportation 42 
488 Support Activities for Transportation 901 
493 Warehousing and Storage 161 
511 Publishing 1,330 
541 Prof. Scientific, Tech., Services 124 
561 Administrative and Support Services 266 
611 Educational Services 120 
624 Social Assistance 185 
Total Jobs With Port-Reliant Importing Firms 58,705 
Source: PIERS 2006 for Port of Philadelphia (excludes Port of Wilmington). 
Delaware River ports also have an economic impact re-
lated to their customer base, which is comprised of firms 
across different industries that rely on water transportation 
to ship or receive products. Based upon information from 
the Port Import Export Reporting Service (PIERS) 2006 
database of importers and exporters provided by the Phila-
delphia Regional Port Authority and employment for port 
customers in the 11-county area derived from Dun and 
Bradstreet data, it is estimated that “port-reliant” firms em-
ploy 72,825 people across Greater Philadelphia.4 Of this to-
tal, 58,705 positions are related to imports and 14,120 to 
exports, a disparity that reflects the region’s import-export 
trade imbalance.  
Much of this activity arises from firms involved in the 
manufacturing of chemicals, computer and electronic prod-
ucts, and petroleum and coals products. With the region’s 
expertise in perishable items and steel, it is unsurprising that 
firms in the region are creating finished products from those 
materials and exporting them through ports in Philadelphia 
and South Jersey. While it is not possible to assess the value 
of Delaware River ports to day-to-day operations, it can be 
surmised that for a great many port-reliant firms, a disrup-
tion in port services would have a some impact on business 
activity. However, port-reliant employment estimates are for 
APPENDIX D: PORT-RELATED EMPLOYMENT 
Appendix D: Port-Related Employment 
NAICS 
Code Description Jobs 
221 Utilities 21 
236 Construction 3 
238 Specialty Trade Contractors 1 
311 Food Manufacturing 1,993 
315 Apparel Manufacturing 60 
322 Paper Manufacturing 64 
324 Petrol and Coal Product Manufacturing 40 
325 Chemical Manufacturing 5,335 
326 Plastics and Rubber Product Manufacturing 811 
331 Primary Metal Manufacturing 2,625 
332 Fabricated Metal Manufacturing 62 
333 Machinery Manufacturing 84 
336 Tran. Equipment Manufacturing 700 
423 Wholesale – Durable Goods 1,222 
424 Wholesale – Non-Durable Goods 436 
441 Motor Vehicle and Parts Dealers 26 
444 Retail – Bldg Material & Garden Supplies 200 
445 Retail – Food and Beverage 2 
541 Prof. Scientific, Tech, Services 400 
561 Administrative and Support Services 3 
562 Waste Management and Remediation Services 32 
Total Jobs With Port-Reliant Exporting Firms 14,120 
Employment of Port-Reliant Business  
in Greater Philadelphia, Exporters 2006 
context only and should not be added to direct, indirect, and 
induced employment estimates. 
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Conference Call 
July 26, 2007 
Topic: Global Issues & Implications 
for Delaware River Ports and the 
Port of Philadelphia 
Panelists 
Steve Fitzroy, Fitzroy Associates;  
Shashi Kumar, Dean, U.S. Merchant 
Marine Academy; Elizabeth Ogard, 
Prime Focus Consulting; John 
Rounesville, Horizon Lines. 
Moderator 
Lisa Petraglia, EDR Group 
Excerpts 
Hierarchy of U.S. Ports 
Kumar: The Port of Philadelphia is 
not and will not become be a top tier 
port – even on the East Coast. Its 
niche is primarily viewed as a bulk 
port (i.e., fruit, other agricultural 
commodities, and petroleum).  With 
respect to container growth pros-
pects there are two criteria that limit 
the Port of Philadelphia: (a) centrality 
(population density), and (b) interme-
diacy (ability to attract supplemental cargo 
typically for transshipment). In both 
cases the Ports of NY/NJ eclipse the 
Port of Philadelphia.  The 45 foot 
draft, while important, is not going 
to add a sustained competitive ad-
vantage in terms of attracting bigger 
containerships.  A 2 or 3 fold in-
crease in global container move-
ments will surely exhaust all U.S. 
ports by 2015. 
Fitzroy: Port of Philadelphia will 
never be NY/NJ or LA/Long 
Beach.  Not realistic to think the 
Port of Philadelphia would attain 3-4 
million TEU’s or 50 million short 
tons per year.  However, the entire 
system of Delaware River ports 
(particularly Wilmington) has huge 
growth potential.  Wilmington has 
already established itself as an impor-
tant niche for containerized 
(refrigerated) fruit, which has grown 
significantly. Separate from any de-
velopments related to a port inland 
distribution network  (PIDN), the Port 
of Philadelphia may carve out a niche 
related to reaching secondary mar-
kets in central and western Pennsyl-
vania as well as Ohio and other mid-
western market areas.  Port of Phila-
delphia might consider looking to 
establishing new markets via the 
North Sea to reach Baltic and eastern 
European markets. 
Ogard: The Port of Philadelphia is 
a second tier, niche port in compari-
son to the deep water East Coast 
container ports.  According to Sean 
Mahoney, Director of Marketing for 
the Philadelphia Regional Port Au-
thority, Philadelphia is perceived to 
have a poor reputation with labor 
which is undeserved.  The Port of 
Philadelphia actually offers 19 start 
times daily while Port of NY only 
has 5. Many feel that Philadelphia’s 
location, up the Delaware river is a 
disadvantage for European cargo,  
but there is no disadvantage for 
South American cargo or carriers 
using the Panama Canal. There are 
clearance issues for double-stack rail, 
and this is a  hindrance for shippers 
who want to move double stack traf-
fic. Rail connections from the port 
are somewhat circuitous, for exam-
ple, the CSX railroad must go north 
or south when leaving the port, to go 
to western markets. While rail invest-
ment is persistently a “big issue” be-
cause of the magnitude of the pro-
jects and costs. Finding funding to 
clear double stack routes is not easy. 
The Port of Philadelphia has sur-
vived with the current rail access be-
cause of its large surrounding market, 
accessible by truck and because it is 
primarily a bulk cargo port.  Class 1 
railroads prefer long haul railroad 
markets.  Highway access issues may 
become a priority to achieve future 
growth at the port. 
There are landside issues at NY/
NJ. Huge containerships require 
large warehouse facilities and suitable 
parcels of property in the vicinity of 
the NY/NJ ports are scarce. This 
could mean an opportunity for Phila-
delphia’s port, if ocean lines currently 
calling  NY/NJ shift southward to be 
closer to the large distribution cen-
ters in Pennsylvania.  Today the Port 
of Philadelphia does not have an 
Asian service. If the Port could es-
tablish an Asian service, this might 
be an opportunity for Philadelphia.  
(Kumar agrees.) 
Rounesville: Philadelphia has good 
niche for refrigerated (reefer) cargo 
which is a very attractive feature for 
shippers. Reefer containers exhibit 
the highest revenue – per unit – for 
most shipping lines.  Pharmaceutical 
companies depend on refrigerated 
containers that once landside move 
predominantly by truck. 
Global Issues 
Fitzroy: Shipping lines determine 
where routes will be established (e.g., 
first ports of call on trans-Atlantic 
routes) and hence where dredging 
investment must be made to capture 
that business.  Philadelphia is not 
likely to be the first port if call for 
large container vessels. However, 
some cargo may be lightered off at 
other ports before going to Phil. In 
this case the 45 foot draft may be 
sufficient for some time.  
Smaller container vessels are com-
ing on the market (fabricated by 
Philadelphia-based ship building 
company–AKER) for Hawaiian trade 
as a result of Jones Act. Vessels of 
this size can already access Philadel-
phia and Delaware ports without 
deepening the current channel. 
Kumar: Panama Canal has growing 
delays and likely will be saturated by 
2008.  As a result more service will 
divert through the Suez Canal from 
Asian and West Asian ports to East 
Coast ports until Panama expansion 
is completed  in 2014 or 2015. Mean-
while, all major East Coast ports are 
expected to be at capacity by 2015.  
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While every East Coast port should 
not aim to be a mega-port, that does-
n’t mean there aren’t opportunities 
for those ports which megaships do 
not call on.  There will be a realloca-
tion of trade activity by vessel type 
when certain ports take on a growing 
share of megaship carried cargo.  
Ogard: There are serious environ-
mental concerns in Southern Califor-
nia as these ports seek to expand.  
Southern California is already dealing 
with diesel  emission issues related to 
truck drayage and marine emissions. 
All port are watching the Port of Los 
Angeles/Long Beach in their effort 
to spread peak gate demand to off-
peak terminal hours. (e.g., PIER 
PASS, an incentive program (per 
container) to induce shipping and 
trucking lines to call on the port dur-
ing off-peak congestion periods). 
Security issues have become para-
mount and the introduction of  
TWIC (transportation worker identi-
fication cards for on-port worker 
clearance) may cause administrative 
related delays if everyone waits until 
closer to the deadline to get their 
credentials. Some are concerned that 
there may be a worker shortage if the 
current workforce does not comply 
with the process.  
Efficiency is also an issue. Many 
ports in the U.S. have a mission to 
create  jobs. While efficiency is im-
portant to attract customers, funding 
for productivity improvements is 
often slow to materialize.48 U.S. port 
productivity is typically constrained 
by worker rules, which is one reason 
productivity is not as high in the U.S. 
as it is in Asian ports. Railroad inter-
modal service particularly on the 
West Coast is becoming constrained 
by key choke points, which are cre-
ated by sheer train volumes, steep 
mountain grades and restricted tun-
nels. As a result of the labor issues in 
2004, many containerized shippers 
have reevaluated their ports of entry 
and are diversifying their ports of 
call. Marine shipments which used to 
arrive on the West Coast are now 
arriving at East Coast U.S. ports. 
Some shippers are looking at a re-
verse Suez Canal operation.  Land-
side transportation can  add as much 
as 30 percent to the total inland 
transportation  cost of getting the 
goods to market.  In the ideal world,  
a  shipping line, would only call a few 
ports and would operate full vessels, 
with quick and efficient terminal 
handling operations, and all markets 
would have a back-haul. We aren’t 
there yet.  
Rounesville: There has been a green 
movement across all industries. 
Dredging and expansion will be hin-
dered by environmental rules. There 
has been revenue erosion (for ship-
pers) due to increasing rail rates; 
these are hard to pass on to the cus-
tomer.  Shipping lines would prefer 
to take on business that requires as 
little intermodal movements as possi-
ble for protecting profits on the 
transaction. 
⇒ Issue 1: Issues that affect a shipping 
line’s profitability other than port 
depth or vessel operating costs 
Ogard: Market density and the 
ability to backhaul cargo helps. 
Kumar: Competition among other 
shipping lines to that port, but 
equally important is maintaining cus-
tomer loyalty and market share, par-
ticularly in the container business. 
Rounesville: While market density is 
viewed as crucial, a port like Jackson-
ville (lacking market density) has pro-
moted several of its locational advan-
tages such as good roads, excellent 
rail connections, and ample and com-
petitive supply of truckers. 
Implications for Philadelphia 
⇒ Issue 2: How water shipping services 
might realistically evolve and how it 
would affect relative position of ports 
Fitzroy: New services will evolve if 
justified – based on efficiency and 
profitability of vessels. There has 
been a reaction to increases in rail 
rates. However, ignoring intermodal 
connections would be a mistake. Op-
portunities may exist around new 
services to handle biofuels coming 
from South America and the export 
of US farm products to Europe 
(building on the reefer capacity in 
Wilmington).  Also exports of dis-
tiller’s dried grains (DDGs) are ex-
pected to increase substantially as 
corn stocks are converted to domes-
tic ethanol production.  There is a 
significant export capacity for these 
products to Europe.49 
Kumar: Philadelphia should focus 
on CAFTA countries which use 
smaller vessels. Short-sea shipping 
could work and I’m a bit surprised it 
hasn’t taken hold yet. There is room 
for it, but you must use a Jones’ Act 
ship which is a problem since there 
aren’t enough vessels with these 
American flagships. 
Ogard: Short-sea shipping has 
strong parallel with intermodal rail. If 
the government subsidizes it, then it 
may be introduced before the pure 
market signals would warrant its in-
troduction. What needs to be worked 
out is the frequency, cost, and profit-
ability of a specific short-sea route, 
and right now, even with truck con-
gestion being what it is, a short-sea 
movement can’t compete with the 
truck. In a recent study looking at 
water service between Burns Harbor, 
Indiana and Milwaukee, Wisconsin, 
truck rates are still too low and the 
transit times are too slow between 
the two terminal points.   
⇒ Issue 3: Types of factors that can be 
attributed to a port’s loss of market 
share 
Rounesville: Philadelphia had a big 
loss of market share when a Puerto 
Rico shipper folded. Alternate ser-
vice was located by the interested 
parties; the service now calls the Port 
of NY/NJ. 
Ogard: Rates on landside transpor-
tation are key.  Port of Tacoma saw 
shipping lines migrate down to Port 
of LA due to a landside transport 
cost increase for one line. 
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Kumar: Union vs. non-union labor 
and other costs associated with using 
a port’s facilities. Capacity issues 
have somewhat curtailed the ship-
ping line’s ability to shop for the best 
port-of-call. 
⇒ Issue 4: What it would take for Phila-
delphia to harness an anticipated over-
flow of growth at NY/NJ 
Fitzroy: PIDN is a possibility. It is 
in competition with New Jersey 
inland warehouses, some (in central 
New Jersey) effectively closing the 
distance between activity generated 
at the Port of NY/NJ and Philadel-
phia. Inter-port agreements would 
pave the way to securing overflow at 
NY/NJ; stimulating investment in 
the Philadelphia region for ware-
housing/distribution facilities net-
work and learning to compete with 
the New Jersey warehousing busi-
ness. 
Ogard: Philadelphia needs to first 
improve its poor intermodal connec-
tions (as defined by FHWA) around 
the port complex. Trains which run 
along Delaware Avenue can block 
access to terminals. Access to I-95 
moves along city congested streets. 
Trains blocking at-grade rail cross-
ings can create delays for motorists 
and trucks. During peak traffic, if a 
train blocks the grade crossings as 
much as a 40-minute delay has been 
reported  in getting to the nearest 
interstate connection. Some vessels 
calling NY/NJ don’t have their own 
terminals, and currently share facili-
ties at other carrier’s terminal.  This 
makes for uncertainty/vulnerability 
regarding future availability of termi-
nal resources, especially if the pri-
mary tenant grows into the full ter-
minal area. As a result these smaller 
carriers are quite interested in consid-
ering the Port of Philadelphia, yet 
terminal access issues create doubt. 
Philadelphia must clarify their core 
competence and market their ser-
vices to specific users. Philadelphia 
has an advantage with access to Le-
high Valley, Carlisle and Harrisburg 
Distribution Centers. It would be 
helpful to segment the current cus-
tomer base, strategically target, and 
sell the port’s high velocity, high security 
traits to new users who would value 
these attributes. For example, Phila-
delphia might clarify its market niche 
as a premier refrigerated load center 
on the East Coast, and target users in 
these markets that they believe they 
provide a competitive advantage.  
(e.g., refrigerated dairy products or 
fruit). 
⇒ Issue 5: How the additional five feet of 
draft would affect the current standing 
of Philadelphia 
Kumar: Every other port is deep-
ening its channels.  The effect will be 
short-lived. 
Fitzroy: It is important to ask for a 
port such as Philadelphia’s (given its 
current activity profile) how much is 
depth a differentiator among the 
class of ports for which it is truly in 
competition with?  What kind of 
business would you lose if you didn’t 
dredge? 
⇒ Issue 6: What Philadelphia must do 
to aggressively grow its container busi-
ness 
Kumar: I have never considered 
Philadelphia to be a player in the 
container market. They would need a 
huge marketing campaign and draw 
customers by offering a lower price.  
They need to evolve certain services 
and make additional terminal invest-
ment. 
Fitzroy: Quickest to get cargo off 
the dock and onto its destination will 
be a key selling point, whether this is 
by on-dock rail, double-stack dock to 
the mainline.  Partnership of port 
with rail industry participants would 
be a big plus and it should be mar-
keted as such. 
Ogard: Show how you stack up 
against port competitors in terms of 
throughput time, cost, and service. 
Sell your niche and make the case for 
why customers should come.  Phila-
delphia would need to do complete 
study on transit time and compare 
strengths and weaknesses with com-
petitive ports; look at primary mar-
kets and their  competitive advantage 
for users in markets that are in their 
niche; and need to make the case 
about why people should come. 
⇒ Issue 7: Why global private investment 
aimed at port infrastructure might 
consider Philadelphia 
Fitzroy: Equity investors will need 
to know their expected return-on-
investment, the value proposition 
and likely risk sharing with the port 
authority as well as the State.  The 
Governors and the Secretary’s of 
Transportation in both New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania have commis-
sioned high-level studies on public-
private partnerships in the past year.  
The timing is right to assess private 
equity interest in port infrastructure 
investments. 
Kumar: People are looking to in-
vest; there are many examples of pri-
vatization outside the U.S. 
⇒ Issue 8: If the Port of Wilmington 
creates a ceiling on growth for Philadel-
phia 
Kumar: Wilmington being closer 
to open water does cause a problem 
for Philadelphia’s competitiveness 
since ships run on a tight schedule. 
Ogard: PRPA needs to ask: Who is 
the Port of Wilmington selling to and 
how do you offset their advantage of 
being closer to open water?  Would 
the Wilmington users find value in 
Philadelphia? 
Fitzroy: Airports offer an analogy 
to marine ports. Reliever airports 
were developed recently when big 
airports reached maximum capacity. 
The lesson is that all ports may gain 
if they cooperate.  
Conclusions 
Ogard: I’m excited about the Port 
of Philadelphia. There is a lot of op-
portunity, and the Port is doing a lot 
of interesting things right now when 
you consider dredging and Port de-
velopment opportunities. PennDOT 
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is focused on freight transportation 
as well as corridor opportunities. The 
stars could be lining up properly. The 
Port needs to explore an increase in 
refrigerated users who need storage 
near a large customer base. Highway 
improvements are needed. Look into 
securing an Asian container service. 
Fitzroy: It could establish relation-
ships with up and coming regions – 
especially in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe/Baltics, and Africa. 
Rounesville: Refrigerated cargo is 
very important. It is time sensitive 
and pays more than other cargo. 
————————— 
Conference Call 
November 16, 2007 
Topic: Future Scenarios for Delaware 
River Ports 
Panelists 
Elizabeth (Libby) Ogard, Prime Focus; 
Sashi Kumar, Dean of the US Mer-
chant Marine Academy; Steve Fitzroy,  
Transport Economics & International 
Trade, EDR Group 
Moderator 
Lisa Petraglia, EDR Group 
Summary of Scenarios 
Scenario 1: “Base case.” As 
defined by DRI/WEFA forecasts to 
2020 for the ACE Re-Analysis Re-
port on River Dredging, all cargo 
(tonnage) would grow at a CAGR of 
0.9% (which is half the projected rate 
for cargo nationwide).  The container 
segment would grow at a CAGR of 
4.4% (in line with U.S. projected 
container growth). 
Scenario 2: “Increased Market 
Share.” Between 2005 and 2020 the 
Delaware River ports group will cap-
ture an additional percentage point of 
the non-petroleum trade (from 5.5% 
to 6.5% of the U.S. short tons). 
Scenario 3: “Diminished Mar-
ket Share.” Similar definition to sce-
nario 2 except between 2005 and 
2020 this group of ports will forfeit a 
percentage point in the U.S. short tons 
handled (from 5.5% down to 4.5%).  
Petroleum trade is unaffected. 
Excerpts 
The following perspectives were 
shared regarding how specific aspects 
of waterborne trade along the Dela-
ware River (affecting the Ports of 
Philadelphia, South Jersey, and Wil-
mington) influence the likelihood of 
these three possible future growth sce-
narios.  At the close of the discussion, 
the panelists were asked which (if any) 
scenario seemed most plausible for 
Delaware River ports and to suggest 
any additional macro (global) influ-
ences that need to be taken into ac-
count when envisioning the growth 
trajectory for these ports. 
⇒ Issue 1: While the above scenarios are to 
motivate a discussion about future levels 
of container and bulk cargo that can be 
attracted to Delaware River ports, the 
river historically has played and will 
continue to play a vital role in receiving 
crude petroleum shipments at private 
terminals.  Comment on how this traffic 
may change over the next 15 years. 
Kumar: U.S. consumption patterns 
will change as oil prices remain high.  
There will be a growth in consumption 
of LNG.  The Delaware River ports 
should therefore expect to maintain 
their share of the petroleum trade but 
not grow it. 
Fitzroy: The CAGR of the Dela-
ware River ports’ petroleum trade are 
near an all-time high. Would only envi-
sion a larger market share if more re-
fining capacity were added in the re-
gion, and that seems unlikely.  What is 
likely to change, however, is where 
crude petroleum shipments will origi-
nate from.  Philadelphia will see more 
liquid tankers arriving from the African 
continent and from South America. 
Another issue to watch is how suc-
cessfully ethanol (corn or sugar based) 
will be in substituting for petroleum.  
If there isn’t ample domestic imports, 
then conceivably the river could see 
liquid bulk ethanol shipments.  This 
current raises storage concerns. 
Ogard: Expect different trade pat-
terns to emerge for the Philadelphia oil 
terminals. 
⇒ Issue 2: The future for bulk and break-
bulk for Delaware River ports 
Kumar: The Port of Philadelphia 
will retain its competitive position in 
this cargo segment.  The commodities 
include beef from Australia and South 
America, forest-products, wood pulp 
and flowers.  It will present a stable 
business segment but not a growth 
segment in part since containerization 
is still on-going and some break-bulk 
cargo will convert to container ship-
ments. 
Fitzroy. Regarding break-bulk, steel 
manufacturing spurred by foreign di-
rect investment from Russia and India 
for integrated and mini mills here in 
the U.S. will create increased ship-
ments for the Port of Philadelphia and 
other East Coast ports which can serve 
midwest and southeast U.S. markets. 
So competition (from Hampton 
Roads, Savannah, Baltimore) will be 
present and Philadelphia should pre-
pare by leveraging its existing steel rela-
tionships and build capacity. Part of 
this potential is driven by steel mills 
looking to reduce the rising transport 
costs over the road (with land bridg-
ing) and looking more at unladening at 
East Coast ports.  Steel shipments are 
a likely factor for scenarios 1 or 2. 
Possible vulnerability in the break-
bulk segment is lumber shipments due 
to the housing slump.  Once housing 
investment re-starts, the additions will 
likely  be for a different housing unit 
concept. Sees a shift towards multi-unit 
which uses many non-wood compo-
nents. 
Ogard: As ports are forced to focus 
on specific market segment to survive, 
the projected growth in international 
container trade will cause some ports 
to shed their bulk and break-bulk busi-
ness.  There is an opportunity for the 
Delaware River ports to concentrate 
further on their existing competitive 
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position in this cargo segment.  It is 
very difficult to balance growing seg-
ments since they make different port 
utilization demands. 
⇒ Issue 3: The future for refrigerated con-
tainers vs. other containers for Delaware 
River ports 
Kumar: Beef (Australia) and fruit 
(South America) shipments will remain 
strong and underpin scenario 1.  
Fitzroy: Wilmington serves as an 
important niche in reefer cargo in 
terms of markets served and custom-
ers.  It will play a moderate positive 
role in underpinning scenario 1.  Port 
of Philadelphia is vulnerable with re-
spect to non-reefer containers as many 
ocean carriers are closely managing 
unit costs given vessel size optimiza-
tion and achieving economies of rota-
tion.  The outcome may be that Phila-
delphia is bypassed in container seg-
ments for which Philadelphia doesn’t 
currently exhibit a competitive posi-
tion. Port of NY/NJ sees the most 
calls from the largest vessels on the 
East Coast, and those vessels typically 
serve Baltimore and Hampton Roads 
on the same string of calls.  The chan-
nel depth requirements are onerous for 
Delaware River port facilities if they 
continue to pursue the lure of larger 
vessels. 
The plus for Delaware River ports 
is their strength in the local market 
served. This must be maintained to 
serve as a stabilizer for facility per-
formance in the future.  Reefer cargo 
will maintain its share, while other con-
tainer cargo will be under pressure. 
Ogard: The re-building of reefer 
capacity in the Gulf post-Katrina has 
been state-of-the art facilities, and 
these locations have a deep reach into 
the midwest. The Port of Philadelphia 
fortunately has a good catchment area 
in the New England market.  Competi-
tion is rising as NYC is underway with 
railroad improvements; Hampton 
Roads is adding new container capac-
ity. As mentioned back in the first 
panel discussion (August 2007), lack of 
a North Asian service is a weakness for 
Philadelphia. 
One other limitation to container 
growth for Philadelphia is that gaps 
exist in the inland rail network depend-
ing on how far goods need to move 
once unladen at Philadelphia.  Pilot 
demonstration projects are being 
fielded for container-on-barge but no 
current proposal includes Philadelphia. 
⇒ Issue 4: Markets and products that 
promise growth for Delaware River ports 
Kumar: Linking the hinterland will 
be a key driver for the ports.  The sus-
tained decline of the U.S. dollar is in-
creasing the demand for U.S. exports.  
Expects less growth from the local 
market served. 
Fitzroy: The local market will be 
demanding building materials.  Hinter-
lands have some potential but are con-
tested – Wilmington for reefers, land-
side infrastructure, slated improve-
ments at competitor ports, priorities 
and privatization all play a role in how 
the hinterland business is awarded. 
Private steel operations are guaranteed 
business for Philadelphia but will need 
to have storage issues addressed (both 
open & closed warehouses) and some 
rail connections established. 
Ogard: Exchange rates will definitely 
affect trading partners and flows and 
so will port improvements that come 
online.  Expects a resurgence of U.S. 
exports to Europe, some of it manu-
factured goods that will move in con-
tainers. Some of these containers ar-
rived at West Coast ports and would 
have traveled back empty across the 
Pacific.  Instead they move inland, are 
filled with manufacturers form the mid
-West and will export to Europe off 
the East Coast. Without an already 
established container position it is hard 
to see the windfall for Philadelphia. 
Foreign Trade Zones have had good 
success statewide with pharmaceuticals 
and small manufacturing. 
⇒ Issue 5: Delaware River ports’ ability to 
play a role in port diversification strate-
gies of shippers/consignees or carriers 
Kumar: Hard to say of there is an 
opportunity here. Ports must re-
package themselves to portray they are 
key player in the supply chain for spe-
cific goods. 
Fitzroy: Market efficiency and ca-
pacity are the most compelling factors 
for being selected on the carrier’s rota-
tion.  Carriers want to see a separate 
treatment for importers and exporters.  
Economies of scale are key to the car-
rier. Baltimore and Savannah have 
these, and they have been the winners 
with carriers. 
Ogard: The economics of vessel 
strings, markets served (rail bottlenecks 
at a port and gateway cities), as well as 
the economic outlook of the trading 
partners are all involved in determining 
whether Delaware River ports would 
be chosen in a port diversification 
strategy.  Volume and capacity at other 
locations may determine some oppor-
tunity. Pending resolution of labor 
issues on both West and East Coasts 
may also influence port diversification. 
⇒ Issue 6: Factors in the relative cost com-
petitiveness of Delaware River ports 
Kumar: While relative cost of the 
port is important it is not the main 
influencer in attracting shipments. Reli-
ability is the driver whereby vessel 
turnaround time and seamless intermo-
dal connections are what matter most.  
This assumes that the port’s cost struc-
ture is not grossly out of line. 
Fitzroy: If Delaware River ports 
build on concentrating their current 
customer cargo (affording them stabil-
ity), then based on current cost pa-
rameters, there is a favorable trajectory.  
Business growth is more complicated 
than just the on-port cost.  Gross in-
vestment in freight infrastructure plays 
a big role. 
Ogard: The channel deepening to 45 
feet is a plus, but there are corridor 
issues. The future will depend on iden-
tifying the corridors that can lead to 
key gateway cities, or link to new ware-
house centers (Lehigh, Chambersburg, 
Harrisburg).  Philadelphia is addressing 
highway infrastructure improvements 
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and the Liberty Corridor has been 
funded to remove clearance issues. 
A supply chain manager examines 
the entire ocean-highway and/or rail 
transit.  They look for a carrier that can 
offer that seamlessly and consider the 
cost and time involved. 
⇒ Issue 7: How Delaware River ports 
should position themselves as they look to 
the future 
Kumar: Each port should focus on a 
specialty. Coordination through politi-
cal collaboration or port unification 
should be looked at (again) seriously. 
Fitzroy: The most successful re-
gional ports have evolved into joint 
marketing entities and are realizing 
economies of scale as a result.  This 
mirrors the trend among carriers.  
Large carriers want to negotiate with 
large port complexes.  Smaller individ-
ual ports can not leverage the same 
bargaining assets.  Internal competition 
along the river can be viewed as non-
productive. 
Ogard: When  viewed as a multi-
jurisdiction planning issue, three states 
present a challenge for coordination, 
but it is not impossible.  Freight will 
flow to the path with least resistance 
(cost effective and smooth reliable 
intermodal movements). All this pre-
sents challenges for a small facility. 
⇒ Issue 8: The role of carrier commitments 
Kumar. The Panama Canal widen-
ing completion in 2014 and the South 
Asian stimulus will contribute to more 
traffic to the East Coast. This traffic 
will typically involve vessels of 12,000 
TEUs as the worldwide fleet is shifting 
into larger vessels. Despite the 45-foot 
channel deepening, there will remain 
depth limitations and the geographic 
limitation of position up river. 
Fitzroy: Continued consolidation 
among carriers will make container 
growth for Philadelphia difficult to 
achieve.  The Suez route of Hong 
Kong to Philadelphia could begin to 
look more attractive, but vessel size 
and the order of ports of call will dis-
advantage Philadelphia.  Channel deep-
ening is necessary but not sufficient.  
These challenges could be somewhat 
mitigated with a unified strategy be-
tween Philadelphia, South Jersey, and 
Wilmington. 
Ogard. First movers on capacity 
enhancements will have an advantage 
over Philadelphia. Possible opportuni-
ties exist through offering support/
feeder services to large vessels calling 
elsewhere on the East Coast. 
⇒ Issue 9: Role for regional intermodal 
initiatives 
Fitzroy: These will become relevant 
for the long-haul move (1-2 day mar-
ket).  These are typically arranged be-
tween the carrier and the consignee.  
Baltimore, Hampton Roads and Port 
of New York/New Jersey are also 
competitive depending on the specific 
commodity.  Increasing fuel costs will 
tend to favor rail move instead of long-
haul truck. 
Ogard: Double stack long-haul rail 
ideally travels 700-1,000 miles before 
the first stop.  Philadelphia (CSX) has 
some rail issues to remedy in terms of 
ease of moving westward from port.  
The port currently does not have the 
volume to justify investment in high 
cube stack services in the near future 
but other competitor ports are already 
underway. 
Intermodal connections – getting 
from port to highway – issues of spot 
congestion and grade separations –
fixable.  Philadelphia has a highway 
network with good connections to 
warehousing districts (Lehigh Valley, 
Chambersburg, Harrisburg) and a 
straight path (one-day drive) to Colum-
bus, Ohio. Also has possibly the fastest 
and most cost effective move for high 
value cargo to the midwest. But not 
being a first port-of-call will limit up-
side.   Best market opportunity reached 
through intermodal is likely the North 
East corridor.  Limited market oppor-
tunity in the midwest. 
⇒ Issue 10: Implications for port capacity 
additions 
Kumar: Should promote through 
public-private investments between 
Operator-Carriers-Shippers. 
Fitzroy: Private money is key. Pick 
specific commodity carefully to de-
velop the capacity around. Locate the 
investments appropriately. Large 
amounts of public money invested are 
best in large economies of scale con-
text. 
Ogard: Focus on a market niche, 
secure commitments and work with 
the customer to build the investment. 
⇒ Issue 11:  What else may influence the 
future for Delaware River ports 
Ogard: Recent AASHTO publica-
tion shows a long-term railroad infra-
structure shortfall despite $8 billion of 
planned improvements. The 2008 elec-
tion may change policy towards trans-
portation and freight but it is an un-
known right now.  The role of fuel 
surcharges is shifting the truck-rail mix 
to move freight to/from the inland.  
Ocean carrier rationalization will dic-
tate where the winner ports are; it will 
be those that can assemble point-to-
point business for the railroad.  Hard 
to see a strong advantage for Philadel-
phia with the inland double-stack ser-
vice.  Lastly, the TWIC daily imple-
mentation official as of January 2008 
may likely pose a process bottleneck. 
⇒ Issue 12: Most probable outlook for the 
Delaware River ports 
Kumar: Would caution that the base 
case is overly ambitious when viewed 
on current market conditions.  Port 
operators are reexamining their recent 
forecasts again. 
Fitzroy. Believes it is unlikely that 
the Delaware River ports will be able 
to keep pace with the assumed growth 
for U.S. ports.  The base case is too 
optimistic for containers and so is sce-
nario 2.  Forecasts from 1 year ago are 
being reworked.   Bulk will likely re-
main the opportunity for these ports. 
Scenario likelihood: #1 – 45%, #2 – 
15%, and #3 – 30% (including liquid 
bulk component). 
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APPENDIX F: PORT PROFILES 
Appendix F: Port Profiles 
Philadelphia Regional Port Authority 
Facility Operator 
2006 
Vessel 
Calls 
Specialized  
Cargoes 
Terminal 
Area Berths Warehouse & Storage 
Landside  
Connection 
Packer Avenue 
Marine Terminal 
(Columbus Blvd. at 
Packer Ave.) 
Greenwich 
Terminals, 
LLC 
363 
Containers, steel 
products, frozen 
meat, fruit, heavy lift, 
project, paper 
112 acres 
45 sq. hec-
tares (ha.) 
6 berths -
3,800 lin-
ear ft.; 1 
Ro/Ro 
1 dry/heated - 100,000 sq. ft. 
1 dry - 90,000 sq. ft 
1 dry - 100,000 sq. ft 
1 reefer - 2,200,000 cu. ft. 
Highway: I-95 
& I-76 within 
0.5 mi.; Rail: 
CP, CSX, NS 
Tioga Marine  
Terminal 
(Delaware Ave. at 
Tioga St.) 
Delaware 
River Steve-
dores, Inc. 
95 
Containers, fresh 
fruit, paper, plywood, 
cocoa beans, autos, 
palletized, project, 
breakbulk, & steel 
116 acres 
47 sq. ha. 
6 berths - 
3,822 lin-
ear ft.; 1 
Ro/Ro 
1 compartment. refeer/heated - 
300,000 sq. ft.  
1 cold storage - 90,000 sq. ft. 
1 heated storage - 97,500 sq. ft. 
1 dry - 40,000 sq. ft. 
1 dry - 107,000 sq. ft. 
Highway: 
Close to I-95; 
Rail: CP, 
CSX, NS 
Piers 78/80 
(Columbus Blvd. at 
Snyder St.) 
Penn Ware-
housing 
Distribution 
60 
Newsprint, coated 
paper, wood pulp, 
other forest products 
44.4 acres 
18 sq. ha. 
4 berths - 
3,892 lin-
ear ft.; 2 
Ro/Ro 
Pier 74 Annex: 115,000 sq. ft. 
Pier 78: 1 dry - 364,000 sq. ft. 
78 Annex: 1 dry - 208,000 sq. ft. 
Pier 80: 1 dry - 456,000 sq. ft.; 
80 Annex: 1 dry - 125,000 sq. ft. 
Highway: 
Close to I-95 
& I-76; Rail: 
CP, CSX, NS 
Pier 82  
(Columbus Blvd. at 
Oregon Ave. & 
Jackson St.) 
Horizon 
Stevedoring 39 
Fruits & vegetables, 
break bulk, project, 
paper 
13.3 acres 
5.4 sq. ha. 
2 berths - 
1,994 lin-
ear ft. 
1 heated chilled - 130,000 
chilled sq. ft. (with humidification 
system) 
Highway: 
Close to I-95 
& I-76; Rail: 
CP, CSX, NS 
Piers 38/40 
(Columbus Blvd. at 
Christian St.) 
Penn Ware-
housing & 
Distribution 
23 
Newsprint, coated 
paper, wood pulp, 
other forest products 
12 acres 
4.9 sq. ha. 
3 berths - 
1,721 lin-
ear ft. 
2 dry - each 180,000 sq. ft.  
Pier 40 - 1st floor heated and 
humidification system 
Highway: 
Close to I-95 
& I-76; Rail: 
CP, CSX, NS 
Pier 84  
(Columbus Blvd. at 
Jackson St.) 
Dependable 
Distribution 
Services 
22 
Cocoa beans & 
other cocoa prod-
ucts 
13.9 acres 
5.6 sq. ha. 
1 berth - 
855 linear 
ft. 
1 dry - 500,000 sq. ft. 
1 dry - 40,000 sq. ft. 
Highway: 
Close to I-95 
& I-76; Rail: 
CP, CSX, NS 
Pier 96 & 98 Annex 
(Columbus Blvd. at 
Oregon Ave.) 
Pasha Auto 
Warehous-
ing, Inc. 
n/a 
Automobiles, pro-
ject, heavy equip-
ment 
Pier 96:  
9.7 acres 
3.9 sq. ha. 
98 Annex: 
45.2 acres 
18.3 sq. ha. 
2 berths - 
2,640 lin-
ear ft. 
Auto-washing system - 15,000 
sq. ft. 
Service building - 80,000 sq. ft. 
Highway: 
Immediate 
access to I-95 
& I-76; Rail: 
CP, CSX, NS 
55 
South Jersey Port Corporation 
Facility Operator 
2006 
Vessel 
Calls 
Specialized 
Cargoes 
Terminal 
Area Berths Warehouse & Storage 
Landside  
Connection 
Beckett Street  
Terminal 
(Beckett St. at Sec-
ond St., Camden) 
South Jersey 
Port Corpo-
ration 
154 
Cocoa beans, wood, 
scrap metal, steel, 
wood products, iron 
ore, pyrite, & salt 
125 acres 
50.9 sq. ha. 
4 berths - 
2,655 lin-
ear ft. 
19 dry - 1,110,000 sq. ft. total 
Highway: 
Access to I-
676, I-76, US 
130, & I-295; 
Rail: CP, CSX, 
NS 
Broadway  
Produce Terminal 
(2500 Broadway, 
Camden) 
Del Monte 
Fresh Pro-
duce N.A., 
Inc. 
65 
Bananas, pineap-
ples, & other perish-
ables 
28 acres 
11.3 sq. ha. 
1 berth - 
1,135 lin-
ear ft. 
3 temperature-controlled -  
Total 210,600 sq. ft. 
1 dry - 25,000 sq. ft. 
Highway: 
Access to I-
676, I-76, US 
130, & I-295; 
Rail: CP, CSX, 
NS 
Broadway  
Terminal 
(Broadway at Mor-
gan Blvd., Camden) 
South Jersey 
Port Corpo-
ration 
34 
Furnace slag, ce-
ment, steel, wood 
products, dolomite, 
salt, cocoa beans, & 
other perishables 
180 acres 
72.8 sq. ha. 
2 berths - 
2,000 lin-
ear ft. 
29 dry - 1,100,000 sq. ft. total 
Highway: 
Access to I-
676, I-76, US 
130, & I-295; 
Rail: CP, CSX, 
NS 
Port of Salem 
(Exit 1, NJ Turn-
pike, Salem) 
South Jersey 
Port Corpo-
ration 
n/a 
Wearing apparel, 
finishing apparel, 
autos, food products, 
sand, & gravel 
22 acres 
8.9 sq. ha. 
1 berth - 
350 linear 
ft. 
Shed & warehouse space - 
80,000 sq. ft. 
Highway: 
Direct access 
to US 45 and 
US 49, with 
access to US 
130, I-295, & 
NJ Turnpike 
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Diamond State Port Corporation 
Facility Operator 
2006 
Vessel 
Calls 
Specialized  
Cargoes 
Terminal 
Area Berths Warehouse & Storage 
Landside  
Connection 
Port of Wilmington 
(Hausel Rd., Wil-
mington) 
Diamond 
State Port 
Corporation 
399 
Containers, autos, 
fruit, juice, meat, 
paper, salt, & steel 
308 acres 
124 sq. ha. 
7 berths - 
general 
cargo; 1 
tanker; 1 
floating; 1 
Ro/Ro 
6 warehouses - chilled & freezer 
storage - 800,000 sq. ft. total 
Controlled atmosphere capabil-
ity - 16,000 sq. ft. total 
Highway: 
Access to I-
95; 
Rail: CSX, NS 
Major Privately Owned Facilities 
Facility Operator 
2006 
Vessel 
Calls 
Specialized 
Cargoes 
Terminal 
Area Berths Warehouse & Storage 
Landside  
Connection 
Penn Terminal 
(Saville Rd., Ed-
dystone, PA) 
Penn Termi-
nals 253 
Containers, fruit, 
autos, clothes, & 
project 
71.4 acres 
28.9 sq. ha. 
1 berth - 
1,150 lin-
ear ft. 
Warehousing capacity - 300,000 
sq. ft. 
Highway: 
Access to I-
95, I-476, & 
NJ Turnpike 
Gloucester Marine 
Terminal 
(King St., Glouces-
ter, NJ) 
Greenwich 
Terminals, 
LLC 
187 
Containers, steel, 
frozen meat, fruit, 
heavy lift, & project 
150 acres 
60.8 sq. ha. 
5 berths - 
2,600 lin-
ear ft. 
11 dry/heated - 1,200,000 sq. ft. 
11 reefer/frozen -  5,090,000 cu. 
ft. 
Highway: 
Access to I-
676, I-76, I-
295, & NJ 
Turnpike 
Fairless Hills 
(Sinter Rd., Fairless 
Hills, PA) 
Kinder  
Morgan 94 Steel 
100 acres 
40.5 sq. ha. 
3 berths - 
2,200 lin-
ear ft. 
Warehousing capacity - 208,000 
sq. ft. 
Highway: 
Access to I-
95, PA Turn-
pike, & NJ 
Turnpike 
Rail: CSX & 
NS 
Other Privately Owned Facilities 
Facility Owner/Operator 
2006 
Vessel 
Calls 
Specialized 
Cargoes 
Kinder Morgan Liquid Terminal (Delaware Ave. at Allegheny Ave., Phila.) Kinder Morgan 58 Chemical 
Bermuda International (Tilbury Rd., Salem, NJ) Bermuda International Mid-Atlantic 49 Containers 
Grows Terminal (New Ford Mill Rd., Fairless Hills, PA) Grows Waste Management 30 Salt & Gravel 
Oceanport (Claymont, DE) Oceanport Industries, Inc. 15 Salt 
National Gypsum (River Rd., Burlington, NJ) National Gypsum Company 14 Gypsum 
Riverside (Newbold Rd., Fairless Hills, PA) Riverside Construction Materials, Inc. 13 Cement 
Georgia Pacific (South Front St., Camden, NJ) Georgia Pacific Gypsum 9 Gypsum 
Oil Refineries 
Facility Owner/Operator 
2006 
Vessel 
Calls 
Delaware City (Wrangle Hill Rd., Delaware City, DE) Valero, Inc. 231 
Eagle Point (US 130 & I-295, Westville, NJ) Sunoco, Inc. 189 
Fort Mifflin (Fort Mifflin, Phila.) Sunoco, Inc. 180 
Marcus Hook (Delaware Ave. at Green St., Marcus Hook, PA) Sunoco, Inc. 166 
Paulsboro (Billingsport Rd., Paulsboro, NJ) Valero Refining Co. of New Jersey 151 
Trainers (Post Rd., Trainer, PA) ConocoPhillips, Inc. 85 
Citgo Paulsboro (Paradise Rd., Paulsboro, NJ) Citgo Asphalt Refining 68 
Hess Delair (Derousse Ave., Pennsauken, NJ) Amerada Hess Corporation 58 
Pacific Atlantic Terminal (3rd St. at Billingsport Rd., Paulsboro, NJ) ST Services 56 
H. Port Richmond (E. Allegheny Ave., Phila.) Westway Terminals, Inc. 42 
Girard Point (Girard Point, Phila.) Sunoco, Inc. 40 
Hog Island (Hog Island, Phila.) Sunoco, Inc. 16 
Wilmington Oil Pier (Christiana Ave., Wilmington, DE) Magellan Midstream Partners 10 
PECO Coal Terminal (Essington, PA) PECO 7 
Koch Fuels (Gloucester City, NJ) Koch Fuels 4 
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Appendix G: Additional Data 
Rankings of U.S. Ports by Tonnage, 2005 
Imports Exports 
Rank Port Short Tons Rank Port Short Tons 
1 Houston, TX 103,189,879 1 South Louisiana, LA 51,083,963 
2 New York/New Jersey 76,566,928 2 Houston, TX 41,860,694 
3 Beaumont, TX 55,505,173 3 Virginia Ports/Hampton Roads, VA 24,417,636 
4 Corpus Christi, TX 45,418,170 4 Long Beach, CA 18,808,002 
5 Long Beach, CA 44,492,991 5 Duluth-Superior, MN and WI 13,951,792 
6 South Louisiana, LA 43,489,700 6 Tacoma, WA 13,014,877 
7 Texas City, TX 38,005,188 7 Los Angeles, CA 12,932,048 
8 Los Angeles, CA 33,994,001 8 Portland, OR 11,945,116 
9 Portland, ME 28,038,852 9 New Orleans, LA 11,826,683 
10 Lake Charles, LA 27,083,364 10 New York/New Jersey 11,231,712 
11 Philadelphia, PA 25,914,744 11 Seattle, WA 10,507,096 
12 Freeport, TX 25,415,676 12 Mobile, AL 10,151,874 
13 Baltimore, MD 21,507,392 13 Savannah, GA 10,084,137 
14 New Orleans, LA 21,251,947 14 Kalama, WA 8,809,228 
15 Mobile, AL 21,224,217 15 Corpus Christi, TX 8,390,095 
16 Savannah, GA 18,216,211 16 Tampa, FL 8,270,965 
17 Paulsboro, NJ 18,133,852 17 Plaquemines, LA 7,914,170 
18 Baton Rouge, LA 17,585,231 18 Oakland, CA 7,113,612 
19 Pascagoula, MS 16,542,106 19 Baltimore, MD 6,727,261 
20 Charleston, SC 15,560,101 20 Charleston, SC 6,314,453 
21 Boston, MA 14,090,568 21 Texas City, TX 5,462,230 
22 Port Arthur, TX 12,992,497 22 Port Arthur, TX 5,060,308 
23 Tampa, FL 11,838,306 23 Lake Charles, LA 5,022,731 
24 Port Everglades, FL 11,566,543 24 Baton Rouge, LA 4,819,554 
25 Jacksonville, FL 10,962,641 25 Beaumont, TX 4,597,105 
26 Seattle, WA 10,476,388 26 Ashtabula, OH 4,319,057 
27 Richmond, CA 9,991,591 27 Presque Isle, MI 3,373,239 
28 Virginia Ports, VA 9,862,698 28 Pascagoula, MS 3,352,099 
29 Marcus Hook, PA 9,570,380 29 Vancouver, WA 3,227,795 
30 Plaquemines, LA 8,039,242 30 Longview, WA 3,204,802 
31 Tacoma, WA 7,658,776 31 Conneaut, OH 3,165,069 
32 Port Lavaca/Point Comfort, TX 7,358,387 32 Freeport, TX 3,029,744 
33 Wilmington, DE 6,896,449 33 Miami, FL 2,834,117 
34 Oakland, CA 6,357,517 34 Toledo, OH 2,752,376 
35 Honolulu, HI 6,220,219 35 Nikishka, AK 2,703,823 
36 Providence, RI 5,795,456 36 Galveston, TX 2,654,586 
37 San Juan, PR 5,791,386 37 Port Everglades, FL 2,654,147 
38 Miami, FL 5,000,574 38 Port Lavaca/Point Comfort, TX 1,872,184 
39 Toledo, OH 4,847,786 39 Richmond, CA 1,744,862 
40 Camden-Gloucester, NJ 4,742,854 40 Sandusky, OH 1,714,235 
41 Portland, OR 4,410,840 41 Jacksonville, FL 1,546,678 
42 Portsmouth, NH 4,285,676 42 Chicago, IL 1,500,501 
43 Detroit, MI 4,120,212 43 Coos Bay, OR 1,440,917 
44 Wilmington, NC 3,989,349 44 Kivilina, AK 1,381,126 
45 Port Canaveral, FL 3,604,931 45 Palm Beach, FL 1,144,665 
46 Cleveland, OH 3,137,262 46 Boston, MA 1,068,296 
47 New Castle, DE 3,056,252 47 Morehead City, NC 1,021,929 
48 Brownsville, FL 2,935,438 48 Anacortes, WA 995,410 
49 Port Manatee, FL 2,931,318 49 Port Manatee, FL 930,651 
50 New Haven, CT 2,783,030 50 Wilmington, NC 912,924 
(Continued on next page) 
57 
 Rankings of U.S. Ports by Tonnage, 2005 
Imports 
Rank Port Short Tons Rank Port Short Tons 
51 San Diego, CA 2,552,817 51 Calcite, MI 899,856 
52 Ponce, PR 2,280,006 52 Grays Harbor, WA 839,018 
53 Barbers Point, Oahu, HI 2,192,235 53 Port Dolomite, MI 734,139 
54 Penn Manor, PA 2,175,149 54 Gulfport, MS 687,240 
55 Anacortes, WA 2,174,164 55 Brunswick, GA 672,140 
56 Stockton, CA 1,904,034 56 Stockton, CA 667,849 
57 Fall River, MA 1,889,507 57 Port Inland, MI 611,367 
58 Bridgeport, CT 1,854,093 58 Burns Waterway Harbor, IN 591,894 
59 Searsport, ME 1,705,823 59 Marblehead, OH 568,744 
60 San Francisco, CA 1,667,908 60 Camden-Gloucester, NJ 545,293 
61 Burns Waterway Harbor, IN 1,597,349 61 San Juan, PR 520,706 
62 Brunswick, GA 1,563,859 62 Everett, WA 495,718 
63 Port Hueneme, CA 1,375,792 63 Anchorage, AK 467,520 
64 Morehead City, NC 1,282,428 64 Honolulu, HI 460,701 
65 Chicago, IL 1,245,876 65 Brownsville, TX 420,287 
66 Chester, PA 1,243,599 66 Chester, PA 400,092 
67 Palm Beach, FL 1,193,852 67 Wilmington, DE 381,567 
68 Milwaukee, WI 1,099,300 68 Fairport Harbor, OH 359,250 
69 Vancouver, WA 1,064,786 69 Panama City, FL 346,551 
70 Salem, MA 1,044,597 70 Philadelphia, PA 322,702 
Source: American Association of Port Authorities. 
Notes: Tonnage is for foreign trade only. 
Exports 
(Continued from previous page) 
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Rankings of U.S. Ports by Value of Goods, 2005 
Imports Exports 
Rank Port Dollars Rank Port Dollars 
1 Los Angeles, CA 199,642,517,489 1 Houston, TX 41,934,379,555 
2 Newark, NJ 100,835,454,909 2 Los Angeles, CA 26,264,621,637 
3 Houston, TX 61,027,767,704 3 New York, NY 26,218,253,329 
4 Long Beach, CA 57,661,560,859 4 Long Beach, CA 21,615,283,322 
5 Charleston, SC 39,097,702,980 5 Norfolk, VA 16,595,053,349 
6 Philadelphia, PA 29,462,379,151 6 Charleston, SC 16,101,460,266 
7 Seattle, WA 27,906,668,169 7 New Orleans, LA 15,232,446,605 
8 Norfolk, VA 27,226,542,494 8 Savannah, GA 13,703,056,423 
9 Baltimore, MD 27,105,718,036 9 Oakland, CA 9,785,999,732 
10 Tacoma, WA 26,911,757,293 10 Baltimore, MD 9,599,931,056 
11 Savannah, GA 25,967,964,985 11 Miami, FL 9,413,624,905 
12 Morgan City, LA 25,399,358,026 12 Seattle, WA 8,610,941,883 
13 Oakland, CA 24,607,011,089 13 Jacksonville, FL 8,151,596,185 
14 New Orleans, LA 18,467,400,418 14 Pt. Everglades, FL 7,570,159,382 
15 Port Arthur, TX 15,713,257,491 15 Newark, NJ 6,945,122,058 
16 Corpus Christi, TX 15,490,616,223 16 Tacoma, WA 4,973,481,293 
17 Jacksonville, FL 12,471,747,504 17 Gramercy, LA 3,607,888,988 
18 New York, NY 11,521,083,027 18 Corpus Christi, TX 3,282,648,360 
19 Portland, OR 11,486,029,187 19 Detroit, MI 3,259,974,703 
20 Miami, FL 11,469,886,241 20 Anchorage, AK 2,816,065,593 
21 Pt. Everglades, FL 10,410,717,153 21 Portland, OR 2,555,628,178 
22 Texas City, TX 10,129,026,843 22 Philadelphia, PA 2,430,517,679 
23 Christiansted, Virgin Islands 10,100,103,974 23 Texas City, TX 2,297,503,047 
24 Lake Charles, LA 9,374,219,400 24 Wilmington, DE 2,175,543,116 
25 Beaumont, TX 9,013,516,806 25 Norfolk/Mobile/Charleston 1,988,681,398 
26 Freeport, TX 8,742,964,843 26 Tampa, FL 1,954,990,969 
27 Boston, MA 7,921,249,597 27 Baton Rouge, LA 1,894,212,777 
28 Port Hueneme, CA 7,273,092,554 28 Beaumont, TX 1,841,535,908 
29 Gramercy, LA 7,146,872,453 29 Mobile, AL 1,720,115,827 
30 San Diego, CA 6,964,608,381 30 Pascagoula, MS 1,627,875,033 
31 Pascagoula, MS 6,949,396,144 31 San Juan, PR 1,614,841,751 
32 Baton Rouge, LA 6,870,916,666 32 Chester, PA 1,594,532,247 
33 Mobile, AL 6,440,936,114 33 Freeport, TX 1,552,170,482 
34 Richmond, CA 5,931,786,701 34 Wilmington, NC 1,357,231,895 
35 Chester, PA 5,684,957,894 35 Boston, MA 1,292,834,383 
36 Brunswick, GA 5,531,070,484 36 Kalama, WA 1,260,132,956 
37 Wilmington, DE 5,499,289,565 37 Port Huron, MI 1,216,838,133 
38 Providence, RI 5,269,111,207 38 West Palm Beach, FL 1,176,090,644 
39 El Segundo, CA 4,961,753,258 39 Lake Charles, LA 1,144,648,129 
40 San Juan, PR 4,837,450,824 40 Port Arthur, TX 1,129,938,104 
41 Honolulu, HI 4,292,762,495 41 Galveston, TX 1,096,490,279 
42 Panama City, FL 3,962,293,344 42 Vancouver, WA 1,081,813,469 
43 Galveston, TX 3,501,867,193 43 Brunswick, GA 1,026,293,932 
44 Perth Amboy, NJ 3,441,226,238 44 Gulfport, MS 922,507,705 
45 San Francisco, CA 2,935,301,630 45 San Francisco, CA 866,723,964 
46 Newport News, VA 2,486,968,631 46 Buffalo-Niagara Falls, NY 833,134,819 
47 Wilmington, NC 2,455,994,599 47 Newport News, VA 802,252,054 
48 Portland, ME 2,189,686,349 48 Panama City, FL 667,799,946 
49 Tampa, FL 2,156,839,891 49 Longview, WA 630,784,599 
50 Bellingham, WA 2,070,271,556 50 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 630,100,362 
51 New Haven, CT 1,859,660,073 51 Chicago, IL 591,617,977 
52 Gulfport, MS 1,518,840,565 52 Toledo-Sandusky, OH 525,819,320 
(Continued on next page) 
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Rankings of U.S. Ports by Value of Goods, 2005 
Imports Exports 
Rank Port Dollars Rank Port Dollars 
53 Humacao, PR 1,501,767,992 53 Champlain-Rouses Pt., NY 525,238,823 
54 Guayanilla, PR 1,406,400,483 54 Christiansted, Virgin Islands 443,056,944 
55 Chicago, IL 1,316,173,599 55 Everett, WA 404,875,614 
56 Vancouver, WA 1,237,656,495 56 Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 368,021,760 
57 Martinez, CA 1,046,283,847 57 Mayagues, PR 310,291,993 
58 Richmond-Petersburg, VA 1,011,247,855 58 Humacao, PR 304,237,111 
59 Detroit, MI 897,985,522 59 Honolulu, HI 292,724,785 
60 Everett, WA 851,056,822 60 Brownsville-Cameron, TX 291,104,448 
61 Anacortes, WA 834,682,942 61 Anacortes, WA 275,003,255 
62 Port Manatee 817,316,420 62 Morehead-Beaufort, NC 256,073,294 
63 West Palm Beach, FL 747,176,243 63 Fernandina, FL 246,625,301 
64 Portsmouth, NH 693,721,722 64 Perth Amboy, NJ 220,703,434 
65 Port Lavaca, TX 648,162,542 65 Eastport, ME 219,744,509 
66 Carquinez Strait, CA 641,877,538 66 Port Hueneme, CA 219,619,353 
67 Anchorage, AK 628,464,774 67 Port Lavaca, TX 214,629,905 
68 Searsport, ME 568,770,515 68 Blaine, WA 208,686,751 
69 San Joaquin River, CA 565,937,065 69 Guayanilla, PR 186,171,703 
70 Port Canaveral, FL 554,688,410 70 Marquette, MI 170,973,341 
71 Toledo-Sandusky, OH 507,168,379 71 Juneau, AK 162,165,865 
72 Cleveland, OH 506,408,171 72 Portsmouth, NH 155,509,546 
73 Morehead-Beaufort, NC 447,638,757 73 Bellingham, WA 154,378,774 
74 Mayagues, PR 408,757,782 74 Camden, NJ 149,968,973 
75 Brownsville-Cameron, TX 369,165,533 75 Albany, NY 142,437,075 
76 Stockton, CA 347,358,071 76 Morgan City, LA 132,807,662 
77 Good Hope, LA 270,017,958 77 Port Townsend, WA 129,516,603 
78 Kalama, WA 269,499,677 78 Aberdeen-Hoquiam, WA 115,533,791 
79 Paulsboro, NJ 255,203,257 79 Richmond, CA 114,233,947 
80 Crockett, CA 248,054,863 80 Port Manatee, FL 110,559,407 
81 Albany, NY 245,460,248 81 Port Canaveral, FL 109,175,706 
82 Milwaukee, WI 243,292,793 82 Fort Pierce, FL 92,589,652 
83 Oswego, NY 230,012,534 83 Providence, RI 92,154,050 
84 Ponce, PR 225,120,810 84 Paulsboro, NJ 88,580,455 
85 Bridgeport, CT 211,443,577 85 Stockton, CA 85,554,551 
86 Longview, WA 202,345,085 86 Sacramento, CA 85,534,998 
87 Port Huron, MI 152,273,688 87 Portland, ME 83,504,871 
88 Fernandina, FL 151,484,840 88 Ketchikan, AK 82,862,637 
89 Selby, CA 138,930,200 89 Coos Bay, OR 77,407,916 
90 Fall River, MA 138,819,889 90 Ponce, PR 73,505,901 
91 Jobos, PR 128,883,420 91 Milwaukee, WI 72,236,565 
92 Duluth-Superior, MN-WI 128,544,575 92 New Haven, CT 70,939,879 
93 Georgetown, SC 127,358,342 93 St. Rose, LA 70,747,918 
94 New London, CT 125,262,747 94 San Diego, CA 63,126,526 
95 Belfast, ME 119,742,120 95 Jobos, PR 52,863,916 
96 Olympia, WA 107,009,652 96 Gary, IN 51,225,502 
97 Marinette, WI 104,176,480 97 Sault Ste. Marie, MI 47,524,993 
98 Newport, RI 89,111,987 98 International Falls-Ranier, MN 41,437,596 
99 Memphis, TN 86,092,331 99 San Pablo Bay, CA 41,118,088 
100 Sacramento, CA 80,324,139 100 Georgetown, SC 32,563,377 
101 Green Bay, WI 78,359,561 101 Alexandria Bay, NY 28,447,201 
102 Ashtabula/Conneaut, OH 77,118,161 102 Memphis, TN 27,076,360 
103 Camden, NJ 67,409,025 103 Annapolis, MD 25,980,909 
Source: U.S. Census Foreign Trade Division.  
 Total-All Ports 971,141,080,593  Total-All Ports 307,553,120,715 
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Ports by North American Region 
Pacific 
Canadian  
Pacific 
U.S. Island  
Pacific 
U.S. North  
Pacific 
U.S. South  
Pacific 
Canadian  
Atlantic 
U.S. North  
Atlantic 
U.S. South  
Atlantic 
U.S.  
Gulf Coast 
Fraser Apra Anchorage Long Beach Halifax Albany Brunswick (GA) Beaumont 
Vancouver (BC) Barbers Point Everett Los Angeles Montreal Baltimore Canaveral Corpus Christi 
 Hilo Grays Harbor Oakland Saint John Boston Charleston Freeport 
 Honolulu Longview Richmond (CA) St. John’s Camden Fernandina Galveston 
 Hueneme Olympia San Diego Toronto Chester Jacksonville Greater Baton Rouge 
 Kahului Portland (OR) San Francisco  Hampton Roads Miami Gulfport 
 Haunakakai Seattle   New York/ New Jersey Palm Beach Houston 
 Kawaihae Tacoma   Philadelphia Ponce Lake Charles 
 Nawiliwili Vancouver (WA)   Portland (ME) 
Port  
Everglades Manatee 
     Portsmouth (NH) San Juan Mobile 
     Richmond (VA) Savannah New Orleans 
     Wilmington (DE) 
Wilmington 
(NC) Panama City 
       Saint Bernard 
       Tampa 
 
Atlantic 
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Mileage to Selected Inland Destinations 
 Philadelphia Norfolk Baltimore New York 
Buffalo, NY 357 542 357 370 
Chicago, IL 744 853 684 798 
Cleveland, OH 421 532 363 475 
Cincinnati, OH 568 585 499 661 
Columbus, OH 461 555 392 554 
Detroit, MI 578 687 518 632 
Indianapolis, IN 635 697 566 728 
Kansas City, MO 1126 1159 1057 1219 
Louisville, KY 668 647 599 761 
Memphis, TN 988 867 894 1092 
Twin Cities, MN 1146 1255 1086 1200 
Pittsburgh, PA 297 406 237 388 
St. Louis, MO 681 908 357 735 
Source: Maryland Port Administration, Mileage Chart. Available at: <http://www.mpa.state.md.us/location/index.htm>. 
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